Inspector General
United States Department *of* Defense

Evaluation of the DoD Safety Program

June 12, 2008
Report No. IE-2008-006

DoD Senior Leader Safety Survey

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

MISSION STATEMENT

The Office of the Inspector General promotes integrity, accountability, and improvement of Department of Defense personnel, programs and operations to support the Department's mission and to serve the public interest.

Senior Leader

Maj. Gen. John R. Vines, Commander Coalition Task Force 82, and Brig. Gen. C. William Fox, Deputy Chief Joint Staff 180, salute as the remains of an airman killed in action pass by them, during a ceremony held at Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan.

(U.S. Army photo by Sgt. 1st Class Milton H. Robinson)

Active Duty

Aviation Ordnanceman Airman Brian Miller of Cleveland, Ohio, assigned to the "Mighty Shrikes" of Strike Fighter Squadron Nine Four secures the fins on an AIM-7 Sea Sparrow missile attached to an F/A-18E Super Hornet on the flight deck of the nuclear powered aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN 68).

(U.S. Navy photo by Photographer's Mate 3rd Class Maebel Tinoko)

Civilian

A civilian construction worker removes a nail from a board during construction of a new cement security wall, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey.

(U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Matthew Hannen)

Guard & Reserve

Pfc. Melissa M. Telaak, from 1st Platoon, 164th Military Police Company, pulls convoy security duty in Kabul, Afghanistan.

(This photo appeared on www.army.mil)

NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL

MISSION STATEMENT

To educate, protect and influence society to adopt safety, health and environmental policies, practices and procedures that prevent and mitigate human suffering and economic losses.

Evaluation of the DoD Safety Program

Senior Leader Safety Survey Results
June 2008

Inspections & Evaluations
A Crystal Focus Review

VISION

We will evolve into the premier Inspections & Evaluations organization

MISSION

The Directorate of Inspections and Evaluations conducts objective and independent customer-focused management and program inspections addressing areas of interest to Congress and the Department of Defense, and provides timely findings and recommendations leading to positive changes in programs.

Purpose

On May 19, 2003, the Secretary of Defense instructed DoD senior leaders to reduce preventable accidents by 50 percent over a two-year period. That goal was subsequently revised in March 2004 to 75 percent by 2008. On August 9, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness requested this evaluation to assist DoD management develop strategies to improve the effectiveness of the DoD safety program and provide observations to help management reduce the Department's accident rate, as directed.

Methodology and Scope

This report presents an overview of the evaluation process and the results of the DoD senior leader safety survey. In April 2005, the Office of the Inspector General entered into a contract arrangement with the National Safety Council (NSC) to assist the evaluation team to develop, administer, and analyze two safety surveys – a senior leader safety survey, and a safety perception survey administered to three distinct populations: active duty military, civilian, and reserve component military. The latter NSC-designed survey was included as an element within the Defense Manpower Data Center annual personnel survey.

The senior leader survey was a Web-based survey sent to all flag officers and senior executive service members. The survey was designed to measure how DoD leaders viewed their role as safety advocates and to collect their opinions of the DoD safety program. This survey had 17 questions—12 multiple choice, 3 demographic, and 2 open-ended, write-ins. There were 1299 responses--a 48 percent response rate. There were over 1,000 write-in comments.

Survey Results

The survey results in this report establish a baseline for future perception surveys. The offices of the Secretary of Defense, Combatant Commanders, and Services should review these survey results and perform additional analyses to best support the objectives of their safety programs.

Overall, senior leaders had a positive perception of their safety program. Leader responses to questions concerning leadership sincerity and commitment to ensuring personnel safety were ranked among the highest of any organization in the National Safety Council database. Leader perceptions were significantly less positive concerning:

- adequacy of resources to manage and support safety-related programs;
- consideration of safety performance when rating personnel;
- cooperation across the Services on safety-related issues;
- acceptance that all accidents and mishaps are preventable;
- achievability of reducing the DoD accident and mishap rate by 50% over the next two years; and,
- adequacy of safety program representation in the budget process.

We concluded from the survey responses that DoD senior leaders understood the importance of safety, but they believed they were constrained from making systemic changes to the program.

INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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June 12, 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS

SUBJECT: Evaluation of the DoD Safety Program: Senior Leader Safety Survey Results (Project No. D-2005-DIP0E2-0051)

The Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General is providing this report for your information and use.

On May 19, 2003, the Secretary of Defense instructed DoD senior leaders to reduce preventable accidents by 50 percent over a two-year period. That goal was subsequently revised in March 2004 to 75 percent by 2008. On August 9, 2004, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness requested this evaluation to assist DoD management develop strategies to improve the effectiveness of the DoD safety program and provide recommendations to help management reduce the Department's accident rate, as directed.

Integral to the evaluation process was a series of perception surveys administered to four population groups—Senior Leaders, Active Duty, DoD Civilians, and Guard and Reserves.

This report describes the safety evaluation process and the results of the Senior Leader Safety Survey. There are no recommendations in this report. Instead, we summarized our conclusions from the survey results and offer our analysis to safety managers, stakeholders and decision makers. Using the constructive engagement technique, the contents of this report were briefed to and discussed with the DoD leaders, Defense Safety Oversight Council officials, Services' Centers of Excellence for safety, and Joint Staff and Combatant Command safety representatives.

We forwarded this report to the Audit Follow-up Directorate as required by DoD Directive 7650.3, "Follow-up on General Accounting Office (GAO), DoD Inspector General (DoD IG), and Internal Audit Reports," June 3, 2004. The report is posted on the DoD Inspector General Website at www.dodig.mil/Inspections/IE/Reports.htm. No management response is required. However, customer feedback is always welcome. E-mail comments to crystalfocus@dodig.mil.

Wm Brem Morrison, III
Assistant Inspector General
for Inspections and Evaluations

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1.1 Introduction

The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness (DUSD [R]) requested this evaluation of the Department of Defense (DoD) safety program. In support of the overall objective, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) surveyed personnel perceptions of the DoD safety program. The results of the survey are described in four separate documents:

Senior Leader Safety Survey (Report No. IE-2008-006)
Active Duty Safety Survey (Report No. IE-2008-007)
DoD Civilians Safety Survey (Report No. IE-2008-008)
Guard and Reserve Forces Safety Survey (Report No. IE-2008-009)

This report describesthe perceptions of DoD senior leaders in regard to safety responsibilities and performance in their organizations, as well as throughout DoD. In addition to the observations presented in this report, it is recommended the reader review the respondent comments tabulated in appendixes I and J.

1.2 Evaluation Purpose

The purpose of this evaluation was to assist DoD management with developing strategies to improve the effectiveness of the DoD safety program and reduce the Department's accident rate.

1.3 Historical Perspective—A Chronology of Significant Events

- October 2001: The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) sent the first of a series of personal notes expressing his concerns regarding safety in DoD. The Secretary:
    - Ordered an executive assessment of the DoD safety program;
    - Declared DoD senior leaders must be personally involved in safety.

- May 2003: SecDef issued a memorandum (App A-1) challenging senior leaders to "reduce the number of mishaps and accident rates by at least 50% in the next two years." The memorandum directed the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD [P&R]) to lead the effort.

- June 2003: USD (P&R) established the Defense Safety Oversight Council (DSOC), which includes an OIG representative as an associate (non-voting) member. The overall purpose of the DSOC is to provide governance of DoD-wide efforts to reduce preventable mishaps (App A-2). The primary tasks of the DSOC are to:
    - Establish and monitor metrics to reduce accidents and injuries for each Military

Department and DoD Agency by 50 percent by the end of 2005 (later increased to 75 percent by the end of FY 2008), using FY 2002 as a baseline.
  - Assess, review, and advise to improve DoD-wide safety and injury prevention information management systems.
  - Promote the development and implementation of safety initiatives.
  - Make recommendations for improving policies, programs, and investments.

- March 2004: SecDef adjusted the objective to reduce accident rates from 50 to 75 percent by the end of 2008, as stated in the FY 06-11 Strategic Planning Guidance (App A-3).

- August 2004: On behalf of the USD (P&R) and the DSOC, the DUSD (R) requested the Inspections and Evaluations Directorate (I&E) of the OIG evaluate the DoD safety program and Department efforts to achieve the SecDef's mishap and accident reduction goal.

- November 2004: I&E announced the formation of a safety evaluation team (the Team) and initiation of an OIG evaluation of the DoD safety program (App A-4). The Team's objectives were:
  - Evaluate the DoD safety program and provide observations to help achieve a reduction in accidents, as directed by the SecDef;
  - Identify safety issues within DoD and provide a roadmap for change to improve the Department's safety program.

- April 2005: I&E contracted with the National Safety Council (NSC) to assist the Team administer, conduct, and evaluate safety perception surveys.

- March 2006: I&E briefed the DSOC on the outcomes of the Leadership and Perception Safety Surveys, and suggested four preliminary recommendations.

- June 2006: SecDef issued a memorandum (App A-5) on reducing preventable accidents. He stated, "We will not simply accept the status quo" and "We can no longer consider safety as nice-to-have."

- October 2006: I&E briefed the DoD Safety and Health Forum on options to improve installation and command safety and health programs; I&E also briefed the National Safety Congress on the safety evaluation's progress and achievements.

- November 2006: In response to the June 2006 SecDef memorandum, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD [AT&L]) addressed safety over the entire life cycle of systems by directing changes to DoD Instructions 5000.2 and 6055.7 to reduce preventable accidents (App A-6).

- March 2007: I&E engaged both the European Tri-Service Safety Conference and the Joint Service Safety Congress on the preliminary results and recommendations of the evaluation.

- May 2007: The new SecDef issued a memorandum (App A-7) stating he remains committed to the 75 percent accident reduction target by 2008, and setting a new goal of "zero preventable accidents."

- July 2007: I&E briefed the Joint Planning Development Office (JPDO) working group of the Next Generation Aviation Transport System program on a comparative analysis of Safety Management Systems (analysis is at http://www.nsc.org/resources/dod-matrix.aspx). The JPDO is a unique partnership of government agencies (the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Homeland Security, and Transportation; the Federal Aviation and National Aeronautical and Space Administrations; and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy) and commercial and general aviation.

- April 2008: In response to a request from the Director of the Joint Staff, USD(AT&L) developed and issued Change 1 to DoD Instruction 6055.07, establishing policy for mishap investigations of friendly fire events.

1.4 Evaluation Context

The evaluation addresses the SecDef's memo that established the DoD mishap and accident reduction goal. This goal applies to military personnel – active duty, Guard, and Reserve – as well as over 700,000 Department civilians in both appropriated and nonappropriated positions. The evaluation does not examine combat-related mishap and accident data, allowing for comparative analysis with any business enterprise inside or outside DoD. However, this limitation is not intended to minimize the importance of safety and accident prevention in areas of ongoing operations.

It is important to remember that all accidents and mishaps, regardless of whether they occur on or off duty, affect readiness and the Department's capability to accomplish its mission.

1.5 Evaluation Process

Figure 1 illustrates the evaluation process and the specific safety program elements that were evaluated: climate and culture, policy, organizational structure, and resources. Throughout the project the Team captured exceptional practices.

Figure 1. Process Diagram for Evaluation of the DoD Safety Program

During and following information collection activities, the Team analyzed perception survey data, reviewed safety programs of other organizations to identify benchmarks, and studied various models of safety management systems.

1.5.1 Safety Surveys

The Team partnered with the National Safety Council (http://www.nsc.org/) and the Defense Manpower Data Center (http://www.dmdc.osd.mil/) to develop, administer, and analyze two safety surveys. The targeted populations for these surveys were:

- Senior Leader Survey – administered to DoD senior leaders (flag officers and senior executive service (SES) members).
- Safety Perception Survey – administered to:
    - Active Duty Personnel (enlisted and officers O-6 and below, all Services).
    - DoD Civilian Personnel (all grades below SES).
    - Guard and Reserve Personnel (enlisted and officers O-6 and below, all Services).

The objectives of the surveys were to:

- measure the current perception of the safety culture throughout DoD; and,
- establish a safety climate baseline against which DoD can measure improvement.

> **Safety Culture** consists of values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies and behavior of the people that make up the organization. In an organization with a positive safety culture there are high levels of trust; people agree that safety is important and that safety management systems are effective.
>
> **Safety Climate** consists of attitudes and perceptions but does not contain values, competencies and behavior. It differs from safety culture since it is specific to one time and location. It can be used as an indicator of the underlying safety culture.
>
> These definitions indicate that safety climate is a sub-set of safety culture, which is a broader, more enduring organizational feature.
>
> "PRISM FG1 Safety Culture Application Guide" – Final Version 1.1 – 8 August 2003, www.keilcentre.co.uk.

The senior leader survey was a Web-based survey sent to all flag officers and senior executive service members. The survey was designed to measure how DoD leaders viewed themselves as safety advocates and to collect their opinions of the DoD safety program. This survey had 17 questions – 12 multiple choice, 3 demographic, and 2 open-ended, write-ins. The Team received 1299 responses for a 48 percent response rate. There were over 1000 write-in comments. This report provides the descriptions, analyses, and results of the senior leader survey.

Additionally, a safety perception survey was mailed to 330,000 DoD personnel as part of the annual personnel survey conducted by DMDC. The survey results provided an excellent empirical picture of the DoD safety climate and identified specific areas for further study and improvement. The survey response rates were: active duty – 37 percent, civilian – 63 percent,

and Guard and Reserve – 36 percent. See reports IE-2008-007 through -009 for the descriptions, analyses, and results of the safety perception survey for each population.

1.5.1.1 Leveraging NSC's Safety Barometer Survey Process

The NSC Safety Barometer survey elicits opinions about a broad spectrum of elements that contribute to successful safety management. At the time of data analysis, 232 organizations (government and non-government) had taken the NSC Safety Barometer survey. The NSC maintains their responses in a database. To the extent possible, the DoD surveys were based on the NSC Safety Barometer survey to allow the evaluation team to benchmark results against the NSC database by generating comparative percentile scores on a scale of 0 to 100. A further benefit of this approach was the ability to prioritize problem areas based on the percentile scores.

1.5.1.2 Other Partnerships

In addition to partnering with NSC and DMDC, the Team worked with the OIG Quantitative Methods Directorate (http://www.dodig.mil/inspections/qmd/index.htm) for the administration and validation of the survey questionnaires. The Quantitative Methods Directorate also independently reviewed the survey data.

1.5.2 Data Analysis and Results

This evaluation was designed and executed to comprehensively identify broad, crosscutting issues within DoD, then suggest changes to guide DoD leadership in making systemic changes in the DoD safety program that would yield program improvements. Two aspects of the evaluation process warrant specific discussion: data-set benchmarking and results communication.

1.5.2.1 Data-Set Benchmarking Analysis and Results

As mentioned above, use of the NSC Safety Barometer survey as the basis for the surveys allowed the Team to benchmark results against the NSC database of government and non-government organizations. Reports IE-2008-007 through -009 describe the results of this benchmarking in detail.

The Team also analyzed large, private sector companies (with 30,000-60,000 employees) that were recipients of the Occupational Hazards Magazine's award for excellence in safety performance. The Team reviewed organizations with excellent safety records, such as DuPont, Texas Instruments, and Delta Airlines, to identify essential safety program practices. Additionally, the Team studied the United States Postal Service, an organization that employs approximately 800,000 people and has similar structural challenges as DoD.

1.5.2.2 Results Communication

The Team practiced "constructive engagement" as a communication technique to keep stakeholders informed of project status and findings. This process included briefing our observations to DoD management and providing progress reports on the safety evaluation throughout the project. We posed questions during interviews to stimulate introspection by senior officials and encourage dialogue among diverse organizations. This approach encouraged decision makers and safety program managers to initiate program improvements immediately following an engagement, well before release of completed reports.

1.6 Prevention Model

Figure 2 graphically depicts the continuum of activities associated with the DoD safety program centered around a decision, mishap, or other event (incident). Risk management should focus on prevention programs, while consequence management efforts should identify and fix mishap root causes. The Team believes a balanced approach between risk management and consequence management is a necessary condition to achieve the SecDef's accident reduction goal. The results of this survey provide stakeholders with a compendium of leading indicators that should be considered to improve safety program risk management.

Figure 2. Prevention Parabola Model



The illustration is constructed around an incident, which represents a management decision, policy release, mishap, or other event affecting safety performance. The green arrow along the center axis shows the time preceding and following the incident.

The blue parabola (left side) encompasses actions taken and data generated prior to the incident. Influencing incidents prior to the event requires leaders and managers to collect and analyze

leading indicators. The chart lists several methods for obtaining leading indicators, including gathering near-miss data, conducting perception surveys, and analyzing current processes. Leading indicators focus on risk reduction by measuring, reporting, and managing safe behaviors. The left side of the chart emphasizes prevention programs and leading indicators.

The orange parabola (right side) represents actions taken and data generated after the incident. Investigations, inspections, and analysis of mishap data allow leaders and managers to influence behavior subsequent to an occurrence. Today's DoD safety program emphasizes lagging indicators as the common measurement for safety performance. Discovering the root causes and managing the consequences of mistakes and poor decisions has generated a measure of success in safety programs across the board. However, overemphasis on after-the-fact metrics may detract attention and resources from prevention activities.

2 Summary -- Senior Leader Safety Survey

2.1 Overview

The senior leader survey was a Web-based survey sent to all flag officers and senior executive service members. The survey was designed to measure how DoD leaders viewed themselves as safety advocates and to collect their opinions of the DoD safety program. This survey had 17 questions—12 multiple choice, 3 demographic, and 2 open-ended, write-ins. There were 1299 responses--a 48 percent response rate (see App C – subsequent reminders, and survey questionnaire). There were over 1,000 write-in comments.

The e-mail mechanism for disseminating survey instructions and collecting responses worked well. Although the survey period extended one week beyond the original schedule, it's unlikely additional extensions would have increased the response rate significantly. Statistically, the 48 percent response rate is considered good.

2.2 Results

2.2.1 Survey Questions

Respondents replied on a 5-point scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The degree of positive response varied considerably among the 12 questions in the survey. For some items, over 95 percent of respondents answered positively, while for other items less than 45 percent answered positively. This indicates good differentiation by respondents among survey topics. Nearly all of the questions with highest marks are broad, culture-related issues. It is clear leaders believe the climate is in place to make necessary changes to support safety. Of the 12 questions, 7 were similar to NSC survey items. We compared DoD senior leader survey responses for those 7 questions with responses from the 232 organizations in the NSC database and calculated a percentile score between 0 and 100. Four of the 7 items received benchmarked scores above the 95th percentile and three scored 85 or below. Senior leaders gave the highest ratings to leadership sincerity and positive commitment regarding personnel safety. The three questions receiving average response scores should be targets for improvement, and comparison with other organizations reinforces that conclusion. The perception of adequate resources to manage and support safety-related programs scored lower than other items when compared with outside organizations, achieving a comparative percentile score of only 55.

2.2.2 Demographics

We analyzed the survey responses by various demographic subgroups:

- Flag Officers versus SES members. Flag officers had higher scores, and thus more positive perceptions, compared to their SES counterparts. The difference should be investigated to determine why SES members' perceptions are lower and what countermeasures might be applied specifically to the SES group.
- Branch of Service. The Air Force had the highest perception scores overall, followed closely by the Army, then the Navy. The lowest scores came from the Marine Corps and Non-Service Civilians (DoD civilians employed by an agency such as the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, or the Defense Logistics Agency rather than by one of the Service Departments [i.e., Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps]). The disparity among responses by category was similar to NSC survey results of other organizations. However, targeted efforts to elevate perceptions of the safety program for Marine Corps and Non-Service Civilian personnel would be an effective strategy for strengthening safety perceptions for the organization.
- Duty Status. The Guard respondents had the highest perception scores both overall and for 8 of the 12 survey questions. Civilians had the lowest perception scores for the survey and for 9 of the 12 survey items. Dialogue among the duty status groups will facilitate obtaining a clearer picture of the accident and mishap problem for DoD, and should level the differences in perceptions.
- Organization of Assignment. Perception scores for MAJCOM/MACOM/CLAIMANT-level respondents were highest overall, and also highest for 6 of the 12 survey items. OSD Staff had the lowest perception scores overall and for 7 of the 12 survey items. All command-related organizations had response scores above the overall average, while all staff-related organizations had response scores below the overall average. Disparity among scores from highest to lowest was fairly large.

2.2.3 Open-ended, Write-in Questions

Respondents were asked to provide their comments to two open-ended, write-in questions. The number and quality of written comments were exceptional. Over 700 respondents provided comments for the first open-ended item regarding suggested actions for improving safety, and nearly 300 respondents answered the second open-ended item asking for general comments.

As a group, the written comments provide high quality, insightful observations on the status of safety issues and suggestions for improvement. Therefore, we listed all the comments in Appendices I and J. Table 1 below summarizes the written comments into 23 broad categories.

Table 1. Summarized Written Comment Categories

- Motor-Vehicle and Off-Duty Safety
- Discipline and Accountability
- Award and Incentive Programs
- Funding and Budgeting
- Operational Readiness and Force Protection
- Best Practices
- Leadership Involvement and Commitment
- Individual Responsibility
- Cooperation across Services
- Safety Stand-downs
- Measurement and Metrics
- Training
- Supervisor Involvement
- Safety as an Item on Performance Appraisals
- Communication of Information and Programs
- Risk Management
- Safety Integration and Culture Change
- Appropriateness of 50 Percent Reduction Goal
- Accepting that Accidents and Mishaps Will Occur
- Praise for Current Safety Efforts
- Safety Personnel
- Comments Regarding the Survey
- Acknowledgement of the Importance of Safety Issues and the Need to Do More

2.2.4 Use of Results

The results of this survey, both the data from the multiple choice items and the write-in comments, should be used to develop strategies to improve the effectiveness of the DoD safety program and generate specific recommendations and initiatives to help reduce the Department's accident rate by 75 percent by 2008.

3 Senior Leader Safety Survey Results

3.1 Introduction

As previously described in the Project Overview section, this report documents the results of the Senior Leader Safety Survey. This survey was designed to measure how DoD leaders viewed themselves as safety program advocates and to identify their opinions of the DoD safety program. The survey measures the perceptions of DoD senior leaders regarding safety knowledge, climate, involvement, resources, priority-setting, and other leadership-related issues.

3.2 The National Safety Council Partnership

In April 2005, the OIG entered into a contract arrangement with the National Safety Council (NSC) to assist the evaluation team develop, administer, and analyze the safety perception surveys. To the extent possible, the survey design was based on the NSC Safety Barometer survey, which allowed the evaluation team to generate percentile scores on a scale of 0 to 100 and benchmark results against the NSC database of responses from 232 government and non-government organizations. A further benefit of this approach was the capability to generate a prioritized list of problem areas based on the percentile scores.

The analyses that follow include a comparison of DoD responses to other organizations in the NSC database by percentile scores. Responses by personnel subgroups were also compared so we could develop a more specific understanding of each subgroup's assessment, with priorities customized and targeted for each group. The results can be used to facilitate management decisions to improve the safety program and reduce mishap and accident rates.

3.3 Survey Administration

3.3.1 Survey Form

The survey form is provided at appendix C. Given the demands on senior leaders' schedules, the survey was designed to be brief. To take advantage of the NSC database, the questions and responses were adapted to be compatible with the Safety Barometer survey and used a 5-point scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Also, respondents completed a demographics section to identify their population subgroup by Rank, Service, and Organization.

In addition to data-oriented responses, two open-ended written sections were included:

- "If you were to suggest one action that would improve safety in DoD, what would it be?
- "Please provide any other general comments you may have."

These sections allowed respondents to provide suggestions and reactions beyond their fixed-answer responses.

Both standardized and customized questions were used in the survey. Standardized questions were based on the NSC Safety Barometer survey, with slight wording changes to adapt the statements to DoD terminology. The evaluation team created five customized questions to garner perceptions of DoD-unique safety climate issues.

3.3.2 Web-Based Survey

The NSC administered the Web-based survey (See appendix B). DMDC provided the names and e-mail addresses of all the flag officers and SES members.

- April 11, 2005. The OIG sent the initial e-mail announcing the Senior Leader Survey to all 2,698 flag officers and SES members – 1,615 flag officers and 1,083 SES members. This e-mail contained the rationale for the survey, a brief description of the survey format, and assurances regarding the confidentiality of their responses.
- April 18, 2005. NSC sent the initial e-mail with instructions and the internet link to complete and submit the survey. Electronic responses were forwarded directly to the NSC.
- May 3, 2005. NSC sent a first follow-up e-mail to non-responders to remind them of the May 9, 2005 survey deadline date. A second follow-up e-mail was sent a week later. (Note: Although survey responses were confidential, NSC used a numerical tracking system that allowed survey researchers to send targeted follow-up e-mails to non-responders at appropriate periods of time, reminding them to complete the survey.)
- May 16, 2005. The survey deadline was extended. All completed surveys received by May 16 were included in the survey analysis and results.

3.4 Survey Analysis

3.4.1 Survey Questions

Statements from the Senior Leader Safety Survey present either a positive or negative description or perception of the safety program. Of the 12 items contained on the survey form, 10 are positive descriptions and 2 are negative descriptions.

The two items with negative descriptions are:

Q5 Safety takes a back seat to mission in our organization
Q12 We have to accept that accidents and mishaps will occur in our line of work

Interspersing negative statements with positive statements helps to ensure the respondents focus on the topic of the questions, rather than give a blanket response for all items.

3.4.2 Survey Analysis

For each item, an average response score is determined by assigning a value of +2 for a strongly positive response; +1 for a positive response; 0 for a neutral response; -1 for a negative response; -2 for a strongly negative response; and then calculating the average value of all responses for that item. For example, a survey response of "Strongly Agree" is scored +2 for a positive item such as "Safety funding is adequately represented in the budget process." However, a response of "Strongly Agree" is scored -2 for "Safety takes a back seat to mission," because it is a strongly negative response. In order to compare items and rank order their average response scores, all statements must be construed as positive. A higher average response score then indicates a more favorable response than a lower average response score, and items can be compared as apples to apples. For continuity and ease of understanding, the negative items have been reworded positively in some sections. See Appendix E for more information regarding methods of analysis.

Using standardized items on the survey form allows for benchmarking against the NSC database. Inclusion of benchmarked data offers an additional perspective to understand population perceptions.

The tables, figures, and charts to follow present safety program issues ranked by priority. Analyzing data from demographic subgroup identifiers allows for comparing responses across personnel categories, and ultimately, setting priorities at the subgroup level. Inferences regarding the prioritization of problem areas can be made from these graphics.

Response frequency and percent distribution of responses for all Senior Leader Survey items are shown in Appendix D. Response frequency and percentage distributions by Flag Officer versus SES member, Service, and organization are presented in appendixes F, G, and H respectively. Respondent comments are presented in Appendices I and J. Appendix K is the list of acronyms, and Appendix L is the report distribution list.

3.5 Results

3.5.1 Survey Response and Response Rate

During the response period, eight e-mails were received that indicated the survey recipient was retired or otherwise should not have been included in the survey population. Deleting these eight individuals from the list of respondents resulted in a total of 2,691 potential survey respondents.

A total of 1,303 survey responses were submitted during the response period. Initial analysis of

data showed that four responses were duplicates. These records were removed from the data file, resulting in a total of 1,299 valid responses--835 from flag officers and 456 from SES members. The flag officer response rate was 52 percent, the SES member response rate was 42 percent, and the total response rate for the survey was 48 percent.

The number of responses by date of response is shown in Figure 3 and follows the classic pattern of peaks and valleys related to original and reminder e-mail dates. Magnitude of the response peaks diminished with successive reminders, nearing zero as the deadline date approached. Given this pattern, it is unlikely that successive reminders or an extension of the response period would have generated a significant number of additional responses.

Figure 3. Number of Survey Respondents by Date (April 18 - May 16, 2005)



3.5.1.1 Conclusions

- The overall response rate for the survey was good – 48 percent. While multiple factors always influence response rates, a 48 percent response rate for this particular target population equates to 1,299 respondent submissions.
- This response rate indicates the survey population took the survey seriously and considered advancing safety a worthwhile effort.
- The response rate for flag officers was 10 percentage points greater than for SES members, indicating greater motivation to complete the survey. Possible reasons for this higher response rate may include:
  - (1) more knowledge or background to contribute,
  - (2) greater perceived responsibility toward achieving the safety goals, or
  - (3) other motivating reasons.
- The e-mail mechanism for collecting information worked well, and provided a relatively straightforward and non-intrusive method of surveying top leaders. There was no indication that confidentiality and anonymity were significant concerns.

- The length of the survey seemed appropriate. There was no indication of a significant abandonment rate once respondents initiated the survey process.
- It is unlikely that either extension of the survey deadline date or subsequent reminders would have increased the response rate significantly.

3.5.2 Analysis of Percent Distribution of Responses

The percent distribution of responses from all respondents for each statement is shown in Figure 4. For each item, the percentage of respondents for each statement is indicated by the numbers shown in the bar for that response. Statements shown in Figure 4 are sorted from top to bottom by those items answered most positively to those answered least positively, when comparing the average response score.

The most positive responses were given to the item dealing with the belief that leadership is sincere in its efforts to ensure personnel safety (Q1). For this item, more than 98 percent of respondents answered positively, including 70 percent answering strongly positive. The next most positive response was given to "Leadership consistently demonstrates a positive commitment to personnel safety" (Q3). For this item, about 95 percent of respondents answered positively, including 55 percent with a strongly positive response.

In contrast to Q1 and Q3, which had 95 percent or higher positive responses, no other items on the survey had more than an 85 percent positive response. Four survey items had between 80 percent and 85 percent positive responses. They include, "Appropriate safety goals are set annually by leadership" (Q2), "Making truly beneficial changes in our safety environment is a high priority for leadership" (Q8), safety is as important as mission in our organization (Q5), and "Implementing successful organizations' best practices in safety is one of the most effective ways to bring about change" (Q9). Each of these items had between 10 percent and 17 percent neutral responses and between 3 percent and 8 percent negative responses.

The remaining 6 survey items had 60 percent or less positive responses, and between 11 percent and 30 percent negative responses. "Leadership has provided adequate resources to manage and support safety-related programs" (Q11) had 60 percent positive response, while 51 percent responded positively to "Supervisors consider safety performance when rating their personnel" (Q4). The item "Good cooperation exists across the Services on safety-related issues" (Q10) had 43 percent positive responses. For each of these 3 items, Q11, Q4 and Q10, neutral responses were between 25 percent and 50 percent. Although neutral responses are not necessarily negative, larger percentages of neutral responses often indicate an element is not sufficiently visible from the respondents' perspective. Increasing the visibility of the items or programs so that a greater portion of personnel are aware of the activity is an appropriate goal representing an opportunity for improvement.

Figure 4. Percent Distribution of Reponses



The final 3 survey items in Figure 4 each had more than 20 percent negative responses. The highest was 30 percent for not accepting that accidents and mishaps will occur in the DoD line of work (Q12). Note that 57 percent of respondents answered positive to not accepting accidents are inevitable. The next item, "Decreasing the DoD accident and mishap rate by 50 percent over the next 2 years is achievable" (Q7), had a 26 percent negative response. Finally, 21 percent responded negative to "Safety funding is not adequately represented in the budget process" (Q6), while 37 percent responded neutral to the same question.

3.5.2.1 Conclusions

- The degree of positive response varied considerably among the 12 survey items, with positive response ranging from more than 95 percent for some items to less than 45 percent for other items. This level of differentiation indicates respondents took the survey seriously.
- Respondents gave very high marks to the survey items dealing with believing that:
    1. Leaders are sincere in their efforts to ensure personnel safety.
    2. Leaders are consistently demonstrating a positive commitment to personnel safety.
    3. Appropriate safety goals are being set annually by the leadership.
    4. Making truly beneficial changes in the safety environment is a high priority for leadership.
    5. Safety is as important as mission in the organization.

  Nearly all of these items with highest marks are broad, culture-related issues. It is clear leaders believe the climate is in place to make necessary changes to support safety.
- About 80 percent of respondents agreed that implementing successful organizations' best practices in safety is one of the most effective ways to bring about change. This should be viewed as affirmation for the best practices approach to identifying potential program items, practices, and countermeasures.
- Three survey items had 35 percent or more neutral response. These items dealt with supervisors considering safety performance when rating their personnel, good cooperation existing across the Services on safety-related issues, and safety funding being adequately represented in the budget process. If elevated levels of neutral responses are due to lack of knowledge about these issues, that lack should not be seen as an acceptable justification. Not only should activities be undertaken to support safety, they should be important enough to be emphasized so they are known to exist, or at least perceived to exist, by all personnel.

3.5.3 Analysis of Average Response Scores

Presented in Figure 5 are the average (mean) response scores for all respondents for each

statement. Average response scores are calculated by assigning a value of +2 for a strongly positive response; +1 for a positive response; 0 for a neutral response; -1 for a negative response; and -2 for a strongly negative response. If all respondents answered strongly positive for an item, the average response score would be +2; if all answered strongly negative, the average response score would be -2; if all answered neutral, the average response score would be 0, etc. More information regarding methods of analysis is detailed in appendix E.

Figure 5. Average Response Scores



Average response scores for the 12 survey items range from +1.67 to +0.25, with items in Figure 5 ranked by average response score. The 2 most positive items on the survey were

answered considerably more positively than other items, with response scores of +1.67 and +1.48. These items dealt with belief that leadership is sincere in its efforts to ensure personnel safety (Q1) and leadership consistently demonstrates a positive commitment to personnel safety (Q3). Next were 4 items with response scores between +1.02 and +1.12. These included the items dealing with appropriate safety goals being set annually by leadership (Q2), making truly beneficial changes in the safety environment being a high priority for leadership (Q8), safety being as important as mission in the organization (Q5), and implementing successful organization best practices being one of the most effective ways to bring about change (Q9).

The remaining 6 survey items had responses that were considerably less positive compared with the previous items. Each had an average response score less than +0.60. These comparatively lower-scoring items included leadership providing adequate resources to manage and support safety-related programs (Q11), supervisors considering safety performance when rating their personnel (Q4), good cooperation existing across the Services on safety-related issues (Q10), refusal to accept that accidents and mishaps will occur in the DoD line of work (Q12), believing that decreasing the DoD accident and mishap rate by 50 percent over the next 2 years is achievable (Q7), and safety funding being adequately represented in the budget process (Q6).

3.5.3.1 Conclusions

- When examining the average (mean) score for the 12 survey items, 2 were scored substantially higher than others, 4 items were midrange, and 6 items scored substantially lower.
- Highest ratings were given to items dealing with leadership sincerity and positive commitment to ensuring personnel safety. Midrange items dealt with appropriate safety goals being set, change being a priority for leadership, safety being as important as mission, and acceptance of the best practices approach.
- Less positive average responses were given to items concerning adequate resources being given to leadership to manage and support safety programs, supervisors considering safety performance when rating their personnel, good cooperation existing across the Services on safety-related issues, and refusal to accept that accidents and mishaps will occur. These items should be viewed as potential target areas for improvement, especially in comparison to the strongly positive responses given to other survey items.
- The least positive average scores on the survey were given to the following items: belief that decreasing the DoD accident and mishap rate by 50 percent over the next 2 years is achievable; and safety funding being adequately represented in the budget process. Each of these items had less than 50 percent positive response, more than 20 percent negative response, and each should be viewed as a strong target for improvement efforts.

3.5.4 Analysis of Benchmarked Percentile Scores

As stated earlier, the senior leader survey consisted of two groups of items: those similar to items on NSC standardized surveys; and non-standardized items customized to particular safety issues within DoD. Of the 12 survey items, 7 were similar to NSC survey items and are listed in the following table, along with the comparable standardized wording.

Table 2. DoD Items Similar to the NSC Standard

DoD Senior Leader Survey	NSC Standardized Survey
• I believe leadership is sincere in its efforts to ensure personnel safety (Q1)	• I believe management is sincere in its efforts to ensure employee safety
• Appropriate safety goals are set annually by leadership (Q2)	• Management annually sets injury rate or other safety goals for which all employees are held accountable
• Leadership consistently demonstrates a positive commitment to personnel safety (Q3)	• Management shows that it cares about employee safety
• Supervisors consider safety performance when rating their personnel (Q4)	• It is well known that management ignores a person's safety performance when determining raises and promotions
• Safety takes a back seat to mission in our organization (Q5)	• Safety takes a back seat to production
• Good cooperation exists across the Services on safety-related issues (Q10)	• Good teamwork exists among departments
• Leadership has provided adequate resources to manage and support safety-related programs (Q11)	• Management has provided adequate staff to manage and support its safety programs

DoD senior leader survey responses were compared with responses from the 232 organizations in the NSC database for these 7 items. Percentile scores calculated from this comparison are shown in Figure 6. A percentile score expresses the percentage of database organizations with a lower average response score than DoD senior leader survey responses.

Possible percentile scores range from 0 to 100, with 0 representing the lowest score in the database and 100 representing the highest. For example, a percentile score of 100 indicates that all of the 232 organizations in the NSC database received a lower average response score than DoD. A percentile score of 50 indicates that half (116) of the 232 organizations were lower than DoD.

Items with the highest average response scores do not necessarily have the highest percentile scores. Since some statements tend to be answered more positively or negatively than others because of the topic or the wording of the statement, comparing results against the NSC database automatically adjusts for the varying difficulty of the survey statements.

Figure 6. Percentile Scores for Standardized Safety Items



Stnd: Standardized items from the NSC SAFETY BAROMETER survey.

Items in Figure 6 are listed in order of decreasing percentile score. Items at the top of Figure 6 are more highly ranked among DoD senior leader survey responses compared with other organizations' responses. Items at the bottom are those evaluated less positively compared with responses from other organizations. Items with the lowest percentile scores represent priority items for DoD safety program improvement efforts.

The majority of opinions from DoD senior leader responses regarding the DoD safety program and culture are moderate to very high compared to the NSC database participants. Of the 7 items, 4 scored above the 95th percentile. Although all 7 items scored above the 50th percentile, which is considered the database average, 3 items received moderate scores between 55 and 85. As percentile scores were only available for 7 of the 12 survey items, no overall percentile score was calculated.

3.5.4.1 Very high percentile scores

As shown in Figure 9, the four highest items received very high percentiles—above 95. These highest rated items, with their comparative percentile scores, in order from highest to lowest are:

- ***Q1 I believe leadership is sincere in its efforts to ensure personnel safety (100)***
- ***Q3 Leadership consistently demonstrates a positive commitment to personnel safety (99)***
- ***Q5 Safety [does not take] a back seat to mission in the organization (98)***
- ***Q2 Appropriate safety goals are set annually by leadership (96)***

The percentage of respondents who answered positively and negatively for these items was discussed earlier. Of note is the fact that the top-scoring item, leaders' sincerity in efforts to ensure personnel safety (Q1), received the highest possible percentile score of 100, meaning that its score was higher than any of the other 232 comparable scores from other organizations in the database. Of these 4 highest-scoring items, 3 dealt with climate-related issues of leadership sincerity, positive commitment to ensure personnel safety, and safety being as important as mission. Appropriate safety goals are set annually by leadership is the only item that is more activity focused. According to the perceptions of top DoD personnel, the safety climate appears to be positive. The safety climate should not pose significant barriers to activity-related countermeasures that are implemented based on survey results.

3.5.4.2 Lower-rated percentile scores

Three items received comparative percentile scores of 85 or below. Items with percentiles less than 50 are usually identified as potential target areas. The 3 lowest scoring items below should be candidates for improvement priorities, especially in comparison to all other standardized survey items with percentiles above 95.

The lowest scored items (with their percentile scores), in order from lowest to highest are:

- ***Q11 Leadership has provided adequate resources to manage and support safety-related programs (55)***
- ***Q10 Good cooperation exists across the Services on safety-related issues (71)***
- ***Q4 Supervisors consider safety performance when rating their personnel (85)***

Of these items, 2 are activity-related and 1 is climate-related. Results for these items indicate that candidates for improvement priorities developed from survey results should include action items concerning the level of resources provided by leadership to manage and support safety-related programs (Q11), the extent of cooperation across the Services on safety-related issues (Q10), and supervisors considering safety performance when rating their personnel (Q4).

As presented in this section, benchmarking against other organizations in the NSC database adds to the understanding of survey results and supplements the use of average response scores. Average response scores can indicate which survey items were answered more positively than others, but benchmarked percentile scores provide an additional frame of reference to indicate whether those average responses should be regarded as satisfactory or somewhat lacking. Those interpreting survey results will need to apply their own judgment regarding organizational goals to decide what score is satisfactory for the organization.

In the case of this survey report, note that since only leadership was surveyed, higher percentiles would be expected compared to other organizations for which all employees were surveyed. In addition, survey questions focused mainly on leadership activities, which may have generated higher scores by those same leaders who are responsible for the activities. In this light, high percentiles might be regarded as expected. Lower scores for items take on added significance as priority items.

3.5.4.3 Conclusions

- The two items on the survey with the highest average response scores were also scored extremely high when compared with responses from other organizations in the NSC database. These items dealt with leadership sincerity and positive commitment regarding personnel safety, and received percentile scores of 100 and 99, respectively. In other words, of all the organizations who have taken the NSC Safety Barometer Survey, DoD senior leaders had the highest scores for these two items. Clearly these items are strengths within DoD.
- Two additional items with midrange responses also received percentile scores in the 90s when compared to other survey items. These items addressed safety being as important as mission in the organization, and appropriate safety goals being set annually by leadership. These results indicate that ratings for DoD survey items that were in the midrange when compared with other DoD survey responses were still rated extremely high when compared with outside organizations.
- Three other survey items had relatively lower comparative percentile scores of 85 and below: supervisors considering safety performance when rating their personnel, good cooperation existing across the Services on safety-related issues, and leadership providing adequate resources to manage and support safety-related programs. Earlier analysis of average

response scores for these items indicated these items should be targets for improvement, and comparison with outside organizations reinforces that conclusion.

- Special attention should focus on the item regarding whether leaders provide adequate resources to manage and support safety-related programs. Not only was this item in the group of lowest rated average response scores, it also was clearly lower than other items when compared with outside organizations, achieving a percentile score of only 55.

3.5.5 Comparison of Survey Responses by Subgroup

This section contains analysis of survey responses by personnel subgroup. Except where noted, figures and tables in this section are sorted in order from highest to lowest average response score.

3.5.5.1 Comparison of Survey Responses by Flag Officer Versus Senior Executive Service Member

Of the 1,299 respondents, the number of respondents representing each of the two categories of Flag officer versus SES member is shown in Table 3. The frequency and percent distributions by Flag officer versus SES member subgroups are included in Appendix F.

Table 3. Flag Officer versus SES Member Response

Flag Officer versus SES Member	*Number of Respondents*	*Percent of Respondents*
Flag Officer	835	64
SES Member	456	35
Unspecified	8	1

Figure 7 graphically compares the overall safety perceptions of Flag officers versus SES members, as indicated by overall average response scores for all survey items combined. Scores were obtained by calculating the mean across the 12 individual item means.

Responding flag officers had higher perceptions overall than their SES member counterparts. The overall average response score for flag officers was 0.88 compared to 0.72 for SES members. The overall average response score for all respondents combined was 0.82. Although the

Figure 7.
Overall Average Response by Flag Officer versus SES Member



Note: (n=number of respondents in each subgroup)

disparity between flag officers and SES members is not extreme compared to that typically found for subgroup comparisons of other survey results, these results still suggest that targeted efforts to elevate perceptions of safety program elements for SES members to the same level as flag officers may be an effective strategy for strengthening safety perceptions for the organization.

Figure 8 compares safety perceptions of DoD senior leaders according to Flag officer versus SES member for each of the individual survey items. Although perceptions for Flag officers were higher than SES members, analysis of Figure 8 indicates whether this difference was maintained

Figure 8. Overall Average Response Scores by Flag Officer versus SES Member



** Calculated from reversed scores. See 3.4.2 for details.

across all survey items or whether relative perceptions of the subgroups differed depending on the survey item topic.

For 8 of the 12 survey items, Flag officer respondents had generally higher perceptions than SES members, consistent with overall results. However, perceptions of SES members were more positive than Flag officers for 2 items: refusal to accept that accidents and mishaps will occur in the DoD line of work (Q12), and belief that decreasing the DoD accident and mishap rate by 50 percent over the next 2 years is achievable (Q7). Perceptions of Flag officers and SES members were nearly identical for good cooperation existing across the Services on safety-related issues (Q10) and safety funding being adequately represented in the budget process (Q6). Interestingly, all 4 of these items were the lower scoring items for the survey.

Results in this section indicate that for the lowest scoring items on the survey, there is relative agreement by both Flag officers and SES members on these items as priorities, with Flag officers in some cases rating these items less positive compared to their SES member counterparts.

3.5.5.1.1 Conclusions

- Perceptions for the survey were higher for responding Flag officers, with an overall average response score of 0.88, compared to their SES member counterparts with an overall average response score of 0.72. This difference is not extreme, but should be investigated to determine why SES member perceptions are lower and what countermeasures might be applied specifically to the SES group.
- For individual survey items, differences between the Flag officer group and SES group mirrored the overall average difference with the exception of 4 survey items:
    1. For items pertaining to good cooperation existing across Services on safety-related issues and safety funding being adequately represented in the budget process, perceptions of the two groups were nearly identical.
    2. For items pertaining to refusal to accept that accidents and mishaps will occur in the DoD line of work and belief that decreasing the accident and mishap rate by 50 percent over the next 2 years is achievable, perceptions of the SES group were actually more positive than Flag officer group.
- Investigation into reasons for differences in responses between Flag officers and SES members should address why the pattern of responses for those 4 items varied from the overall. A possible explanation may be that SES members are more involved with or responsible for activities that occur across Services or in budgeting and funding activities, and therefore are more likely to have favorable responses for items concerning these activities. Likewise, SES members may have higher expectations regarding the potential for

accident prevention than Flag officers who face risk management decisions in their line of work on a more frequent basis.

- Reasons for these differences should be investigated with a goal of sharing viewpoints and expectations of each group, and for tailoring of subsequent interventions, actions or countermeasures to the specific personnel subgroups. Dialogue between groups to share viewpoints will facilitate obtaining a clearer picture of the accident and mishap problem for DoD, and should result in decreasing differences in perceptions.

3.5.5.2 Comparison of Survey Responses by Category (Service)

The 1,299 respondents represent five categories as shown in Table 4. In this report, the category Non-Service Civilian represents those SES members who are not a member of one of the Services. The category Civilian, used later in this report, refers to all SES members, whether or not they belong to a Service. Non-Service Civilian respondents are included as a category in this analysis in order to assign all respondents. Frequency and percent distributions by category subgroup can be calculated from distributions by Service as presented in Appendix G.

Table 4. Responses by Category

Category	*Number of Respondents*	*Percent of Respondents*
Army	485	37
Navy	243	19
Marine Corps	78	6
Air Force	319	24
Non-Service Civilian	166	13
Unspecified	8	1

Figure 9 graphically compares the safety perceptions of DoD senior leaders by category, as indicated by overall average response scores for all survey items combined. Overall scores were obtained by calculating the mean across the 12 individual item means. The Air Force had the highest perception overall, followed closely by the Army, then Navy. Non-Service Civilian and Marine Corps respondents had lower perceptions. The overall average response score was 0.87 for Air Force, 0.86 for Army and 0.83 for Navy, compared to 0.68 for Non-Service Civilian and 0.65 for the Marine Corps. The overall average response score for all respondents was 0.82.

The disparity among responses by category is not extreme compared to that typically found for comparisons of other NSC survey results. However, these results still suggest that targeted efforts to elevate perceptions for Non-Service Civilian and Marine Corps personnel to the same level as the other categories may be an effective strategy for strengthening safety perceptions for the organization. Figure 9 compares safety perceptions of DoD senior leaders according to the category for each survey item.

Figure 9. Overall Average Response Scores by Category (Service)



Note n=number of respondents

Table 5 shows these data in tabular form with rankings and each group's score. Highest scores are indicated with green shading; lowest scores are indicated with red shading. While overall perceptions for Air Force, Army, and Navy are higher than for Non-Service Civilian and Marine Corps, analysis of Figure 10 and Table 5 indicates whether this difference was maintained across all survey items or whether relative perceptions of the subgroups differed depending on the survey question.

Air Force had the highest perceptions overall for 6 of the 12 survey items. However, they had the lowest perceptions on the survey item regarding good cooperation existing across the Services on safety-related issues (Q10) and the second lowest perception regarding refusal to accept that accidents and mishaps will occur in the DoD line of work (Q12).

Army had the second highest perceptions overall, and had the highest perceptions regarding supervisors considering safety performance when rating their personnel (Q4) and good cooperation existing across the Services on safety-related issues (Q10). Army respondents had the second lowest ratings on items regarding belief that a 50 percent reduction in the accident and mishap rate is achievable (Q7) and safety funding being adequately represented in the budget process (Q6).

Figure 10. Overall Average Response Scores by Category (Service)



Table 5
Ranking of Average Response Scores[1] by Category

Survey Item	Average Response Scores[1] and Ranking[2]					ALL RESPONDENTS
	Air Force	Army	Navy	Non-Service Civilian	Marine Corps	
1 I believe leadership is sincere in its efforts to ensure personnel safety	1.73 (1)	1.72 (2)	1.65 (4)	**1.48 (5)**	1.68 (3)	**1.67**
3 Leadership consistently demonstrates a positive commitment to personnel safety	1.58 (1)	1.55 (2)	1.41 (4)	**1.18 (5)**	1.44 (3)	**1.48**
2 Appropriate safety goals are set annually by leadership	1.22 (1)	1.20 (2)	1.06 (3)	**0.83 (5)**	1.01 (4)	**1.12**
8 Making truly beneficial changes in our safety environment is a high priority for leadership	1.19 (3)	1.20 (2)	1.05 (4)	**0.76 (5)**	1.21 (1)	**1.11**
5 Safety takes a back seat to mission in our organization *	1.21 (1)	1.15 (2)	1.11 (3)	0.88 (4)	**0.86 (5)**	**1.10**
9 Implementing successful organization best practices in safety is one of the most effective ways to bring about change	1.08 (2)	1.01 (3)	1.09 (1)	0.92 (4)	**0.73 (5)**	**1.02**
11 Leadership has provided adequate resources to manage and support safety-related programs	0.69 (1)	0.60 (2)	0.46 (4)	0.49 (3)	**0.37 (5)**	**0.57**
4 Supervisors consider safety performance when rating their personnel	0.56 (2)	0.64 (1)	0.36 (4)	**0.11 (5)**	0.39 (3)	**0.48**
10 Good cooperation exists across the Services on safety-related issues	**0.23 (5)**	0.51 (1)	0.37 (3)	0.34 (4)	0.51 (1)	**0.39**
12 We have to accept that accidents and mishaps will occur in our line of work *	0.28 (4)	0.29 (3)	0.76 (1)	0.52 (2)	**0.06 (5)**	**0.39**
7 Decreasing the DoD accident and mishap rate by 50% over the next two years is achievable.	0.28 (3)	0.26 (4)	0.40 (1)	0.33 (2)	**-0.35 (5)**	**0.26**
6 Safety funding is adequately represented in the budget process	0.37 (1)	0.21 (4)	0.22 (3)	0.32 (2)	**-0.08 (5)**	**0.25**
OVERALL	**0.87 (1)**	**0.86 (2)**	**0.83 (3)**	**0.68 (4)**	**0.65 (5)**	**0.82**

[1] Calculated by assigning a value of +2 for strongly positive response; +1 for a positive response; 0 for neutral response; -1 for a negative response; and -2 for a strongly negative response. (See Appendix C for more information regarding methods of analysis)

[2] The ranking of each group's score is indicated in parentheses. "1" indicates most positive response; "5" indicates the least positive.

* Calculated from reversed scores. See 3.4.2 for details.

For each statement, the highest performing group is shaded green. The lowest performing group is shaded **red.**

Navy had the third highest perceptions overall, but had the highest perceptions regarding 3 survey items: implementing successful organization best practices being one of the most effective ways to bring about change (Q9), refusal to accept that accidents and mishaps will occur in the DoD line of work (Q12), and belief that a 50 percent reduction in the accident and mishap rate is achievable (Q7).

Non-Service Civilian had the second lowest perceptions overall, but the lowest perceptions regarding 5 survey items. Three of these lowest-scoring items dealt with the safety climate within DoD: belief that leaders are sincere in their efforts to ensure personnel safety (Q1), leadership consistently demonstrates a positive commitment to personnel safety (Q3), and making truly beneficial changes in the safety environment being a high priority for leaders (Q8). Two other items that were scored lowest by Non-Service Civilians involve activity-related items: appropriate safety goals being set annually by leadership (Q2), and supervisors considering safety performance when rating their personnel (Q4). Consideration should be given to whether these activity-based items are scored lowest by Non-Service Civilians because of lack of knowledge on their part. For all survey respondent subgroups, lack of visibility of elements should not be considered an acceptable contributor to low scores. In the highest functioning safety programs, having elements that are present and effective is not sufficient. Great care must be taken to ensure that the elements are visible. Awareness by all DoD senior leaders is essential to the program's success.

Marine Corps respondents had the lowest perceptions for the survey and for 6 of 12 survey items. However, the Marine Corps had the highest perceptions of all Services for 2 survey items, relating to making truly beneficial changes in the safety environment being a high priority for leadership (Q8) and (tied with Army) regarding good cooperation existing across the Services on safety-related issues (Q10). These responses indicate that Marine Corps leaders are aware of the need for change and perceive that cooperation across the Services is in place to bring about that change.

There were several important differences in results for individual survey items among the categories. As such, there may be value in considering the development of customized priorities for each Service and Agency in addition to the development of priorities at the DoD level.

3.5.5.2.1 Conclusions

- Perceptions for the survey were highest for Air Force, with an overall average response score of 0.87, followed closely by Army and Navy with average response scores of 0.86 and 0.83, respectively. Non-Service Civilian and Marine Corps had lower perceptions, with average response scores of 0.68 and 0.65, respectively. These differences are not extreme, but should be investigated to determine particularly why perceptions are lower for the Non-Service

Civilian and the Marine Corps groups and what countermeasures might be applied specifically for these two groups.

- Air Force had the highest perceptions overall as well as for 6 of the 12 survey items. However, they had relatively lower perceptions on 2 survey items regarding cooperation among the Services and refusal to accept that accidents and mishaps will occur.
- Army had the second highest perceptions overall, but scored particularly low regarding belief that a 50 percent reduction in the accident and mishap rate is achievable and regarding safety funding in the budget process.
- Navy had the third highest perceptions overall, but scored particularly high regarding acceptance of the best practices approach, refusal to accept that accidents and mishaps will occur, and belief that a 50 percent reduction in the accident and mishap rate is achievable.
- Marine Corps had the lowest perceptions for the survey and for 6 of the 12 survey items. However, they had the highest perceptions regarding change being a high priority for leadership and regarding good cooperation across the Services on safety-related issues.
- Non-Service Civilians had the second lowest perceptions overall, but had the lowest perceptions regarding 5 survey items. It may be that non-service civilians are not as aware of these issues, or that they perceive those in the Services to be more responsible for these activities.
- Investigation into reasons for differences in responses among the different categories should address why the pattern of responses for certain items varied from the overall. Reasons for the overall differences by subgroup and the variations for individual items should be investigated, with a goal of sharing viewpoints and expectations of each category and for tailoring of subsequent interventions, actions or countermeasures to the specific subgroups. Dialogue among the Services to share viewpoints will facilitate obtaining a clearer picture of the accident and mishap problem for DoD, and should result in decreasing differences in perceptions among the Services.

3.5.6 Comparison of Survey Responses by Duty Status

Table 6 shows the number of respondents from each of the four duty status subgroups. Note that Civilian in this case refers to all SES members. Frequency and percent distributions by duty status subgroups can be calculated from distributions by Service, as presented in Appendix G.

Table 6. Survey Responses by Duty Status

Duty Status	*Number of Respondents*	*Percent of Respondents*
Active	591	46
Guard	135	10
Reserve	121	9
Civilian	444	34
Unspecified	8	1

Figure 11 graphically compares the safety perceptions of DoD senior leadership according to duty status, as indicated by overall average response scores for all survey items combined.

Figure 11. Overall Average Response Scores by Duty Status



Note: n=number of respondents

Overall scores were obtained by calculating the mean across the 12 individual item means. Guard respondents had the highest perceptions overall, followed by active duty and reserve. Civilian respondents had the lowest perceptions. The overall average response score was 0.98 for guard, 0.87 for active duty, 0.83 for reserve, and 0.71 for civilian respondents. The overall average response score for all respondents was 0.82. While the disparity among responses by duty status is not extreme compared to that typically found for other NSC survey results, these results still suggest that targeted efforts to elevate perceptions of safety program elements for civilians (and to some extent for reserve and active personnel) to the same level as the Guard may be an effective strategy for strengthening safety perceptions for DoD.

Figure 12 compares safety perceptions of DoD senior leaders according to duty status for each of the individual survey items.

Figure 12. Overall Average Response Scores by Duty Status



Note: See Table 6 for numerical data.

Table 7 shows these data in tabular form with rankings of each group's score among duty status categories shown in parentheses. Highest scores are indicated with green shading; lowest scores are indicated with red shading. Although perceptions for guard respondents are higher than active and reserve respondents, which in turn are higher than civilian respondents, analysis of Figure 12 and Table 7 indicates whether this difference was maintained across all survey items or whether relative perceptions of the subgroups differed depending on the survey item topic.

Table 7. Ranking of Average Response Scores[1] by Duty Status

Survey Item	Average Response Scores[1] and Ranking[2]				ALL RESPONDENTS
	Guard	Active	Reserve	Civilian	
1 I believe leadership is sincere in its efforts to ensure personnel safety	1.70 (3)	1.75 (2)	1.78 (1)	**1.53 (4)**	**1.67**
3 Leadership consistently demonstrates a positive commitment to personnel safety	1.54 (3)	1.59 (1)	1.55 (2)	**1.29 (4)**	**1.48**
2 Appropriate safety goals are set annually by leadership	1.27 (1)	1.21 (2)	1.18 (3)	**0.93 (4)**	**1.12**
8 Making truly beneficial changes in our safety environment is a high priority for leadership	1.22 (2)	1.28 (1)	1.16 (3)	**0.85 (4)**	**1.11**
5 Safety takes a back seat mission in our organization *	1.18 (2)	1.24 (1)	1.04 (3)	**0.93 (4)**	**1.10**
9 Implementing successful organization best practices in safety is one of the most effective ways to bring about change	1.16 (1)	1.05 (3)	1.09 (2)	**0.91 (4)**	**1.02**
11 Leadership has provided adequate resources to manage and support safety-related programs	0.76 (1)	0.63 (2)	0.59 (3)	**0.43 (4)**	**0.57**
4 Supervisors consider safety performance when rating their personnel	0.73 (1)	0.59 (2)	0.50 (3)	**0.26 (4)**	**0.48**
10 Good cooperation exists across the Services on safety-related issues	0.55 (1)	0.38 (2)	0.38 (2)	**0.37 (4)**	**0.39**
12 We have to accept that accidents and mishaps will occur in our line of work *	0.58 (1)	0.29 (3)	**0.26 (4)**	0.51 (2)	**0.39**
7 Decreasing the DoD accident and mishap rate by 50% over the next two years is achievable	0.65 (1)	**0.12 (4)**	0.25 (3)	0.35 (2)	**0.26**
6 Safety funding is adequately represented in the budget process	0.36 (1)	0.27 (2)	**0.14 (4)**	0.21 (3)	**0.25**
OVERALL	**0.98 (1)**	**0.87 (2)**	**0.83 (3)**	**0.71 (4)**	**0.82**

[1] Calculated by assigning a value of +2 for strongly positive response; +1 for a positive response; 0 for neutral response; -1 for a negative response; and -2 for a strongly negative response. (See Appendix D for more information regarding methods of analysis)

[2] The ranking of each group's score is indicated in parentheses. "1" indicates most positive response; "5" indicates the least positive.

* Calculated from reversed scores. See 3.4.2 for details.

For each statement, the highest performing group is shaded green. The lowest performing group is shaded **red.**

Guard had the highest perceptions overall and for 8 of the 12 survey items. This is a relatively consistent result for Guard across all survey items. However, they had the second lowest perceptions on the survey item regarding the belief that leadership is sincere in its efforts to ensure personnel safety (Q1) and leadership consistently demonstrates a positive commitment to personnel safety (Q3).

Active Duty had the second highest perceptions overall, but had the highest perceptions concerning 3 of the 12 survey items, including: leadership consistently demonstrates a positive commitment to personnel safety (Q3); making truly beneficial changes in the safety environment being a high priority for leadership (Q8); and safety being as important as mission in the organization (Q5). However, active duty respondents had the lowest perceptions of all duty status subgroups regarding belief that a 50 percent reduction in the accident and mishap rate is achievable (Q7).

Reserve had the second lowest perceptions overall, but had the lowest perceptions of all duty status groups regarding two survey items: refusal to accept that accidents and mishaps will occur in the DoD line of work (Q12) and safety funding being adequately represented in the budget process (Q6). In contrast, the reserve subgroup had the highest perceptions regarding the belief that leadership is sincere in its efforts to ensure personnel safety (Q1).

Civilian had the lowest perceptions overall and also the lowest perceptions regarding 9 of the 12 survey items. This is a relatively consistent result for civilian respondents across all survey items. As indicated earlier regarding non-service civilian respondents, consideration should be given to determine whether these items are scored lowest by civilian respondents because they lack knowledge compared to the other duty status subgroups. For all survey respondent subgroups, lack of visibility of a safety program element should not be considered an acceptable contributor to low scores. In the highest functioning safety programs, having elements that are present and effective is not sufficient. Great care must be taken to ensure that the elements are visible and that DoD senior leaders are aware they are essential to the program's success.

Results in this section show some variation did occur by individual survey item, such as with active respondents scoring low on belief that a 50 percent reduction in the accident and mishap rate is achievable, and with reserve respondents scoring high on belief that leadership is sincere in its efforts to ensure personnel safety. As such, there would be value in developing targeted priorities for each duty status category in addition to the development of priorities for DoD.

3.5.6.1 Conclusions

- Perceptions for the survey were highest for guard respondents, with an overall average response score of 0.98, followed closely by active and reserve respondents with average response scores of 0.87 and 0.83, respectively. Civilian respondents had the lowest perception, with an average response score of 0.71. These differences are not extreme, but should be investigated to determine particularly why perceptions are lower for the civilians.
- Guard had the highest perceptions overall and for 8 of the 12 survey items. However, they had relatively lower perceptions on 2 survey items regarding leadership sincerity in safety efforts and leadership consistently demonstrates positive commitment to safety.

- Active Duty had the second highest perceptions overall, but scored particularly high regarding leadership demonstrates commitment, change being a priority for leadership, and safety being as important as mission. However, active respondents scored particularly low regarding belief that a 50 percent reduction in accidents is achievable.
- Reserve had the second lowest perceptions overall, but scored particularly high regarding leadership sincerity in safety efforts. However, they had the lowest responses of any group regarding refusal to accept that accidents and mishaps will occur and safety funding in the budget process.
- Civilians had the lowest perceptions for the survey and for 9 of the 12 survey items. Consideration should be given to determine whether these items are scored lowest by civilian respondents because they lack knowledge compared to the other duty status groups.
- Investigation into reasons for differences in responses among these duty status groups should address why the pattern of responses for certain items varied from the overall. Reasons for the overall differences by subgroup and the variations for individual items should be investigated with a goal of sharing viewpoints and expectations of each duty status group and for tailoring of subsequent interventions, actions or countermeasures to the specific duty status subgroups. Dialogue among duty status groups to share viewpoints will facilitate obtaining a clearer picture of the accident and mishap problem for DoD, and will lead to decreased differences in perceptions.

3.5.7 Comparison of Survey Responses by Category/Duty Status

Table 8 shows the number of respondents categorized by both service and duty status.

Table 8. Responses by Category/Duty Status

Service	*Number of Respondents*	*Percent of Respondents*	*Service*	*Number of Respondents*	*Percent of Respondents*
Army-Active	231	18	Air Force-Guard	52	4
Army-Guard	83	6	Air Force-Reserve	19	2
Army-Reserve	79	6	Air Force-Civilian	63	5
Army-Civilian	92	7	Marine Corps-Active	62	5
Navy-Active	113	9	Marine Corps-Reserve	5	*
Navy-Reserve	18	1	Marine Corps-Civilian	11	1
Navy-Civilian	112	8	Non-Service Civilian	166	13
Air Force-Active	185	14	Unspecified	8	1

*less than 0.5 percent.

As indicated earlier, the non-service civilian category represents those SES members who are not a member of one of the Services. Frequency and percent distributions by Service are included in Appendix G.

Figure 13 graphically compares the safety perceptions of DoD senior leaders according to Service, as indicated by overall average response scores for all survey items combined. Overall scores were obtained by calculating the mean across the 12 individual item means. The order of presentation for categories in Figure 13 is not highest to lowest, but rather by category within duty status subgroups.

Figure 13. Overall Average Response Scores by Category/Duty Status



Air Force-Guard had the highest perceptions overall of any specific subgroup, followed by Army-Guard, Air Force-Active, and Navy-Active. Of the active duty subgroups, all had relatively consistent responses overall, with average response scores between 0.87 and 0.92, except for the Marine Corps-Active which had an average response score of 0.62. The Army Guard and Air Force-Guard had high overall scores. There was little variation among the reserve subgroups, all with average response scores above the overall average range of 0.82 to 0.88. By contrast, all civilian subgroups had average response scores below the overall average, ranging from a high of 0.81 for Army-Civilian to a low of 0.68 for Non-Service Civilian.

The disparity among subgroup responses from highest to the lowest is relatively large compared to that typically found in other NSC survey results. These results suggest that targeted efforts to elevate perceptions of the lowest ranking groups (for example, Air Force-Civilian and Marine Corps-Active) to the same level as Guard respondents may be an effective strategy for strengthening safety perceptions for DoD.

Table 9 compares safety perceptions of DoD senior leaders according to categories/duty status for each of the individual survey items. This table indicates whether the differences discussed above for overall survey results by subgroup were maintained across all survey items or whether relative perceptions of the subgroups differed depending on the survey item topic. In Table 9, rankings of each subgroup's score among categories/duty status are shown in parentheses. Highest scores are indicated with green shading; lowest scores are indicated with red shading. Since Marine Corps-Reserve had only 5 respondents, this group was eliminated from the analysis in Table 9.

Perceptions for Air Force-Guard were highest overall and for 3 of the 12 survey items, namely the belief that leaders are sincere in their safety efforts (Q1), supervisors consider safety performance when rating personnel (Q4), and belief that decreasing the DoD accident and mishap rate by 50 percent over the next 2 years is achievable (Q7). Army-Guard had the highest perceptions for 1 survey item: good cooperation existing across the Services on safety-related issues (Q10). Air Force-Active had the third highest average response score overall, but had the highest scores for 6 of the 12 survey items.

Navy-Active had the fourth most positive perception of the categories/duty status subgroups overall, but had the most positive perceptions in regard to refusal to accept that accident and mishaps will occur in the DoD line of work (Q12). Navy-Reserve had only the tenth highest overall, but had the highest perceptions of any group in regard to appropriate safety goals being set by leadership (Q2) and implementing successful organization best practices being one of the most effective ways to bring about change (Q9). However, Navy-Reserve also had the lowest perceptions in regard to good cooperation existing across the Services on safety-related issues (Q10).

Air Force-Civilian had the lowest perceptions of any categories/duty status subgroup overall and for 3 of the 12 survey items. Marine Corps-Active had the second lowest scores overall and the lowest for 4 of the 12 survey items. Non-Service Civilian had the third lowest scores overall and the lowest for 4 of the 12 survey items.

Table 9. Ranking of Average Response Scores[1] by Categories/Duty Status

Survey Item	Average Response Scores[1] and Ranking[2]														ALL RESPONDENTS
	Air Force-Guard	Army-Guard	Air Force-Active	Navy-Active	Air Force-Reserve	Army-Active	Army-Reserve	Army-Civilian	Navy-Reserve	Marine Corps-Civilian	Navy-Civilian	Non-Service Civilian	Marine Corps-Active	Air Force-Civilian	
1 I believe leadership is sincere in its	1.81 (1)	1.64 (9)	1.81 (1)	1.68 (7)	1.74 (6)	1.77 (4)	1.77 (4)	1.63 (11)	1.78 (3)	1.64 (9)	1.59 (12)	1.48 (13)	1.66 (8)	**1.44 (14)**	**1.67**
3 Leadership consistently demonstrates a positive commitment to personnel safety	1.63 (2)	1.49 (7)	1.71 (1)	1.47 (8)	1.42 (10)	1.62 (3)	1.54 (6)	1.45 (9)	1.56 (4)	1.55 (5)	1.33 (12)	**1.18 (14)**	1.37 (11)	1.22 (13)	**1.48**
2 Appropriate safety goals are set annually by leadership	1.37 (2)	1.20 (6)	1.28 (4)	1.12 (7)	1.32 (3)	1.28 (4)	1.08 (9)	1.08 (9)	1.39 (1)	1.09 (8)	0.96 (11)	**0.83 (14)**	0.95 (12)	0.90 (13)	**1.12**
8 Making truly beneficial changes in our safety environment is a high priority for	1.22 (3)	1.22 (3)	1.34 (1)	1.21 (5)	1.05 (9)	1.28 (2)	1.19 (6)	0.98 (11)	1.00 (10)	1.09 (8)	0.89 (12)	**0.76 (14)**	1.19 (6)	0.78 (13)	**1.11**
5 Safety takes a back seat to mission in our organization *	1.27 (3)	1.12 (7)	1.39 (1)	1.19 (6)	1.32 (2)	1.24 (5)	1.04 (9)	1.04 (9)	0.94 (11)	1.27 (3)	1.05 (8)	0.88 (12)	0.82 (13)	**0.62 (14)**	**1.10**
9 Implementing successful organization best practices in safety is one of the most effective ways to bring about change	1.20 (3)	1.13 (6)	1.14 (5)	1.26 (2)	0.89 (11)	0.99 (8)	1.05 (7)	0.93 (9)	1.39 (1)	1.18 (4)	0.88 (13)	0.92 (10)	**0.59 (14)**	0.89 (11)	**1.02**
11 Leadership has provided adequate resources to manage and support safety-related programs	0.73 (4)	0.78 (3)	0.82 (1)	0.58 (5)	0.79 (2)	0.58 (5)	0.57 (7)	0.53 (8)	0.33 (12)	0.36 (10)	0.35 (11)	0.49 (9)	0.32 (13)	**0.25 (14)**	**0.57**
4 Supervisors consider safety performance when rating their personnel	0.83 (1)	0.67 (2)	0.61 (4)	0.50 (7)	0.47 (8)	0.67 (2)	0.57 (6)	0.58 (5)	0.39 (11)	0.45 (9)	0.22 (13)	**0.11 (14)**	0.41 (10)	0.23 (12)	**0.48**
10 Good cooperation exists across the Services on safety-related issues	0.32 (10)	0.69 (1)	0.22 (12)	0.34 (8)	0.26 (11)	0.47 (4)	0.53 (3)	0.46 (5)	**0.00 (14)**	0.45 (7)	0.46 (5)	0.34 (8)	0.56 (2)	0.17 (13)	**0.39**
12 We have to accept that accidents and mishaps will occur in our line of work *	0.65 (3)	0.53 (5)	0.15 (13)	0.83 (1)	0.63 (4)	0.19 (11)	0.21 (10)	0.40 (7)	0.29 (8)	0.18 (12)	0.76 (2)	0.52 (6)	**0.08 (14)**	0.26 (9)	**0.39**
7 Decreasing the DoD accident and mishap rate by 50% over the next two years is achievable	0.81 (1)	0.55 (2)	0.11 (11)	0.46 (3)	0.32 (9)	0.10 (12)	0.22 (10)	0.45 (4)	0.44 (5)	0.00 (13)	0.34 (7)	0.33 (8)	**-0.43 (14)**	0.35 (6)	**0.26**
6 Safety funding is adequately represented in the budget process	0.37 (2)	0.35 (3)	0.48 (1)	0.34 (4)	0.32 (5)	0.19 (8)	0.13 (9)	0.20 (7)	-0.06 (13)	0.09 (11)	0.13 (9)	0.32 (5)	**-0.15 (14)**	0.08 (12)	**0.25**
OVERALL	**1.02 (1)**	**0.95 (2)**	**0.92 (3)**	**0.91 (4)**	**0.88 (5)**	**0.87 (6)**	**0.82 (7)**	**0.81 (9)**	**0.79 (10)**	**0.78 (11)**	**0.75 (12)**	**0.68 (13)**	**0.62 (14)**	**0.60 (15)**	**0.82**

[1] Calculated by assigning a value of +2 for strongly positive response; +1 for a positive response; 0 for neutral response; -1 for a negative response; and -2 for a strongly negative response. (See Appendix D for more information regarding methods of analysis)

[2] The ranking of each group's score is indicated in parentheses. "1" indicates most positive response; "5" indicates the least positive.

* Calculated from reversed scores. See 3.4.2 for details.

For each statement, the highest performing group is shaded green. The lowest performing group is shaded **red.**

Results in this section show that overall results across duty status categories generally were borne out when considering individual survey items. Almost all of the 12 survey items were scored highest by either the Air Force-Guard, Army-Guard or Air Force-Active groups, while almost all of the 12 survey items were scored lowest by either the Air Force-Civilians, Marine Corps-Active, or Non-Service Civilian groups. However, some variation did occur by individual survey item, such as with Navy-Active respondents scoring highest on refusal to accept that accidents and mishaps will occur in the DoD line of work, with Navy-Reserve scoring highest on setting appropriate safety goals annually and on beliefs regarding implementing best practices, and with Navy-Reserve scoring lowest on good cooperation existing across the Services in regard to safety.

3.5.7.1 Conclusions

- Air Force-Guard had the highest perceptions overall of any specific categories/duty status subgroup, with an overall average response score of 1.02, followed by Army-Guard, Air Force-Active, and Navy-Active, with averages response scores of 0.95, 0.92, and 0.91, respectively. Air Force-Civilian had the lowest perceptions, with an average response score of 0.60, followed by Marine Corps-Active, Non-Service Civilian, Navy-Civilian, and Marine Corps-Civilian, with scores of 0.62, 0.68, 0.75, and 0.78, respectively. In general, Marine Corps and Civilian subgroups had the lowest perceptions, while 3 of the top 5 subgroups were Air Force. Disparity among scores from highest to lowest scoring subgroups was fairly large.
- Almost all of the 12 survey items were scored highest by the Air Force-Guard, Army-Guard, or Air Force-Active subgroups. The only exceptions were regarding refusal to believe that accidents and mishaps will occur, which was scored highest by Navy-Active, and regarding safety goals being set by leadership and belief in best practices, both of which were scored highest by Navy-Reserve.
- Almost all of the 12 survey items were scored lowest by the Air Force-Civilian, Marine Corps-Active, or Non-Service Civilian subgroups. The only exception was regarding good cooperation existing across the Services, which was scored lowest by Navy-Reserve.
- Particular attention should be paid to the Air Force-Civilian subgroup. It scored lowest in perceptions of all the Service subgroups, and contrasted with the other 3 Air Force subgroups, each of which was 1 of the top 5 scoring subgroups. Reasons for the disparity should be investigated.
- Investigation into reasons for differences in responses among these subgroups should address why the pattern of responses occurred. Reasons for the overall differences by subgroup and the variations for individual items should be investigated with a goal of sharing viewpoints and expectations of each categories/duty status subgroup and for tailoring of subsequent interventions, actions or countermeasures. Dialogue to share viewpoints will facilitate obtaining a clearer picture of the accident and mishap problem and should result in decreasing differences in perceptions.

3.5.8 Comparison of Survey Responses by Organization

Table 10 shows the number of respondents representing each of the 11 organizations.

Table 10. Survey Responses by Organization

Organization	*Number of Respondents*	*Percent of Respondents*
OSD Staff	64	5
JSC Staff	29	2
DoD Agencies	93	7
COCOM and other Joint Commands	83	6
Service Secretariat Staff	78	6
Service Headquarters Staff	174	13
MAJCOM/MACOM/CLAIMANT	189	15
Major Subordinate Commands and Below	351	27
DoD Field Activities	48	4
Joint Service Schools	18	1
Other	150	12
Unspecified	22	2

Frequency and percent distributions by organization are presented in Appendix H. Since the Joint Service Schools had only 18 respondents, they were combined with the category "Other" for analysis in this section.

Figure 14 graphically compares the safety perceptions of responding DoD senior leaders according to organization, as indicated by overall average response scores for all survey items combined. Overall scores were obtained by calculating the mean across the 12 individual items' means. MAJCOM/MACOM/CLAIMANT had the highest perceptions overall of any organization group, followed by the Major Subordinate Commands and Below, Other, DoD Agencies, and COCOM and other Joint Commands. All of these organizations had average response scores at or above the overall average score of 0.82. The OSD Staff and JSC Staff had the lowest perceptions, with scores of 0.51 and 0.62, respectively. Other organizations with scores below the overall average included the Service Secretariat Staff, DoD Field Activities, and
Service Headquarters Staff. It should be noted that all command-related organizations had average response scores above the overall average, while all staff-related organizations had average response scores below the overall average.

Figure 14. Overall Average Response Scores by Organization



The disparity among responses by organization from the highest to the lowest is relatively large compared to that typically found in comparisons of other NSC survey results. These results suggest that targeted efforts to elevate perceptions of the lower scoring staff groups to the same level as command-related respondents may be an effective strategy for strengthening safety perceptions for DoD.

Table 11 compares safety perceptions of responding DoD senior leaders according to organization for each of the individual survey items. This table indicates whether the differences discussed above for overall survey results by organization were universal for all survey items or whether relative perceptions of the organizations differed depending on the survey item topic. In Table 11, rankings of each group's score among organization are shown in parentheses. Highest scores are indicated with green shading; lowest scores are indicated with red shading. As noted earlier, the Joint Service School respondents were included in the Other category.

Table 11. Ranking of Average Response Scores[1] by Organization

Survey Item	Average Response Scores[1] and Ranking[2]										ALL RESPONDENTS
	MAJCOM/ MACOM/ CLAIMANT	Major Subordinate Commands and Below	Other	DoD Agencies	COCOM and other JC	Service HQ Staff	DoD Field Activities	Service Secretariat Staff	JSC Staff	OSD Staff	
1 I believe leadership is sincere in its efforts to	1.76 (1)	1.73 (3)	1.64 (7)	1.62 (8)	1.75 (2)	1.68 (6)	1.71 (5)	1.60 (9)	1.72 (4)	**1.27 (10)**	**1.67**
3 Leadership consistently demonstrates a positive commitment to personnel safety	1.60 (1)	1.58 (2)	1.46 (5)	1.40 (6)	1.54 (3)	1.40 (6)	1.50 (4)	1.39 (8)	1.38 (9)	**0.94 (10)**	**1.48**
2 Appropriate safety goals are set annually by leadership	1.30 (1)	1.21 (3)	1.05 (6)	1.12 (4)	1.24 (2)	1.03 (8)	0.96 (9)	1.04 (7)	1.07 (5)	**0.58 (10)**	**1.12**
8 Making truly beneficial changes in our safety environment is a high priority for leadership	1.23 (1)	1.22 (2)	1.08 (6)	1.02 (7)	1.12 (3)	1.12 (3)	0.94 (8)	1.12 (3)	0.93 (9)	**0.63 (10)**	**1.11**
5 Safety takes a back seat to mission in our organization *	1.29 (1)	1.16 (2)	1.08 (5)	1.00 (8)	1.12 (4)	1.15 (3)	1.02 (6)	1.01 (7)	**0.72 (10)**	0.75 (9)	**1.10**
9 Implementing successful organization best practices in safety is one of the most effective	1.15 (1)	1.05 (2)	0.96 (7)	1.04 (3)	1.02 (5)	0.97 (6)	0.94 (8)	1.03 (4)	**0.79 (10)**	0.86 (9)	**1.02**
11 Leadership has provided adequate resources to manage and support safety-related programs	0.71 (2)	0.55 (5)	0.65 (3)	0.73 (1)	0.51 (6)	0.59 (4)	0.40 (7)	0.36 (8)	0.28 (9)	**0.24 (10)**	**0.57**
4 Supervisors consider safety performance when rating their personnel	0.53 (5)	0.66 (1)	0.56 (3)	0.31 (7)	0.55 (4)	0.41 (6)	0.58 (2)	0.15 (9)	0.28 (8)	**-0.11 (10)**	**0.48**
10 Good cooperation exists across the Services on safety-related issues	0.43 (4)	0.38 (8)	**0.29 (10)**	0.42 (6)	0.45 (2)	0.39 (7)	0.45 (2)	0.43 (4)	0.62 (1)	0.34 (9)	**0.39**
12 We have to accept that accidents and mishaps will occur in our line of work *	0.28 (9)	0.44 (3)	0.60 (1)	0.41 (6)	0.33 (8)	0.34 (7)	0.42 (5)	0.45 (2)	**-0.32 (10)**	0.44 (3)	**0.39**
7 Decreasing the DoD accident and mishap rate by 50% over the next two years is achievable	0.34 (2)	0.27 (5)	0.34 (2)	0.34 (2)	0.10 (8)	0.19 (7)	0.09 (9)	0.45 (1)	**-0.07 (10)**	0.21 (6)	**0.26**
6 Safety funding is adequately represented in the budget process	0.33 (2)	0.17 (6)	0.31 (3)	0.60 (1)	0.13 (7)	0.29 (4)	0.23 (5)	**0.05 (9)**	0.07 (8)	**0.05 (9)**	**0.25**
OVERALL	**0.91 (1)**	**0.87 (2)**	**0.84 (3)**	**0.83 (4)**	**0.82 (5)**	**0.80 (6)**	**0.77 (7)**	**0.76 (8)**	**0.62 (9)**	**0.51 (10)**	**0.82**

[1] Calculated by assigning a value of +2 for strongly positive response; +1 for a positive response; 0 for neutral response; -1 for a negative response; and -2 for a strongly negative response. (See Appendix D for more information regarding methods of analysis)

[2] The ranking of each group's score is indicated in parentheses. "1" indicates most positive response; "5" indicates the least positive.

* Calculated from reversed scores. See 3.4.2 for details.

For each statement, the highest performing group is shaded green. The lowest performing group is shaded **red.**

Showing notable consistency, perceptions for MAJCOM/MACOM/CLAIMANT were highest overall and also highest for 6 of the 12 survey items. The Major Subordinate Commands and Below had the second highest perceptions overall, but responded most positively of any group regarding supervisors considering safety performance when rating their personnel (Q4). The DoD Agencies had the fourth highest perceptions overall, but had the highest perceptions regarding safety funding being adequately represented in the budget process (Q6) and leadership providing adequate resources to manage and support safety programs (Q11).

The Service Secretariat Staff had the third lowest perceptions overall and the lowest perception regarding safety being adequately represented in the budget process (Q6). However, the Service Secretariat Staff had the highest perceptions of any organization regarding the belief that decreasing the DoD accident and mishap rate by 50 percent over the next 2 years is achievable (Q7). The JSC Staff had the second lowest ratings overall and rated 4 of the 12 survey items lower than any other organization. However, the JSC Staff gave the highest rating of all organizations to the item regarding good cooperation existing across the Services on safety-rated issues (Q10). OSD Staff had the lowest perception overall and for 7 of the 12 survey items.

Results in this section show that overall results across organizations generally were borne out when considering individual survey items. Almost all of the 12 survey items were scored highest by either the MAJCOM/MACOM/CLAIMANT, the Major Subordinate Commands and Below, or the DoD Agencies, while almost all of the 12 survey items were scored lowest by either the Service Secretariat Staff, the JSC Staff, or the OSD Staff. However, some variation by individual survey items did occur, such as with the Service Secretariat Staff scoring highest on belief that decreasing the accident and mishap rate by 50 percent is achievable and with the JSC Staff scoring highest on belief that good cooperation exists across the Services on safety-related issues.

3.5.8.1 Conclusions

- MAJCOM/MACOM/CLAIMANT had the highest perception overall of any specific organization with an overall average response score of 0.91, followed by the Major Subordinate Commands and Below, Other, DoD Agencies, and COCOM and other Joint Commands. All of these organizations had average response scores at or above the overall average score of 0.82.
- The OSD Staff and JSC Staff had the lowest perceptions, with average response scores of 0.51 and 0.62, respectively. Other organizations with scores below the overall average

included the Service Secretariat Staff, DoD Field Activities, and Service Headquarters Staff.

- All command-related organizations had average response scores above the overall average, while all staff-related organizations had average response scores below the overall average. Disparity among scores from highest to lowest was fairly large.
- Almost all of the 12 survey items were scored highest by either the MAJCOM/MACOM/CLAIMANT, the Major Subordinate Commands and Below, or the DoD Agencies. The only exceptions were regarding belief that decreasing the accident rate by 50 percent was achievable, which was scored highest by the Service Secretariat Staff, and regarding good cooperation existing across the Services, which was scored highest by the JSC Staff.
- Almost all of the 12 survey items were scored lowest by either the Service Secretariat Staff, the JSC Staff, or OSD Staff. The only exception was regarding good cooperation existing across the Services, which was scored lowest by those in the Other category.
- Investigation into reasons for differences among these organizations should address why the pattern of responses for certain items varied from the overall. Reasons for the overall differences by organization and the variations for individual items should be investigated with a goal of sharing viewpoints and expectations and for tailoring of subsequent interventions, actions or countermeasures. Dialogue to share viewpoints will facilitate obtaining a clearer picture of the accident and mishap problem and should result in decreasing differences in perceptions.

3.6 Respondent Comments

DoD senior leaders provided written comments to the two open-ended questions at the end of the survey form:

- ***If you were to suggest one action that would improve safety in DoD, what would it be?***
- ***Please provide any other general comments you may have.***

The number and quality of comments provided were extremely high when compared to other NSC surveys. Approximately 722 respondents provided comments for the first open-ended item regarding suggested actions. This represents over 55 percent of respondents, while the threshold of a 50 percent response rate on comments is considered excellent. Nearly 300 survey respondents also provided responses for the second open-ended item regarding general comments. It is clear that respondents took the survey subject very seriously and cared enough about the issue to take the extra time to provide their thoughts. It is also clear that the brevity of the survey allowed respondents to provide meaningful comments before

they tired of the survey task or were distracted by other duties.

Those responsible for interpreting survey results and considering follow-up actions should allow time for reading the comments in their entirely. As a group, they provide high quality and insightful suggestions for improvement and observations on the status of safety issues. While the path forward from survey results to implementation of countermeasures should be based on survey data and input from many groups, the written comments provide an excellent starting point for the process of translating the survey into action.

3.6.1 Comments Regarding Suggested Actions

Comments from the first open-ended item regarding suggested actions that would improve safety in DoD are included in Appendix I. We deleted names, unit, and location to preserve respondent anonymity and edited inappropriate language, but otherwise the comments are verbatim. The comments were categorized and are described briefly in this section in order to summarize the most common suggestions and themes communicated by respondents.

3.6.1.1 Motor-Vehicle and Off-Duty Safety

One of the most frequent suggestions made by commenters was to focus on what is perceived to be the major DoD accident and mishap problem – motor-vehicle accidents, especially in off-duty privately-owned vehicles. The primary contributing factors to these accidents appear to be alcohol, speed, lack of seat belt use, fatigue, and reckless driving. The issue seems to be especially common among young people and involves an attitude of risk taking.

Regarding alcohol, many commenters labeled this issue as the most pressing one for motor-vehicle safety. Some specific suggestions included closing stores selling alcohol on all military installations, a mandatory breathalyzer key ring, mandatory designated drivers at military clubs that serve alcohol, and stricter enforcement of the uniform 21-year-old drinking age. Some questioned leaders' commitment to the alcohol issue in particular. This indicated there may be some denial it is a problem or that anything can be done about it. Several respondents indicated those who have accidents found to be alcohol-related should have the accident classified as not in the line of duty, with the possibility the individual would have to fund his or her own medical care, and family members would not receive survivor benefits.

Regarding seat belt use, suggestions mainly focused on education, communication, and penalties. Commenters called for increased penalties for lack of seat belt use, such as loss of driving privileges for a month or other serious penalties.

Special attention was also paid to the topic of motorcycles, the most serious issue for off-

duty motor-vehicle safety. Many commenters suggested the problem is so serious it warrants an outright ban on motorcycle use by military personnel. Others suggested prohibiting them on installations, either overseas, in the U.S., or both. As a minimum, respondents call for implementing DoD-wide standards for motorcycle safety, such as helmet use, regardless of varying state laws.

By far, the most commonly suggested countermeasure to improve motor-vehicle safety was widespread implementation of driver training. Format of the suggested training varied, including all new personnel to an installation getting a 1-hour driving course, remedial courses just for those with speeding violations or poor driving records, practical hands-on training, specific training for motorcycle operators, etc. Some mentioned this should be part of a new comprehensive motor-vehicle safety program focused on education and training and uniformly implemented across Services.

3.6.1.2 Discipline and Accountability

Accountability at various levels of the organization was a topic frequently mentioned by respondents. Many felt accountability needs to be implemented at the commander level. Others felt the supervisor, non-commissioned officer, or safety officer is the appropriate level, or that accountability needs to be built into the system at the lowest levels. Several respondents indicated accountability needs to be implemented throughout the organization and felt at all levels.

Comments addressing accountability ranged from specific suggestions for the off-duty motor-vehicle safety issue to consequences for a poor safety record within the command. Comments on motor-vehicle safety accountability included implementing standards like helmets for motorcycle riders even if the State does not require them, suspending a drivers license upon identification of unsafe actions, imposing stiffer penalties for those riding without seat belts, and taking cars away from DoD personnel who break speed limits.

In general, respondents felt that while goals have been established and safety is discussed more than ever, the likelihood of real change is limited without a critical change in the system of accountability from the top down, including relieving commanders who “do not have an effective safety program, who fail to set the personal example necessary, or who exercise poor judgment by sacrificing safety for expedience.”

3.6.1.3 Award and Incentive Programs

As a companion to discipline and accountability, respondents felt that rewards and incentives were important keys to improving safety. Many mentioned rewards/incentives and discipline/accountability as related issues. However, others felt that rewards were even more

important than accountability since it is a positive way of modifying behavior, and because Service members want to succeed regarding safety. Some implied that the discipline/accountability system was in place to a greater extent than the rewards/incentives system.

Suggestions for addressing rewards and incentives ranged from financial versus non-financial, individual versus unit-level, and one-time versus cumulative. Specific ideas included an increase in organizational budget, a bonus or increase in individual pay, time off, unit or individual recognition, special celebratory events, and competition/award for best unit safety or number of accident-free miles.

Respondents indicated the awards need to be valuable and visible to others, be closely aligned with the achievement of specific safety improvements or performance indicators, and be coordinated throughout the organization so that all individuals and commands had the opportunity to compete. Commenters felt the cost of any increase in the rewards/incentive program would be minimal compared to the savings in reduced accidents. Some commenters indicated that since personal motor-vehicle accidents are the biggest issue, the rewards/incentive program should focus on this issue first.

3.6.1.4 Funding and Budgeting

Funding was one of the most common themes expressed by respondents as a suggestion to improve safety. Many comments were brief, indicating simply that funding is the critical element and needs to be increased. Other comments were specific regarding which programs or initiatives need to be funded, where the funding needs to be focused, or why the current system of funding is not working.

Some commenters noted rhetoric and goals are not sufficient to bring about change, and setting goals without addressing the funding issue is irresponsible. Commenters addressed the timeliness of funding, indicating that many times goals are set first with funding put in place many years later. Many indicated safety needs to be a separate line item in the budget, so leaders would not be faced with the choice of funding an operational war fighting program or the safety office. In these instances, safety usually places second, according to responders. Some suggestions for funding went beyond the specific safety-related offices, programs, or initiatives and implied inadequate funding for the organization's manpower and equipment also affect safety.

In regard to specific activities that need to be funded, respondents listed training, continuation and expansion of incentive programs, safety staff or civilian safety experts, driving simulators and other specific training equipment, and an adequate budget for

acquisitions. Responders stated safety is currently funded only to the make-do level, many mandated programs are not funded, and the current level of funding will not be sufficient to achieve the step change the SecDef is looking for in regard to safety.

3.6.1.5 Operational Readiness and Force Protection

Several commenters suggested advancing safety by including it as an element in a variety of broader issues related to moral, ethical, or practical principles. In this way, safety would not be regarded as a stand alone issue, but a by-product of professionalism and doing things the right way. Many commented on the relationship between safety and force protection or operational readiness, principles that are readily embraced by military leaders and Service members alike. Actions to ensure all Service members understand the impact of safety on force protection and operational readiness would also make them aware the safety decisions they make on or off duty affect more than just themselves. They would realize their presence (or absence) impacts the whole unit. Addressing the sense of obligation to the unit may be more effective than emphasizing the individual benefits of safe behavior.

Commenters suggested that this appeal to Service members' sense of duty would be effective. Many in the Service feel a strong sense of its underlying spirit or sentiment regarding values and the obligations of a warrior. One commenter also extended this connection to patriotism, "To operate safely should be recognized as a good American citizen's obligation/duty to himself/herself and every other citizen whose life or property he or she may affect."

3.6.1.6 Best Practices

Many comments focused on the theme of best practices – that is, sharing of the best or most effective ideas, methods, initiatives, programs, or trends. This sharing could be done from one unit to another. Several comments specifically mentioned the possible application of aviation best safety practices to ground operations. Expanding the source of best practices was mentioned by many respondents to include benchmarking against the American insurance or loss prevention industry, general industry or industry leaders. Others mentioned, however, that the unique aspects of the military required potential best practices from industry be subjected to a filtering process so that appropriate modifications could be made.

One commenter indicated past efforts to share among Services met with obstacles and roadblocks such as funding, attitude, and applicability. These would need to be overcome. Another commenter suggested that since safety is not a stand-alone issue, sharing best practices should focus on organizations that successfully perform the mission in the most effective way, not those with simply the best safety program.

3.6.1.7 Leadership Involvement and Commitment

Many respondents indicated leadership involvement and commitment are the most critical factors in achieving the 50 percent reduction goal. The perception is that current goals are established, but they don't have top-tier attention to match the rhetoric. Safety is seen as a priority for the organization, but not as high a priority as it needs to be to achieve stated goals.

Respondents commented on many facets of leadership involvement and commitment, including issues of responsibility, accountability, focus, attention, and participation by leaders. Various levels of leadership were discussed, with the majority indicating the higher in rank leaders are, the more critical they are to creating change. Many indicated commanders are the key, and there is little chance of any success unless it is a well-known concern of the senior commander. Conversely, when the commander believes and communicates, then things happen. Others indicated involvement of non-commissioned officers or other junior leaders is critical. With the trend toward younger non-commissioned officers this means less experience and a greater need for communication and training regarding management issues such as safety. Junior leaders need to be taught how to conduct accident and tactical risk mitigation. Still others felt civilian leadership is critical, and until the Service members see their leaders giving safety more than just rhetoric, only marginal reductions in accidents will be achieved.

Many commented on the special nature of leadership involvement required. It is not just an element in the process, but rather it is the one critical element that supersedes others. Some commenters indicated it is so important the whole focus on safety should shift from a programmatic approach to one of active leader involvement. Descriptions of the nature of leaders' involvement portray the need for it to be personal, genuine, vocal, open, active, continuous and consistent. It must also be pervasive, aggressive, and intrusive. It must be part of a leader's culture and the caring command climate the leader sets. It must be subject to constant discussion and focus. Leaders must also personally set the example for following good safety practices and raising the awareness of safety issues.

Key messages that should be communicated by leadership's involvement include: some accidents are unavoidable but the vast majority result from a chain of events within leadership's ability to manage; accidents can be prevented if procedures are known, understood, followed, and enforced; and safety and mission for the organization are one and the same. Leadership involvement needs to be of such magnitude that it sends the message that the safety and well-being of the people is not a once or twice a year emphasis, but an everyday job.

Besides general comments on the nature of leadership involvement, there were suggestions for more specific actions that should be taken. These included:

- Safety needs to be strongly emphasized in all leadership development training
- Senior commanders need to play a role in developing and communicating safety program changes within their organizations
- Leaders need to understand and be trained in how they can influence Service members' off-duty behavior
- A program should be created for safety akin to those already created for drugs, alcohol, and sexual harassment in the Service
- Address safety by means of a strategic communication plan with safety given priority in all guidance and directives
- Safety should be mentioned by leadership in every speech they make, similar to current common references to core values
- Safety should be an element of the President's Management Agenda

3.6.1.8 Individual Responsibility

In contrast to many respondents who focused on the roles and responsibilities of leadership in regard to safety issues, many others commented on safety involving an individual or personal responsibility. Many felt individuals should be held accountable for safety violations or unsafe acts instead of placing the entire responsibility on leaders or the organization. In this way, individuals would also take ownership of the safety problems, issues, and goals.

Some commenters suggested that people who willfully put themselves at risk should be held accountable, especially in their use of alcohol, or where individual judgment is a significant contributing factor. Personal adherence to standards is an important part of the military culture and should be applied to safety as well. Many commenters suggested that accountability is not a leadership versus individual issue, but that all personnel at all levels must be held accountable.

3.6.1.9 Cooperation Across Services

Besides sharing of best practices as described above, commenters expanded the discussion of cooperation across the Services to include other elements. Several respondents commented on the need for a joint or OSD safety center instead of Service safety centers. These

commenters noted it would reduce differences among Service reporting formats, align the Services with common, clearly defined terminology, and make better use of information on accidents across Services that share common activities. They indicated that since most ground mishaps and off-duty accidents share common elements among the Services, determining these common elements and working to solve the behavior that contributes to them could benefit all the Services.

Commenters indicated sharing among the Services is insufficient and the safety approach varies significantly among the Services. Establishing one safety office at the OSD level may help solve the division of responsibility between P&R and AT&L. It would be necessary to provide the adequate resources in terms of personnel and funding to a joint safety center.

Some commenters indicated there should be an Assistant Secretary of Defense for safety. That individual would then be empowered to leverage safety requirements globally, establish policy, and be part of the SecDef hierarchy to attend daily or weekly meetings.

3.6.1.10 Safety Stand-Downs

Several commenters indicated the need for periodic safety stand-down days or safety-event days. These would help draw attention to the issue of safety, focus all personnel at one time on the issue, and show safety is integral to the mission. The most common time frame mentioned was at least annually. Variations on the theme included a safety fair, symposia, or demonstrations where more comprehensive information on recreational, home or off-duty safety could be communicated. General safety activities to be performed during a stand-down included cleaning up office areas, removing hazardous items that block hallways, and every organization receiving an unannounced visit from a Flag officer or SES member.

3.6.1.11 Pace of Duties

The pace of work and level of staffing was a topic many respondents indicated was a major contributor to accidents and mishaps. Many called for reduced OPSTEMPO, PERSTEMPO, and reduced task overload to allow adequate time for performance of duties. In their view, there is reduced manning with increased mission demands resulting in cut corners and little time to plan. Several commenters noted most safety violations or incidents occur when the workforce is under pressure. To gloss over this fact or not acknowledge it harms the credibility of leadership when calling for reduced mishap rates.

The related issue of fatigue, especially while performing critical tasks, was also noted by several commenters. Sufficient crew rest, proper relief, monitoring of required work hours, and enforcement of worker rest periods in the field were all called for by respondents. Training was also mentioned as a related issue, as the increased number of events and

complexity of the mission has resulted in a greater need for training but less actual time for it.

Suggestions from commenters included having the senior leaders of major commands, Services, and OSD say "no" to increased mission activities unless they are adequately funded and staffed. Some commenters focused on non-mission distractions as a target, indicating that unnecessary ancillary activity and program changes during these times of high OPSTEMPO should be questioned. Some called for increases in the "organizational constancy of purpose" so people are more able to focus on mission performance, as there are "too many good ideas and new visions coming from too many organizations at too fast a pace." One respondent suggested a need to "control change without compromising our ability to train and execute our mission safely" and that "change should be governed so that only a few things that can be done well are initiated simultaneously, while permitting our limited personnel to safely accomplish their normal day-to-day missions."

3.6.1.12 Measurement and Metrics

Many commenters called for increased use of statistical tracking and measuring of safety performance as a key driver for reducing accident and mishap rates. Leaders should agree on specific metrics, review them regularly, and use them universally throughout DoD, as some commenters indicated mishap reports are currently not shared and lessons learned are not universally addressed. Some indicated metrics for safety should mirror those used to address other operational factors, so that safety readiness is measured similarly to combat readiness. In this way, the mission would be managed safely rather than safety being managed separately from the mission.

Several respondents called for creation or enhancement of a database of accidents for analysis. Location, circumstances, primary contribution factors, and good root cause data for analysis would be included. The database would be used not just for enumeration of past events, but for trend analysis, correlations, and finding commonalities of causes so that actionable prevention strategies could be implemented. Modeling of the data may also enable predicting when a certain type of mishap is most likely to occur, related to deployment levels, experience levels, and mission types. Other suggestions regarding the database included collection of cost-benefit information showing statistical tracking of safety versus impact on mission, dollars or time lost, or the operational impact of accidents or safety improvements.

Another specific suggestion related to creation of accident databases focused on the need to collect information on near misses and first-aid cases. Having a definition that includes any unplanned event in any critical operation, whether or not injury or damage occurs, would

capture leading indicators and allow a more proactive approach to safety management and accident prevention. This would ensure DoD benefits from lessons learned and prevent more serious accidents from occurring.

Communication and publicizing metrics and statistics was also a common theme. Many indicated the need to make sure the safety trend is always in front of everyone and the need to show the goal and progress toward it. All personnel need a better picture of safety-related challenges and opportunities in their specific work areas.

3.6.1.13 Training

Increasing the level of training provided on safety issues was mentioned frequently by respondents. Most indicated that training should be required while funding and resources should be provided. Also, safety education should begin during basic training and be included in professional development.

Respondents indicated that while each individual Service member needs ongoing periodic safety training, there is an additional need to target younger members and all top leaders, especially first-level commanders. Additional attention should also be paid to those involved in activities with moderate to high risk. Refresher training should occur on a regular quarterly or annual basis through an established training format or a newly created Web-based format.

Suggestions regarding content of the training were many:

- a clear focus on safety at work, at home, and during travel;
- compliance with established safety principles;
- how to mitigate risks as part of everyday activities;
- use of best behavior modification and influencing science;
- training on responsibility and decision making;
- presentation of relevant data and statistics to create an ongoing awareness; and
- training on new equipment under conditions where the equipment will be used.

It was suggested that commanders and top non-commissioned officers should be required to periodically conduct a training session with their direct reports and their staff to discuss safety and risk assessment “as the leader, with the focus on leadership, truly demonstrating the caring for the welfare of the soldier.” One commenter indicated training time is so brief and precious the content of the training should be considered carefully to derive the greatest benefit.

Another commenter indicated the need to include safety in the culture change training leaders receive. DoD culturally conditions officers as they mature, but there is little purposeful grooming of command skills concerning safety. There is a substantial dimension to safety dealing with the psychology and conditioning of Service members. It requires well-developed skills to identify leading indicators of safety downturns or upturns. The commenter indicated the need to train leaders to recognize problematic scheduling, equipage, discipline and attitude, to understand the safety office doesn't "own" safety, and other related issues.

3.6.1.14 Safety Personnel

Several respondents described issues involving safety personnel, including the number required, reporting structure, and specifics of their role. Most indicated personnel with specific expertise in safety are required in greater numbers and their role is critical in facilitating various aspects of the safety program. Safety officers' involvement in developing plans and orders would have a positive influence by making everyone aware of safety, risk management, and mitigation of risks.

Commenters addressed the level where safety personnel are needed. It was suggested the SecDef needs a dedicated safety chief to consolidate lessons learned, communicate with the field, and fix common issues and problems. Some suggested putting more safety officers at several levels since safety personnel are overworked at the installation. Others recommended the safety office contain a special staff officer reporting to the commander, giving them better access to the command group. Still others recommended the position be at the unit level. Regardless of the level of placement, most respondents indicated the position needs to be full-time, not an additional duty or responsibility, and staffed with the most capable, experienced, and professional safety personnel available.

Some commenters addressed specific functions of the safety office or safety personnel. Many indicated their focus needs to be solely on safety practices, safety information, safety training, and military member safety integration operations. It was suggested current data would show that those organizations with a dedicated safety structure and assigned personnel demonstrate operational and training safety improvements. Compared to the current structure, some respondents indicated the need for a more tactical safety focus, shifting towards specific training, information sharing tools, and authority.

3.6.1.15 Supervisor Involvement

The critical role of the supervisor or junior enlisted leader in terms of visible involvement, participation, and responsibility was mentioned by several commenters. Supervisors often have the benefit of a close working relationship with direct reports and can leverage their

parental role to model safe behavior or intervene in risky practices in the workplace or off-duty. Commenters suggested supervisors conduct personal risk mitigation with each direct subordinate, be given more authority to impose limited disciplinary punishments, and be held accountable for training and mishaps in their unit.

3.6.1.16 Safety as an Item on Performance Appraisals

A substantial number of commenters indicated the need to have safety be rated as an item on performance evaluations. In this way, commanders and senior non-commissioned officers would be forced to take safety seriously. Safety would be rated in a leader's career development equally with other tasks, and accountability and reward would be facilitated.

Specifically, respondents suggested safety should be a rated item on all performance appraisals with mandatory comment by the rater as to how the individual performed in accordance with current safety guidelines and how successful the individual was in reducing accidents or initiating a new concept to protect his/her personnel. Safety should be included on all supervisors' performance appraisals and in the subordinate's evaluation. One commenter indicated that safety performance should be a positive consideration in the calculation of promotion scores for E-4 and below, and mandatory in performance reporting for E-5 through Flag officer. Another commenter indicated the answers or goals regarding items in this senior leader survey should be tied to an officer's performance report.

3.6.1.17 Communication of Information and Programs

Communication of safety information was mentioned by many commenters as a useful and necessary tool. Respondents indicated that regular reminders about safety can educate, motivate, elevate awareness, and help avoid complacency. Format of the suggested communications varied from posters, videos, signs, and visual aids to effective e-mail messages sent to all in the workforce on a regular basis. It was suggested since safety has a short half-life, constant, new, and innovative ways to remind the workforce and get the safety message across are needed.

Content in the messages can range from informational to motivational. Organizational safety goals should be in full view of the workforce everyday. Beneficial safety programs or real case studies of superior safety programs in units can be communicated. Conversely, near miss information or safety reports can be distributed to gain the widest audience and the most benefit of lessons learned. Safety tips and reminders can be distributed in print or e-mail newsletters.

Several commenters mentioned the need to have communication materials developed by a central office and then distributed for use at the unit level. These tools should be easy to use,

and would provide commands with the material to promote safety and address critical safety concerns. These safety materials would also facilitate public discussion of safety issues by all levels of leadership and their subordinates.

3.6.1.18 Risk Management

Respondents had high praise for one approach that has been implemented within DoD – a formal risk management process called operational risk management (ORM). This process formalizes procedures for identifying hazards, assessing risks, considering risk control measures, making control decisions, implementing risk controls, and supervising and reviewing. Many commenters indicated though the ORM approach is in place, change is necessary to actualize its potential.

Some claimed ORM is not understood well and many indicated it is not emphasized enough to become part of the DoD culture. Others indicated risk assessment too often takes place with no real attempt to mitigate the risk. Risk decisions may be made at an inappropriate level where rhetoric is not taken seriously until an accident occurs. In some instances, ORM has become a function or mechanical process rather than an integrated approach to leadership and supervision.

Respondents indicated risk management training needs to be implemented throughout the organization, beginning very early in institutional training. The risk management process needs to be standardized across DoD and incorporated into every operational plan and training event. The process needs to be an instinctive and integrated part of the actions of all personnel. Many indicated examples of personally seeing the process work efficiently and effectively. One respondent pointed to recent reductions in mishaps for a certain operation as a result of continuous communications pertaining to safety and ORM practices. It can "focus a crew and supporting personnel on the importance of prevention and directly influence mishap reductions attributable to human factors." Another respondent praised ORM by indicating it "doesn't say we won't accomplish the mission, it says we must find a safe way to accomplish the mission." Others claimed too many programs or processes are difficult to manage and make stick, but ORM provides a process that all can understand if sufficient training occurs and if emphasis is placed on integration into daily processes.

3.6.1.19 Safety Integration and Culture Change

A substantial number of respondents addressed the need for culture change within the organization regarding safety, as well as the related need to integrate safety within everyday DoD operations. The need to elevate the status of safety was evident to many respondents. They provided the following thoughts: safety can't be legislated, but rather needs to be imbedded as a value in every Service member's life; safety should be considered a value

instead of a priority because while priorities change, values are never compromised; safety is an attitude consisting of many small actions, not one action. A final comment of note was the need to instill the type of leadership that allows an openness where personnel can say when they can't do what they're tasked in the time frame given – the "can do and roger that to everything ego/attitude gets in the way of smart operating procedures."

Several commenters were disappointed with the current status of safety within their organization. They indicated it's discussed far less than other things like cost savings, leading to the conclusion it is not a high priority. Others indicated that aside from goals set once in a while, they rarely heard from their leaders at OSD or in the Services that safety is important.

Many addressed the need to change the current stove-pipe way safety is treated, and instead integrate it into daily operations. They indicated safety is not a separate stand-alone process, an afterthought, a square filler, a category to turn on or off or address at convenient times, a special project add-on, or a distinct topic parsed from mission performance. Rather, it needs to be built in to the entire process starting with receipt of mission all the way through execution, and inextricably woven into all that Service members do every day.

Some commenters noted current safety initiatives, while well-meaning, have actually done some harm in achieving the necessary culture regarding safety. Separate activities like safety meetings, safety days, chiefs of safety, and safety non-commissioned officers all reinforce that safety is a stove pipe. Respondents suggest this may have been a mistake since safety is not the result of programs, but a mindset and a value that must be inculcated at basic training and reinforced throughout one's career. The current culture separates and segregates safety from the operation flow, and assigns it to people who do not fully understand the reason to practice safety has an operational rationale. Safety needs to be mainstreamed into the line management function and a routine part of operations, not left the responsibility of the safety department.

Respondents acknowledged changing culture is not a quick or easy task. In fact, it is the most difficult but most necessary of tasks. Culture change takes years and should commence when people first come into the Service. The resulting change will create a culture of safety awareness where personnel look after one another, where peer pressure will prevent a safety mistake, where mishaps are not tolerated, where the idea that accidents will happen is never accepted, and where all these concepts are woven into the everyday way of life.

3.6.1.20 Other Topics

Commenters mentioned several other topics in the first write-in question, but less frequently

compared to those listed above. Some of the other topics were as follows:

- Excessive driving distances because of location of Service members' homes in relation to the installation should be investigated to shorten or eliminate the drive
- Consider involving family members in terms of education and safety emphasis
- Ensure an open leadership atmosphere is in place that empowers Service members to stop a mission activity if they feel it is unsafe, as opposed to compromising safety to get a job done in order to please a supervisor
- Budgetary considerations are important for modernization of the equipment used, which many felt had an impact on safety
- A high risk area for safety incidents is when Service members return from deployment
- Properly maintain roads, buildings, and infrastructure, including snow and ice removal
- Gear the safety program specifically to young Service members using findings regarding that age group from the sciences of learning and psychological development

3.6.2 Other Written Comments

Comments from the second open-ended item regarding "any other general comments you may have" are included in Appendix J. We deleted names, unit, and location to preserve respondent anonymity and edited inappropriate language, but otherwise the comments are verbatim. The comments were categorized and are described briefly in this section in order to summarize the most common suggestions and themes communicated by respondents.

3.6.2.1 Appropriateness of the 50 Percent Reduction Goal (SecDef)

Many respondents commented on whether the DoD 50 percent goal in reduction of accidents and mishaps was appropriate. While some applauded the initiative, the vast majority of these comments were negative, indicating the goal is unrealistic, not achievable, daunting, useless, not helpful, or a bridge too far for most leaders. Many commenters indicated not only was the goal not achievable, it was actually damaging to the safety program and detracted from it. Unreasonable goals turn people off, rob the program of credibility, and cause people to not take the subject seriously. Some indicated if goals aren't relevant, both the goal and the program will be ignored. Others indicated the goal will not result in a decrease in rates, only an increase in frustration.

Another theme regarding the negative impact of the 50 percent goal focused on a perceived inference the current program is poor or insufficient. Commenters indicated the goal implies the current program is not working, those responsible are not doing all they could, and it

doesn't give credit for huge improvements in safety already achieved. Many felt safety has been emphasized within the Services for many years with significant reductions, many qualified people have been working hard at this issue for a long time, and if it were as easy as just setting a goal there would have been far fewer accidents and mishaps by now.

Other negative comments about the goal included its appearance as absolutely arbitrary, a top-down decision, and not based on any science, scientific data, or comprehensive study of its feasibility. Some commenters indicated the goal was not accompanied by any realistic program of achieving the results, or any thought to what actions and resources are necessary to make it possible. Reasons given for why the achievement of the goal seemed doubtful included the current OPSTEMPO in the Services, perceived limitations on ability to influence young drivers' behavior, and lack of resources, manpower, or training. Some questioned whether the goal would only be reached with creative paperwork, and wondered what the reaction would be when or if the goal wasn't reached. One commenter hoped it would be seen as a failure to set reasonable goals rather than a failure to perform.

Various alternatives to the current goal and approach were suggested. Some acknowledged goals should be tough and lofty, but also reasonable and achievable. Several suggested achieving the 50 percent goal over a longer period of time, with reasonable annual or intermediate goals such as 10 percent per year improvement for 5 years. Some commenters acknowledged the goal has succeeded in focusing attention on the issue. A few commenters took an opposing approach, indicating the 50 percent goal was inappropriate because it didn't go far enough—the only appropriate goal was zero accidents and mishaps.

3.6.2.2 Accepting that Accidents and Mishaps Will Occur

There were many comments addressing the topic of the final item (Q12) on the senior leader survey regarding whether or not it should be accepted that accidents and mishaps will occur in the DoD line of work. Many felt the military environment is by nature dangerous and the profession has many inherent risks. Some indicated the dangers can't be removed entirely, and it is important to acknowledge that eliminating all risk is not the goal.

Many commenters indicated it is important to be realistic and admit accidents are going to happen no matter how intensive a program is planned or executed. These respondents felt because risk exists, accidents will occur due to the nature and complexities of the military environment and human behavior. Some commenters indicated a zero point will never be reached, especially in regard to motor-vehicle accidents and wartime activities. Most felt being realistic doesn't mean anyone should accept unsafe tactics or procedures or shouldn't strive constantly for a safer situation. Nor does it mean that education, risk assessment, risk management, or any other safety activity shouldn't be refined, enhanced, improved, or occur

more frequently. Some indicated being realistic "doesn't mean we can't do anything about the accidents or strive for anything less than 100 percent safety." There were also comments to the effect that accidents should never be repeat events, given that lessons should have been learned from previous events.

However, there were many comments addressing the subtle, yet profound, difference between *acknowledging* that accidents may occur versus *accepting* that accidents will occur. The difference is embodied in their corresponding attitudes. Acknowledgement understands there is a measure of uncertainty in the universe and appropriate actions must be taken to eliminate or reduce associated risk. Acceptance, on the other hand, is a fatalistic value that offers "if it's going to happen anyway, why bother?" attitude. Acceptance results in reduced or no prevention, and subsequently, increased losses.

Some commenters felt safety is already interfering with operations, or were concerned about additional emphasis on safety activities. These respondents felt the military had "long since reached the point where mission effectiveness was being reduced without corresponding payback," or that decreasing mishap rates drastically "became impossible a long time ago without bringing the enterprise to a halt." Another commenter felt there is "a fine line between doing great risk management to increase force protection and reduce accidents, versus creating an environment where leaders stop conducting realistic, demanding training because they are afraid to fail to make their accident numbers."

3.6.2.3 Praise for Current Safety Efforts

Many respondents commented on the current status of safety within DoD and praised the amount of attention and level of dedication it receives. Among the comments on this theme were:

- The focus on decreasing accidents is important and the message is getting through
- There is sufficient leadership focus on safety
- Safety is preached at the senior leadership level
- Safety permeates all that is done within DoD
- DoD personnel across the board care about safety and work diligently to make it a central element of their lifestyle and work habits
- Appropriate programs are in place and are actively supported
- Safety climate is superb
- Safety receives considerable attention

- DoD is doing all it can to reduce or mitigate accidents
- Safety community is a dedicated group that tries to get the message across
- DoD has lots of good people and experts who are addressing the matter of safety and who care deeply about it
- Safety is the fabric of how we do business
- Considering the daily work environment, DoD has an outstanding safety record
- All resources are adequate, except for time

Several expressed sincere appreciation to safety personnel and all within DoD for their genuine dedication to this important issue. Others noted the improvements in safety within DoD either over a period of time or recently. Commenters mentioned the tremendous strides the military has made regarding safety, indicating that virtually every aspect of safety has improved over the last several decades. Death or serious injury used to be commonplace, but are now considered a rarity. People are working harder and great progress is being made at lower levels with new initiatives. Some commenters felt encouraged by seeing much more recent emphasis on safety issues and by the strong push to fix the significant challenges. Respondents felt that DoD is making progress, especially within the last year, but the last few numbers are the hardest to reach.

Respondents specifically praised several organizations within DoD, including the Army's Combat Readiness Center, Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army Europe, and the Air National Guard fighter community. For the most part, respondents either were a part of these organizations or knew of their operations intimately enough to single them out as exceptional. In praising the military's safety operations, some commenters differentiated between on-duty and off-duty issues. They indicated the military's safety program was excellent in regard to on-duty incidents, but off-duty issues were more challenging and had experienced less success.

3.6.2.4 Acknowledgement of the Importance of Safety Issues and the Need to Do More

Many commenters went beyond praising current safety efforts, indicating the topic of safety is so important DoD needs to do more. Some statements had a tone of frustration or impatience that actions or results are not matching the importance of the principle of safety. Among the comments on this theme were:

- DoD may be serious about safety, but not serious enough to put real money behind it
- DoD can do much better than it currently does in regard to safety and accident prevention and must do all it possibly can do to reduce or mitigate accidents,

especially among a population of Service members who often feel themselves invulnerable

- DoD senior leaders can never do enough to ensure safety and must continue to increase efforts to emphasize safety across the board
- DoD needs to demand higher standards of itself; leaders must do more and demand higher standards of those they work with and those who they lead
- Senior leaders do a better job of talking about safety than living it or enforcing it
- DoD spends lots of time talking about safety, but very little getting it done
- DoD needs to get serious about safety from the top down; some processes have not changed in decades
- Telling people to be safe is not enough; we have been doing that for years and the results are not impressive
- The safety message has not been institutionalized and it needs to be
- The military is very busy; soldiers are complacent and not listening to leadership
- DoD is slowly getting better, but it can't afford to be slow
- The loss of young service men and women due to private motor vehicle and motorcycle accidents is absolutely too high; safety has to be mission one

Some commenters indicated there should be zero tolerance for accidents and mishaps; the goal or benchmark should be zero. Regarding the concept of improvement, several commenters remarked on the continuous or constant nature of the attention that safety required. They indicated safety is an attitude that must continually be reinvented to avoid complacency, persistence is essential, safety must be in your face, and there are no off days, times, or events. Others noted safety requires constant reinforcement and emphasis at all levels of leadership. It is a journey, not a destination, since new troops are joining each day.

3.6.2.5 Comments Regarding the Survey

Many comments addressed the senior leader survey instrument, with both positive and negative remarks and other suggestions for changes. On the negative side, some commenters felt the survey was badly designed, pointless, stupid, or a waste of time. Others commented on the topic of the questions, indicating they were not very meaningful or applicable, would not provide anything of value, or would not "adequately get at what you are trying to discern." Some found the questions to be too general or innocuous, or felt the questions unjustly implied there was a problem with safety.

Several commenters indicated they didn't have enough information to answer a question

satisfactorily and provided a neutral rating as a result. Many indicated they would have preferred a "not applicable" or "don't know" response rather than having to indicate neutral.

On the positive side, many commenters expressed appreciation for the opportunity to participate, lauded the focus on safety, and felt the survey was indicative of leadership's commitment to safety. Here is a partial list of positive comments:

- Thanks for soliciting our views and recommendations
- I appreciate the survey; in itself, the survey demonstrates leadership commitment
- Good survey
- The fact that leadership is concerned is demonstrated by the execution of this survey
- Thank you for looking into this important issue
- Appreciate the survey; I look forward to receiving the results along with any recommendations
- Thank you for making it concise
- Thanks for the opportunity to participate
- It is terrific to see this attention to safety as evidenced by devoting a survey such as this to safety
- Thanks for asking these questions
- Thanks for taking this on; a critical subject
- I laud the effort to get leadership thoughts on safety
- This is an important survey, and I hope the results are shared with the Services

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4 Conclusions

4.1 Overview

This report provides results for the first part of a four-part DoD Safety perception survey.

The results can be used to assess perceptions among DoD senior leaders regarding a variety of culture and activity-based items, to identify priority problem areas for specific action, and to analyze differences by Flag officer versus SES member, by Service, and by organization. The data presented in this report can also be used as a baseline to measure future progress and verify numerical advancement in perceptions of culture-related issues in the future. If repeated on a periodic schedule, the survey can be useful to sustain corporate visibility on safety and serve as a planning, management, and evaluation tool.

4.2 Path Forward

We encourage DoD leaders to use these results as a catalyst and guide for making current safety program improvements. This report identifies lower-scoring priority items and problem areas for the organization and for various subgroups of personnel. Each priority identified should be examined by those interpreting results using a three-step process to:

- Investigate, discuss, and understand why the areas have been identified as lower-scoring priorities by survey respondents;
- Decide whether attention to each candidate priority element aligns with the broader culture and strategic initiatives of the organization; and
- Select and implement specific, action-oriented strategies as countermeasures.

In addition, we encourage DoD senior leaders take the following actions to maximize use of survey results:

- Communicate survey results to those identified in the initial survey population and to a wider distribution within DoD, as appropriate
- Create a result interpretation team or teams with members from all Services, duty status, rank, and levels of command
- Task the team(s) to further understand survey results using the three-step interpretation process described above, then propose action-oriented strategies
- Review the team's strategies and implement them with clear support
- Measure results of the action plans and conduct the senior leader survey again, using a timetable determined as far in advance as possible

While the path forward from survey results to implementation of countermeasures should use the survey data and input from many groups, the survey respondents' written comments provide a starting point for the process of translating the survey into action. The number and quality of comments provided were extremely high. Great care should be taken by those responsible for interpreting survey results and developing follow-up actions to allow time for reading the comment summaries provided in this text, or preferably, for reading the comments in their entirety in appendixes I and J of this report. They provide concrete, insightful suggestions for improvement and observations on the status of safety issues.

4.3 List of Report Conclusions

The following are specific conclusions from the report regarding results from the Senior Leader Survey:

4.3.1 The overall response rate for the survey was good – 48 percent. For this particular target population 48 percent equates to 1,299 responses. (3.5.1.1)

4.3.2 The response rate indicates the survey population took the survey seriously and considered advancing safety a worthwhile effort. (3.5.1.1)

4.3.3 The response rate for flag officers was 10 percentage points greater than for SES members, indicating greater motivation to complete the survey. Possible reasons for this higher response rate may include: (3.5.1.1)

a. more knowledge or background to contribute,

b. greater perceived responsibility toward achieving the safety goals, or

c. other motivating reasons.

4.3.4 The e-mail mechanism for collecting information worked well and provided a relatively straightforward, non-intrusive method of surveying top leaders. There was no indication that confidentiality and anonymity were significant concerns. (3.5.1.1)

4.3.5 Length of the survey seemed appropriate. There was no indication of a significant abandonment rate once respondents initiated the survey process. (3.5.1.1)

4.3.6 It is unlikely that either extension of the survey deadline date or subsequent reminders would have increased response rate significantly. (3.5.1.1)

4.3.7 The degree of positive response varied considerably among the 12 survey items, with positive response ranging from more than 95 percent for some items to less than 45 percent for other items. This indicates good differentiation by respondents among survey questions. (3.5.3.1)

4.3.8 Respondents gave very high marks to survey items dealing with believing that:

a. Leaders are sincere in their efforts to ensure personnel safety.

b. Leaders consistently demonstrate a positive commitment to personnel safety.

c. Appropriate safety goals are set annually by the leadership.

d. Making truly beneficial changes in the safety environment is a high priority for leadership.

e. Safety is as important as mission in the organization.

Nearly all of these items with highest marks are broad culture-related issues. It is clear leaders believe the climate is in place to make any necessary changes to support safety. (3.5.3.1)

4.3.9 About 80 percent of respondents agreed that implementing successful organization best practices in safety is one of the most effective ways to bring about change. This should be viewed as affirmation for the best practices approach to identifying potential program items, practices, and countermeasures. (3.5.3.1)

4.3.10 Three survey items had 35 percent or more neutral response. These items dealt with supervisors considering safety performance when rating their personnel, good cooperation existing across the Services on safety-related issues, and safety funding being adequately represented in the budget process. If elevated levels of neutral responses are due to lack of knowledge about these issues, that lack should not be seen as an acceptable justification. Not only should activities be undertaken to support safety, they should be important enough to be emphasized so they are known to exist, or at least perceived to exist, by all personnel. (3.5.3.1)

4.3.11 Of the 12 survey items, 2 were scored substantially higher than others, with 4 items in the midrange, and 6 items scored substantially lower. (3.5.4.1)

4.3.12 Highest ratings were given to items dealing with leadership sincerity and positive commitment to ensure personnel safety. Midrange items dealt with appropriate safety goals being set, change being a priority for leadership, safety being as important as mission, and acceptance of the best practices approach. (3.5.4.1)

4.3.13 Less positive responses were given to items concerning adequate resources being given to leadership to manage and support safety programs, supervisors considering safety performance when rating their personnel, good cooperation existing across the Services on safety-related issues, and refusal to accept that accidents and mishaps will occur. These items should be viewed as potential target areas for improvement, especially in comparison to the strongly positive responses given to other survey items. (3.5.4.1)

4.3.14 The least positive scores on the survey were given to the following items: belief that decreasing the DoD accident and mishap rate by 50 percent over the next 2 years is

achievable; and safety funding being adequately represented in the budget process. These items had less than 50 percent positive response and more than 20 percent negative response, thus each should be viewed as a strong target for improvement efforts. (3.5.4.1)

4.3.15 The two items on the survey with the highest average response scores were also scored extremely high when compared with responses from other organizations in the NSC database. These items dealt with leadership sincerity and positive commitment regarding personnel safety, and received percentile scores of 100 and 99, respectively. It is clear that these items were strengths not only within DoD, but also compared to outside organizations. (3.5.5.3)

4.3.16 Two additional items with midrange responses compared to other survey items also received comparison percentile scores in the 90s. These items addressed safety being as important as mission in the organization and appropriate safety goals being set annually by leadership. These results indicate ratings for DoD survey items that were in the midrange when compared with other DoD survey responses were still rated extremely high when compared with outside organizations. (3.5.5.3)

4.3.17 Three other survey items had relatively lower percentile scores of 85 and below, including supervisors considering safety performance when rating their personnel, good cooperation existing across the Services on safety-related issues, and leadership providing adequate resources to manage and support safety-related programs. While analysis of average response scores for these items indicated they should be targets for improvement, comparison with outside organizations reinforced that conclusion. (3.5.5.3)

4.3.18 Special attention should focus on the item regarding whether leaders provide adequate resources to manage and support safety-related programs. Not only did this item receive a low average response score, it was significantly lower than other items when compared with outside organizations, achieving a percentile score of only 55. (3.5.5.3)

4.3.19 Perceptions for the survey were higher for responding Flag officers compared to their SES member counterparts with overall average response scores of 0.88 versus 0.72, respectively. This difference is not extreme, but should be investigated to determine why SES member perceptions are lower and what countermeasures might be applied specifically to the SES group. (3.5.6.1.1)

4.3.20 For individual survey items, differences between the Flag officer group and SES group mirrored the overall differences with the exception of 4 survey items: (3.5.6.1.1)

a. For items pertaining to good cooperation existing across Services on safety-related issues and safety funding being adequately represented in the budget process, perceptions of the two groups were nearly identical.

b. For items pertaining to refusal to accept that accidents and mishaps will occur in the DoD line of work and belief that decreasing the accident and mishap rate by 50 percent over the next 2 years is achievable, perceptions of the SES group were actually more positive than Flag officer group.

4.3.21 Investigation into reasons for differences in responses between Flag officers and SES members should address why the pattern of responses for these 4 items varied from the overall. A possible explanation may be that SES members are more involved with or responsible for activities that occur across Services or in budgeting and funding activities, and therefore are more likely to have favorable responses for items concerning these activities. Likewise, SES members may have higher expectations regarding the potential for accident prevention than Flag officers who face risk management decisions in their line of work on a more frequent basis. (3.5.6.1.1)

4.3.22 Reasons for these differences should be investigated with a goal of sharing viewpoints and expectations of each group, and for tailoring of subsequent interventions, actions or countermeasures to the specific personnel subgroups. Dialogue between groups to share viewpoints will facilitate obtaining a clearer picture of the accident and mishap problem for DoD, and should result in decreasing differences in perceptions. (3.5.6.1.1)

4.3.23 Perceptions for the survey were highest for Air Force, with an overall average response score of 0.87, followed closely by Army and Navy with average response scores of 0.86 and 0.83, respectively. Non-Service Civilian and Marine Corps had lower perceptions, with average response scores of 0.68 and 0.65, respectively. These differences are not extreme, but should be investigated to determine why perceptions are lower for the Non-Service Civilian and Marine Corps groups and what countermeasures might be applied specifically for these two groups. (3.5.6.2.1)

4.3.24 Air Force had the highest perceptions overall, as well as for 6 of the 12 survey items. However, they had relatively lower perceptions on 2 survey items regarding cooperation among the Services and refusal to accept that accidents and mishaps will occur. (3.5.6.2.1)

4.3.25 Army had the second highest perceptions overall, but scored particularly low regarding belief that a 50 percent reduction in the accident and mishap rate is achievable and regarding safety funding in the budget process. (3.5.6.2.1)

4.3.26 Navy had the third highest perceptions overall, but scored particularly high regarding acceptance of the best practices approach, refusal to accept that accidents and

mishaps will occur, and belief that a 50 percent reduction in the accident and mishap rate is achievable. (3.5.6.2.1)

4.3.27 Marine Corps had the lowest perceptions for the survey and for 6 of the 12 survey items. However, they had the highest perceptions regarding change being a high priority for leadership and regarding good cooperation across the Services on safety-related issues. (3.5.6.2.1)

4.3.28 Non-Service Civilians had the second lowest perceptions overall, but had the lowest perceptions regarding 5 survey items. It may be that non-service civilians are not as aware of these issues or that they perceive those in the Services to be more responsible for these activities. (3.5.6.2.1)

4.3.29 Investigation into reasons for differences in responses among the different Services should address why the pattern of responses for certain items varied from the overall. Reasons for the overall differences by subgroup and the variations for individual items should be investigated with a goal of sharing viewpoints and expectations of each Service and for tailoring of subsequent interventions, actions or countermeasures to the specific Service subgroups. Dialogue among the Services to share viewpoints will facilitate obtaining a clearer picture of the accident and mishap problem for DoD, and should result in decreasing differences in perceptions among the Services. (3.5.6.2.1)

4.3.30 Perceptions for the survey were highest for guard respondents, with an overall average response score of 0.98, followed closely by active and reserve respondents with average response scores of 0.87 and 0.83, respectively. Civilian respondents had the lowest perception, with an average response score of 0.71. These differences are not extreme, but should be investigated to determine particularly why perceptions are lower for the civilians. (3.5.7.1)

4.3.31 Guard had the highest perceptions overall and for 8 of the 12 survey items. However, they had relatively lower perceptions on 2 survey items regarding leadership sincerity in safety efforts and leadership consistently demonstrates positive commitment to safety. (3.5.7.1)

4.3.32 Active Duty had the second highest perceptions overall, but scored particularly high regarding leadership demonstrates commitment, change being a priority for leadership, and safety being as important as mission. However, active respondents scored particularly low regarding belief that a 50 percent reduction in accidents is achievable. (3.5.7.1)

4.3.33 Reserve had the second lowest perceptions overall, but scored particularly high regarding leadership sincerity in safety efforts. However, they had the lowest responses of any group regarding refusal to accept that accidents and mishaps will occur and safety funding in the budget process. (3.5.7.1)

4.3.34 Civilians had the lowest perceptions for the survey and for 9 of the 12 survey items. Consideration should be given to determine whether these items are scored lowest by civilian respondents because they lack knowledge compared to the other duty status groups. (3.5.7.1)

4.3.35 Investigation into reasons for differences in responses among these duty status groups should address why the pattern of responses for certain items varied from the overall. Reasons for the overall differences by subgroup and the variations for individual items should be investigated with a goal of sharing viewpoints and expectations of each duty status group and for tailoring of subsequent interventions, actions or countermeasures to the specific duty status subgroups. Dialogue among duty status groups to share viewpoints will facilitate obtaining a clearer picture of the accident and mishap problem for DoD, and should result in decreasing differences in perceptions. (3.5.7.1)

4.3.36 Air Force-Guard had the highest perceptions overall of any specific categories/duty status subgroup, with an overall average response score of 1.02, followed by Army-Guard, Air Force-Active, and Navy-Active, with averages response scores of 0.95, 0.92, and 0.91, respectively. Air Force-Civilian had the lowest perceptions, with an average response score of 0.60, followed by Marine Corps-Active, Non-Service Civilian, Navy-Civilian, and Marine Corps-Civilian, with scores of 0.62, 0.68, 0.75, and 0.78, respectively. In general, Marine Corps and Civilian subgroups had the lowest perceptions, while 3 of the top 5 subgroups were Air Force. Disparity among scores from highest to lowest scoring subgroups was fairly large. (3.5.8.1)

4.3.37 Almost all of the 12 survey items were scored highest by the Air Force- Guard, Army-Guard, or Air Force-Active subgroups. The only exceptions were regarding refusal to believe that accidents and mishaps will occur, which was scored highest by Navy-Active, and regarding safety goals being set by leadership and belief in best practices, both of which were scored highest by Navy-Reserve. (3.5.8.1)

4.3.38 Almost all of the 12 survey items were scored lowest by the Air Force-Civilian, Marine Corps-Active, or Non-Service Civilian subgroups. The only exception was regarding good cooperation existing across the Services which was scored lowest by Navy-Reserve. (3.5.8.1)

4.3.39 Particular attention should be paid to the Air Force-Civilian subgroup. They scored lowest in perceptions of all the Service subgroups and contrasted with the other 3 Air Force subgroups, all of whom scored comparatively high. Reasons for the disparity should be investigated. (3.5.8.1)

4.3.40 Investigation into reasons for differences in responses among these subgroups should address why the pattern of responses occurred. Reasons for the overall differences by subgroup and the variations for individual items should be investigated

with a goal of sharing viewpoints and expectations of each categories/duty status subgroup and for tailoring of subsequent interventions, actions or countermeasures. Dialogue to share viewpoints will facilitate obtaining a clearer picture of the accident and mishap problem and should result in decreasing differences in perceptions. (3.5.8.1)

Appendix A – Source Documents

Secretary of Defense Memorandum: "Reducing Preventable Accidents"

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

May 19, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: Reducing Preventable Accidents

World-class organizations do not tolerate preventable accidents. Our accident rates have increased recently, and we need to turn this situation around. I challenge all of you to reduce the number of mishaps and accident rates by at least 50% in the next two years. These goals are achievable, and will directly increase our operational readiness. We owe no less to the men and women who defend our Nation.

I have asked the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to lead a department-wide effort to focus our accident reduction effort. I intend to be updated on our progress routinely. The USD(P&R) will provide detailed instructions in separate correspondence.

U06916-03

Appendix A-1

Defense Safety Oversight Council Charter

DEFENSE SAFETY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL CHARTER

I. ESTABLISHMENT, PURPOSE AND SCOPE

A. ESTABLISHMENT

The Deputy Secretary of Defense established the Defense Safety Oversight Council in July 2003, herein referred to as the Council. The Charter delineates the Council's membership, and specifies the scope of activities and procedures.

B. PURPOSE

The Council will provide governance on DoD-wide efforts to reduce preventable mishaps.

C. SCOPE OF ACTIVITY

The Council shall:

1. Review accident and incident trends, ongoing safety initiatives, private sector and other governmental agency best practices, and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for safety improvement policies, programs, and investments.

2. The Council will establish and monitor metrics to reduce DoD accidents and injuries by 75% of the FY 2002 levels for each Military Department and the Defense Agencies by the end of FY 2008.

3. Assess, review and advise on improving all aspects of the coordination, relevance, efficiency, efficacy, timeliness and viability of existing DoD-wide safety and injury prevention information management systems.

4. Promote the development and implementation of safety initiatives including:
   - Employing proven safety technologies; and
   - Applying systems safety for acquisitions and operations, to improve mission success as well as preserve human and physical resources throughout DoD.

5. Oversee Council committees, receive regular progress reports on the status of approved action plans, serve as the approval authority for actions proposed by Council committees, and endorse appointment letters for committee chairs and members through their chain of command.

6. Coordinate with other federal agencies and industry leaders, to facilitate communication, coordination, and integration of best practices into DoD planning, development and implementation of initiatives and programs.

7. Support research to improve human performance and/or sustainment, safety training and education standards/procedures, and equipment.

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Appendix A-2

Defense Safety Oversight Council Charter

II. ORGANIZATION

A. The Defense Safety Oversight Council shall include committees, task forces and work groups appointed by the Council. Each task force formed under this Council will submit a charter to the Council for approval. These charters will receive an annual review by the Council.

B. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness will chair this Council.

C. The Council shall have overall responsibility for the implementation of this Charter. The Council shall consist of the principals and associate members. The principal members include the following:

Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (as Chair)
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs
Under Secretary of the Army
Under Secretary of the Navy
Under Secretary of the Air Force
Vice Chief of Staff of the Army
Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force
Vice Chief of Naval Operations
Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps

The associate members will attend meetings of the DSOC when matters under their cognizance are addressed. Associate members include the following:

Deputy Inspector General of the Department of Defense (Inspections and Policy)
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment)
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness)
Deputy Under Secretary (Civilian Personnel Policy)
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Resource Planning/Management)
Deputy Director (Administration & Management)
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Clinical & Program Policy)

D. The Director, Readiness Programming and Assessment, will serve as the Executive Secretary for the Council.

III. PROCEDURES

A. The Chair will convene the Council as needed, but at least semi-annually. All committees, task forces and work groups shall keep the Council current on all their respective actions.

B. The Council Chair will regularly brief the Senior Executive Committee on all Council actions and recommendations.

2

Appendix A-2

Defense Safety Oversight Council Charter

C. The Council Chair will report for the Council to the Secretary through the Deputy Secretary as appropriate. The Council Chair may amend this charter as necessary to accomplish the Council's mission.

D. Budgetary requirements and administrative support for the Council will be coordinated by the Chair.

E. The Council Chair will ensure that communication of all activities will occur throughout DoD. The Executive Secretary will maintain historical documentation of accomplishments and recommendations.

F. The Council will operate in accordance with DoD Directive 5105.18, "DoD Committee Management Program," February 8, 1999.

IV. DURATION OF COMMITTEE

The Charter will continue until amended, superseded, or revoked.

3

Appendix A-2

FY 06-11 Strategic Planning Guidance – Unclassified Extract

Workplace Safety (U)

(U) Every lost workday due to injury reduces available end strength, adversely affects force readiness, and diverts funds that could be used for other military priorities. The Secretary of Defense's current goal is to reduce accidents by 50 percent in FY 2005 over the FY 2002 baseline. Components will continue safety initiatives to achieve a net decrease of 75 percent from the baseline by FY 2008.

Announcement Memorandum

INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

NOV 10 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)/
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL
AND READINESS
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE ARMY
NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE AIR FORCE
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE MARINE CORPS
GENERAL ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
DEFENSE SAFETY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Evaluation of DoD Safety Program (D2005-DIPOE2.0051)

We will begin the evaluation in November 2004. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness (DUSD(R)) and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment (DUSD(I&E)) requested this project. The overall objective is to develop a roadmap for overcoming identified challenges to improve the effectiveness of the DoD safety program. We will identify the best safety practices within DoD.

We plan to visit or contact DoD installations, Service and major command headquarters, and elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense responsible for safety. We will also collaborate with other Federal agencies such as the Department of Energy, National Transportation Safety Board, National Safety Council, and Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Additional locations may be identified during the evaluation. We will provide a series of interim briefings, management letters, and reports to DUSD(R), DUSD(I&E), and appropriate commands during our evaluation.

Please provide points of contact for this evaluation to Col Forrest R. Sprester at (703) 604-9120, e-mail address (fsprester@dodig.osd.mil) or Dr. Sardar Q. Hassan at (703) 604-9146, e-mail (shassan@dodig.osd.mil).

L. Jerry Hansen
Deputy Inspector General
for Inspections and Policy

Appendix A-4

Secretary of Defense Memorandum: Reducing Preventable Accidents

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

JUN 22 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS
SERVICE CHIEFS

SUBJECT: Reducing Preventable Accidents

I have set some very specific mishap reduction goals for the Department to achieve. My congratulations to those who are progressing toward their respective goals, but others are not. We must rededicate ourselves to those goals – and achieve them.

Too often we excuse mishaps by citing the difficult circumstances in which we operate. We have trained our men and women to operate safely in very trying conditions. There is no excuse for losing lives given proper planning, attention to detail, and the active involvement of the chain of command.

Accountability is essential to effective leadership. I expect all the Department's leaders, from the Commander to the first line supervisors, to be accountable for mishaps under their watch. We simply will not accept status quo.

If we need to change our training, improve our material acquisition, or alter our business practices to save the precious lives of our men and women, we will do it. We will fund as a first priority those technologies and devices that will save lives and equipment. We will retrofit existing systems, and consider these devices as a "must fund" priority for all new systems. We can no longer consider safety as "nice-to-have."

I want to hear what you are doing to improve your safety performance and I want to see the results of your actions.

OSD 09959-06
6/22/2006 2:59:57 PM

Appendix A-5

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Memorandum: Reducing Preventable Accidents



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

NOV 21 2006

ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: Reducing Preventable Accidents

In response to the June 22, 2006, SECDEF memorandum, "Reducing Preventable Accidents," I am directing the changes below to influence the entire life cycle of systems.

The Acquisition & Technology Programs Task Force will develop a process to provide the DoD Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System with recommendations that have the potential to cost effectively prevent accidents. These inputs should include all aspects of the MIL-STD-882D System Safety process.

Effective immediately, all Acquisition Program Reviews and fielding decisions, regardless of the Acquisition Category, shall address the status of: each High and Serious risk using the MIL-STD-882D System Safety methodology; and compliance with applicable safety technology requirements, e.g., insensitive munitions. The next revision to DoDI 5000.2, "Operation of the Defense Acquisition System," will incorporate this change.

DoD Components will include in all system-related Class A and B mishap investigation reports the system program office analysis of hazards that contributed to the accident and recommendations for materiel risk mitigation measures, especially those that minimize potential human errors. The next revision to DoDI 6055.7, "Accident Investigation, Reporting, and Record Keeping," will incorporate this change.

Successful implementation of these changes will contribute significantly to achieving the SECDEF's direction to reduce preventable accidents.

Kenneth J. Krieg

Appendix A-6

Secretary of Defense Memorandum: Zero Preventable Accidents

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MAY 30 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: Zero Preventable Accidents

I am committed to reducing preventable accidents as one of the cornerstones of the Department of Defense's Safety Program. Consistent with the President's Safety, Health, and Return-To-Employment (SHARE) initiative, I have set some very specific mishap reduction goals for the Department. We are focused on closely monitoring our most pressing mishap areas: civilian and military injuries, aviation accidents, and the number one non-combat killer of our military, private motor vehicle accidents.

We can no longer tolerate the injuries, costs, and capability losses from preventable accidents. Accidents cost the Department about $3 billion per year, with indirect costs up to four times that amount. We have made progress in reducing aviation accidents and civilian lost work days, but have much more to do to address military injuries and private motor vehicle fatalities. Our goal is zero preventable accidents, and I remain fully committed to achieving the 75% accident reduction target in 2008.

The current focus of our Safety Council is on increasing the accountability of individuals and leaders, as well as pursuing safety technologies. Accountability and leadership are key to an effective safety program. I urge you to continue to emphasize safety in the workplace and hold leaders accountable for their safety programs. Your efforts will make the Department a safer place to work, and more capable of defending the Nation and her interests. We have no greater responsibility than to take care of those who volunteer to serve.

OSD 07979-07
5/31/2007 9:36:40 AM

Appendix A-7

Appendix B – Scope and Methodology

Scope. This is one of four reports by the DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) documenting perception survey results. The purpose of this report was to evaluate the DoD active duty members' perception of safety, and to establish a baseline for future reviews. The survey was designed and administered with the support of the National Safety Council (NSC).

Work Performed. The DoD OIG safety evaluation team, in conjunction with the NSC, designed, developed, administered, and analyzed results of the DoD safety perception surveys. This senior leader survey was designed to assess the overall DoD safety climate as perceived by all Flag Officers and Senior Executive Service members. The survey was deployed to a population of over 2900 DoD senior leaders. One hundred percent of the senior leader population received the survey.

Seven questions on the survey were from prior NSC questionnaires with the wording slightly adjusted to more clearly communicate using DoD terminology. Additionally, the DoD OIG developed questions to address specific safety issues such as the Secretary of Defense 50 percent accident reduction goal.

The DoD OIG, with assistance from the NSC, analyzed the results and produced charts, tables, and this report. Also, the DoD OIG has provided a series of results briefings to senior leaders within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Service staff offices, Service Secretariats, Service Safety Centers, and others. These briefings were part of the OIG's constructive engagement process to provide DoD leaders with timely safety information as it was identified.

All survey questions were reviewed by DoD OIG Inspections & Evaluations and vetted through:

- The National Safety Council
- The Defense Manpower Data Center
- The DoD OIG Quality Management Division

This report is intended to provide the Office of the Secretary of Defense a general program analysis. Detailed analysis of Service, Defense Agencies, or other DoD subordinate organization safety programs is beyond the scope and intent of this report.

The Team and the NSC performed the survey and analysis between January and August 2005. The OIG evaluation team performed the evaluation in accordance with the *Quality Standards for Inspections*, the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency, January 2005.

Appendix C – DoD Senior Leader Survey Form and Letters



Page 1 of 3

DoD Senior Leadership Survey

Access Code: #####

The following 12 questions deal with leadership and safety. Please answer the questions by clicking on the appropriate button. At the end of the survey, please type your comments to the questions in the two blocks provided. When responding, consider only the conditions at your current organization assigned. Thank you for your participation in this important effort.

		Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Q1	I believe leadership is sincere in its efforts to ensure personnel safety.	○	○	○	○	○
Q2	Appropriate safety goals are set annually by leadership.	○	○	○	○	○
Q3	Leadership consistently demonstrates a positive commitment to personnel safety.	○	○	○	○	○
Q4	Supervisors consider safety performance when rating their personnel.	○	○	○	○	○
Q5	Safety takes a back seat to mission in our organization.	○	○	○	○	○
Q6	Safety funding is adequately represented in the budget process.	○	○	○	○	○
Q7	Decreasing the DoD accident and mishap rate by 50% over the next two years is achievable.	○	○	○	○	○
Q8	Making truly beneficial changes in our safety environment is a high priority for leadership.	○	○	○	○	○

http://www.nsc.org/surveys/dod/tgeneral_ses2c.htm?#### ...2005

		Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Q9	Implementing successful organizations' "Best Practices" in safety is one of the most effective ways to bring about change.	○	○	○	○	○
Q10	Good cooperation exists across the Services on safety-related issues.	○	○	○	○	○
Q11	Leadership has provided adequate resources to manage and support safety-related programs.	○	○	○	○	○
Q12	We have to accept that accidents and mishaps will occur in our line of work.	○	○	○	○	○

Demographics

Rank --Click Here--

Service --Click Here--

Organization Assigned --Click Here--

If you were to suggest one action that would improve safety in DoD, what would it be?

Please provide any other general comments you may have:

Thank You For Your Feedback

Please click submit button below after completing this survey

Reset Submit

From: DoD Inspector General [mailto:safetysurvey@dodig.mil]
Sent: Monday, April 11, 2005 5:29 PM
To:
Subject: DoD IG Leadership Survey

INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICERS AND MEMBERS OF THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: DoD Senior Leadership Survey

The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General is evaluating the DoD safety program in response to the Secretary of Defense memorandum, "Reducing Preventable Accidents," dated May 19, 2003, to reduce the Department's accidents and mishaps by 50 percent within 2 years. As part of this evaluation, I request that you personally participate in an anonymous, Web-based survey, administered by the National Safety Council (NSC).

Within the next 5-7 days, the NSC will send you an email explaining the survey and provide you a survey access code. Please promptly complete this survey. Your candid responses will ensure accurate and useful recommendations to improve the Department's safety initiatives and, thereby, improve mission readiness.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Wm Brem Momson, my Assistant Inspector General for Inspections and Evaluations, at 703-604-9151 (DSN 664-9151) or wmomson@dodig.osd.mil.

Joseph E. Schmitz

From: National Safety Council [mailto:safetysurvey@nsc.org]
Sent: Monday, April 18, 2005 15:41
To:
Subject: DoD Leadership Survey

Dear Sir/Madam:

We are following up on the letter you received via e-mail last week from Mr. Joseph Schmitz, the Department of Defense Inspector General. Mr. Schmitz identified an important safety evaluation underway by the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG). One of the first steps involved in this evaluation is the collection of data from DoD's senior leadership. You were selected to participate in this effort.

The DoD OIG partnered with the National Safety Council, an independent non-governmental public service organization, to implement this safety evaluation survey. Your response is extremely important for the success of this survey tool which will be used to improve DoD safety initiatives. Please be candid in your answers as all identities are confidential. The survey will take approximately 10 minutes to complete. Thank you for your participation on this survey to help improve safety in DoD.

Please click on the link below to begin.

Take the survey

Research & Statistical Services
National Safety Council
1121 Spring Lake Drive
Itasca, IL 60143-2301

From: National Safety Council [mailto:safetysurvey@nsc.org]
Sent: Tuesday, April 26, 2005 7:32 AM
To:
Subject: DoD Leadership Survey

Dear Sir/Madam:

As described in a previous e-mail you received, the DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) has undertaken an important safety evaluation. One of the steps in this process is the safety survey of DoD's senior leadership. This is a reminder to please participate in this important survey as soon as possible.

The DoD OIG partnered with the National Safety Council, an independent non-governmental public service organization, to implement this safety evaluation survey. Your response is extremely important for the success of this survey tool which will be used to improve DoD safety initiatives.

Please be candid in your answers as all identities are confidential. The survey will take approximately 10 minutes to complete. Thank you for your participation on this survey to help improve safety in DoD!

Please click on the link below to begin.

Take the survey

Research & Statistical Services
National Safety Council
1121 Spring Lake Drive
Itasca, IL 60143-2301

From: DoD Inspector General [mailto:safetysurvey@dodig.mil]
Sent: Tuesday, May 03, 2005 3:05 PM
To:
Subject: DoD Senior Leadership Survey

INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICERS AND MEMBERS OF THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT DoD Senior Leadership Survey

The Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) has partnered with the National Safety Council (NSC) to administer the subject survey. The NSC emailed the web-based survey to all senior leaders on April 19, 2005. Although all survey responses are anonymous, our "access code" tracking system indicates that we have not received your reply. Your participation in this survey is very important and we hope you can find a few minutes during your busy schedule to give us your leadership perspectives.

The Offices of the Secretary of Defense requested our assistance to conduct an evaluation in support of SecDef's goal to reduce accidents and mishaps by 50 percent within 2 years. This survey will be used to describe the baseline DoD safety culture and will serve as one of many elements in the evaluation of the DoD safety program. Your participation and responses to the survey will help us develop recommendations to improve the safety program and improve mission effectiveness.

The survey must be completed no later than May 9, 2005.

Take the survey

If you have any questions, please contact me at (703) 604-9151 (DSN 664-9151) or wmomson@dodig.osd.mil

William Brem Momson, III
Assistant Inspector General
For Inspections and Evaluations

Appendix D – Response Frequency and Percentage Distributions

Q1 Leadership sincere in efforts to ensure

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Strongly Agree	1	915	70.4	70.5	70.5
Agree	2	357	27.5	27.5	98.0
Neutral	3	14	1.1	1.1	99.1
Disagree	4	11	.8	.8	99.9
Strongly Disagree	5	1	.1	.1	100.0
	.	1	.1	Missing	
	Total	1299	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.325 Std dev .549 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000
Valid cases 1298 Missing cases 1

Q2 Safety goals set annually by leadership

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Strongly Agree	1	436	33.6	33.6	33.6
Agree	2	631	48.6	48.7	82.3
Neutral	3	183	14.1	14.1	96.4
Disagree	4	41	3.2	3.2	99.5
Strongly Disagree	5	6	.5	.5	100.0
	.	2	.2	Missing	
	Total	1299	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.882 Std dev .795 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000
Valid cases 1297 Missing cases 2

Q3 Ldrship demonstrates positive commitment

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Strongly Agree	1	709	54.6	54.8	54.8
Agree	2	513	39.5	39.6	94.4
Neutral	3	53	4.1	4.1	98.5
Disagree	4	19	1.5	1.5	100.0
	.	5	.4	Missing	
	Total	1299	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.101 Std dev .909 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000
Valid cases 1291 Missing cases 8

Q6 Safety funding adequate in budget proces

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Strongly Agree	1	88	6.8	6.8	6.8
Agree	2	450	34.6	34.8	41.6
Neutral	3	484	37.3	37.5	79.1
Disagree	4	232	17.9	18.0	97.1
Strongly Disagree	5	38	2.9	2.9	100.0
	.	7	.5	Missing	
	Total	1299	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.754 Std dev .926 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000
Valid cases 1292 Missing cases 7

Q7 Decreasing rate by 50% is achievable

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Strongly Agree	1	109	8.4	8.4	8.4
Agree	2	500	38.5	38.7	47.1
Neutral	3	354	27.3	27.4	74.5
Disagree	4	283	21.8	21.9	96.4
Strongly Disagree	5	47	3.6	3.6	100.0
	.	6	.5	Missing	
	Total	1299	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.736 Std dev 1.010 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000
Valid cases 1293 Missing cases 6

Q8 Making changes is high priority for ldrs

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Strongly Agree	1	422	32.5	32.6	32.6
Agree	2	655	50.4	50.5	83.1
Neutral	3	165	12.7	12.7	95.8
Disagree	4	53	4.1	4.1	99.9
Strongly Disagree	5	1	.1	.1	100.0
	.	3	.2	Missing	
	Total	1299	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.522 Std dev .648 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000
Valid cases 1294 Missing cases 5

Q4 Supvrs consider safety when rating perso

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Strongly Agree	1	153	11.8	11.9	11.9
Agree	2	503	38.7	39.0	50.9
Neutral	3	455	35.0	35.3	86.1
Disagree	4	170	13.1	13.2	99.3
Strongly Disagree	5	9	.7	.7	100.0
	.	9	.7	Missing	
	Total	1299	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.519 Std dev .890 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000
Valid cases 1290 Missing cases 9

Q5 Safety takes back seat to mission

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Strongly Agree	1	22	1.7	1.7	1.7
Agree	2	72	5.5	5.6	7.3
Neutral	3	126	9.7	9.8	17.0
Disagree	4	605	46.6	46.9	63.9
Strongly Disagree	5	466	35.9	36.1	100.0
	.	8	.6	Missing	
	Total	1299	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.886 Std dev .782 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000
Valid cases 1296 Missing cases 3

Q9 Best practices is good way to bring abou

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Strongly Agree	1	334	25.7	26.0	26.0
Agree	2	692	53.3	53.8	79.7
Neutral	3	216	16.6	16.8	96.5
Disagree	4	37	2.8	2.9	99.4
Strongly Disagree	5	8	.6	.6	100.0
	.	12	.9	Missing	
	Total	1299	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.984 Std dev .774 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000
Valid cases 1287 Missing cases 12

Q10 Cooperation exists across Services

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Strongly Agree	1	96	7.4	7.4	7.4
Agree	2	459	35.3	35.6	43.1
Neutral	3	600	46.2	46.5	89.6
Disagree	4	123	9.5	9.5	99.1
Strongly Disagree	5	11	.8	.9	100.0
	.	10	.8	Missing	
	Total	1299	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.607 Std dev .794 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000
Valid cases 1289 Missing cases 10

Q11 Ldrship has provided resources to suppor

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent

Percent

Strongly Agree	1	134	10.3	10.4	10.4
Agree	2	649	50.0	50.2	60.6
Neutral	3	342	26.3	26.5	87.0
Disagree	4	153	11.8	11.8	98.8
Strongly Disagree	5	15	1.2	1.2	100.0
	.	6	.5	Missing	
	Total	1299	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.432 Std dev .872 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000
Valid cases 1293 Missing cases 6

Q12 We have to accept that accidents will oc

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Strongly Agree	1	62	4.8	4.8	4.8
Agree	2	328	25.3	25.4	30.2
Neutral	3	158	12.2	12.2	42.4
Disagree	4	536	41.3	41.5	83.8
Strongly Disagree	5	209	16.1	16.2	100.0
	.	6	.5	Missing	
	Total	1299	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.388 Std dev 1.165 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000
Valid cases 1293 Missing cases 6

Q13 Rank

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
O-7 and Above	1	835	64.3	64.7	64.7
SES	2	456	35.1	35.3	100.0
	.	8	.6	Missing	
	Total	1299	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.353 Std dev .478 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 2.000
Valid cases 1291 Missing cases 8

Q14 Service

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Army-Active	1	231	17.8	17.9	17.9
Army-Guard	2	83	6.4	6.4	24.3
Army-Reserve	3	79	6.1	6.1	30.4
Army-Civilian	4	92	7.1	7.1	37.6
Navy-Active	5	113	8.7	8.8	46.3
Navy-Reserve	6	18	1.4	1.4	47.7
Navy-Civilian	7	112	8.6	8.7	56.4
Air Force-Active	8	185	14.2	14.3	70.7
Air Force-Guard	9	52	4.0	4.0	74.7
Air Force-Reserve	10	19	1.5	1.5	76.2
Air Force-Civilian	11	63	4.8	4.9	81.1
Marines-Active	12	62	4.8	4.8	85.9
Marines-Reserve	13	5	.4	.4	86.3
Marines-Civilian	14	11	.8	.9	87.1
DoD-Civilian	15	166	12.8	12.9	100.0
	.	8	.6	Missing	
	Total	1299	100.0	100.0	

Mean 6.772 Std dev 4.605 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 15.000
Valid cases 1291 Missing cases 8

Q15 Org. Assign.

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
OSD Staff	1	64	4.9	5.0	5.0
JSC Staff	2	29	2.2	2.3	7.3
DoD Agencies	3	93	7.2	7.3	14.6
COCOM and other JC	4	83	6.4	6.5	21.1
Service Secretariat	5	78	6.0	6.1	27.2
Service HQ Staff	6	174	13.4	13.6	40.8
MAJCOM/MACOM/CLAIMAN	7	189	14.5	14.8	55.6
Major Subordinate Co	8	351	27.0	27.5	83.1
DoD Field Activities	9	48	3.7	3.8	86.8
Joint Service School	10	18	1.4	1.4	88.3
Other	11	150	11.5	11.7	100.0
	.	22	1.7	Missing	
	Total	1299	100.0	100.0	

Mean 6.703 Std dev 2.618 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 11.000
Valid cases 1277 Missing cases 22

Appendix E – NSC Methods and Data Analysis

Senior Leader Survey Form

The DoD Senior Leader survey gauged the perception of DoD senior leaders regarding safety knowledge, climate, involvement, resources, priority-setting, and other leadership-related issues. The survey form was intended to be brief, from 12 to 15 questions in length. Format of the questions and response categories retained the format of the National Safety Council's Safety Barometer survey. Items were answered using a 5-point scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The survey contained both standardized and customized items. Standardized items were based on climate-related statements on the National Safety Council's Safety Barometer, with slight wording changes to adapt the items to DoD terminology. Customized items focused on safety climate issues specifically identified at DoD, as well as more generic issues such as budgeting, goals, and best practices.

Also included on the form was a demographics section in which respondents indicated their appropriate organization subgroup identifiers. For this survey, the following demographics were identified: Service, organization, and Flag Officer or Senior Executive Service (SES).

Besides these data-oriented responses, two open-ended written comments sections were developed. In these sections, respondents were able to provide specific suggestions and reactions to the topic of the survey. One of the open-ended items contained a relatively focused request as follows: "If you were to suggest one action that would improve safety in DoD, what would it be?" The other open-ended question was a more broad-based request, "Please provide any other general comments you may have."

Administration Process

The NSC conducted the survey for DoD senior leaders using a Web-based format. The survey population included all DoD Flag Officers and comparable SES-level civilian members. A total of 2,698 recipients (1,615 Flag Officers and 1,083 SESs) were sent an introductory e-mail from the OIG informing them the survey would take place. The e-mail contained the rationale for the survey, a brief description of the format, and assurances regarding the confidentiality of their responses. Approximately five days later, survey recipients received an e-mail from the NSC containing a link to a page on their website where they could securely complete and submit the survey. Electronic responses were forwarded directly to the NSC database.

While the survey responses were confidential, a numerical tracking system allowed survey researchers to send targeted follow-up reminder e-mails to non-responders at appropriate periods of time. Two follow-up e-mails were sent to non-responders approximately one and two weeks after the initial e-mail. Follow-up e-mails also contained the link to complete the survey.

National Safety Council Database
Seven of the 12 items on the survey were comparable to standard questions on the National Safety Council's Safety Barometer**. S**urvey results from the Senior Leader survey were compared with the 232 organizations within the NSC database.

The NSC database comparisons enable an organization to evaluate its results in relation to those of other survey users. The database does not represent a random sample of organizations nor does it reflect only the top performers in safety. Even so, results from organizations with a similar need and/or desire to involve personnel directly in the examination of their safety programs offer an external gauge against which to judge the DoD level of performance.

Survey Content
The Senior Leader survey asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement with items regarding a variety of safety and climate-related topics. These statements described activities or conditions related to the operation of the DoD safety program from a leadership perspective. Statements presented either a positive or negative description, as follows:

Positive:	Describes a condition, attitude or practice that can be considered conducive to safety
Negative:	Describes a condition, attitude or practice that can be considered detrimental to safety

Of the 12 survey items, 10 items presented positive descriptions and 2 items presented negative descriptions. Agreement with a positive statement or disagreement with a negative statement has a positive safety implication for the DoD safety program. Disagreement with a positive statement or agreement with a negative description has a negative implication.

Data Analyses
Responses to the senior leader survey items with positive descriptions were scored as follows:

+2 = Strongly Agree
+1 = Agree
0 = Neutral
-1 = Disagree
-2 = Strongly Disagree

Responses to senior leader survey items with negative descriptions were scored oppositely. An average (mean) response score was produced for each item by computing the average score for all respondents in the group.

Average response scores were compared with scores from the NSC database for comparable items. Percentile scores for each of the seven comparable Safety Barometer items in the senior

leader survey were computed by calculating the percentage of organizations in the database with lower average response scores. Percentiles range from 0 to 100, with 0 representing the lowest score in the database and 100 representing the highest.

Our intent was to provide senior leaders an overall but general analysis. The Services/Agencies should review our results and perform additional analyses according to their needs.

Appendix F – Response Distributions by Flag Officer versus Senior Executive Service Member

Q1 Leadership sincere in efforts to ensure by Q13 Rank

	Count / Col Pct	O-7 and Above (1)	SES (2)	Row Total
Q1	1	642	272	914
Strongly Agree		76.9	59.8	70.9
	2	186	167	353
Agree		22.3	36.7	27.4
	3	2	12	14
Neutral		.2	2.6	1.1
	4	5	3	8
Disagree		.6	.7	.6
	5		1	1
Strongly Disagre			.2	.1
	Column Total	835 / 64.7	455 / 35.3	1290 / 100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 9

Q2 Safety goals set annually by leadership by Q13 Rank

	Count / Col Pct	O-7 and Above (1)	SES (2)	Row Total
Q2	1	317	118	435
Strongly Agree		38.1	25.9	33.7
	2	417	210	627
Agree		50.1	46.1	48.6
	3	72	110	182
Neutral		8.6	24.1	14.1
	4	24	15	39
Disagree		2.9	3.3	3.0
	5	3	3	6
Strongly Disagre		.4	.7	.5
	Column Total	833 / 64.6	456 / 35.4	1289 / 100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 10

Q3 Ldrship demonstrates positive commitment by Q13 Rank

	Count / Col Pct	O-7 and Above (1)	SES (2)	Row Total
Q3	1	518	188	706
Strongly Agree		62.2	41.5	54.9
	2	290	220	510
Agree		34.8	48.6	39.7
	3	18	35	53
Neutral		2.2	7.7	4.1
	4	7	10	17
Disagree		.8	2.2	1.3
	Column Total	833 / 64.8	453 / 35.2	1286 / 100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 13

Q4 Supvrs consider safety when rating perso by Q13 Rank

	Count / Col Pct	O-7 and Above (1)	SES (2)	Row Total
Q4	1	108	45	153
Strongly Agree		13.0	10.0	11.9
	2	377	124	501
Agree		45.4	27.4	39.1
	3	257	196	453
Neutral		31.0	43.4	35.3
	4	86	81	167
Disagree		10.4	17.9	13.0
	5	2	6	8
Strongly Disagre		.2	1.3	.6
	Column Total	830 / 64.7	452 / 35.3	1282 / 100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 17

Q5 Safety takes back seat to mission by Q13 Rank

	Count / Col Pct	O-7 and Above (1)	SES (2)	Row Total
Q5	1	13	7	20
Strongly Agree		1.6	1.5	1.6
	2	47	25	72
Agree		5.7	5.5	5.6
	3	43	81	124
Neutral		5.2	17.8	9.7
	4	381	220	601
Disagree		46.0	48.4	46.8
	5	344	122	466
Strongly Disagre		41.5	26.8	36.3
	Column Total	828 / 64.5	455 / 35.5	1283 / 100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 16

Q6 Safety funding adequate in budget proces by Q13 Rank

	Count / Col Pct	O-7 and Above (1)	SES (2)	Row Total
Q6	1	60	28	88
Strongly Agree		7.2	6.2	6.9
	2	311	138	449
Agree		37.5	30.4	35.0
	3	275	203	478
Neutral		33.1	44.7	37.2
	4	156	75	231
Disagree		18.8	16.5	18.0
	5	28	10	38
Strongly Disagre		3.4	2.2	3.0
	Column Total	830 / 64.6	454 / 35.4	1284 / 100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 15

Q7 Decreasing rate by 50% is achievable by Q13 Rank

	Count / Col Pct	O-7 and Above (1)	SES (2)	Row Total
Q7	1	77	32	109
Strongly Agree		9.2	7.1	8.5
	2	326	172	498
Agree		39.1	38.1	38.8
	3	178	174	352
Neutral		21.4	38.5	27.4
	4	212	68	280
Disagree		25.5	15.0	21.8
	5	40	6	46
Strongly Disagre		4.8	1.3	3.6
	Column Total	833 / 64.8	452 / 35.2	1285 / 100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 14

Q8 Making changes is high priority for ldrs by Q13 Rank

	Count / Col Pct	O-7 and Above (1)	SES (2)	Row Total

Q8		O-7 and Above	SES	Row Total
	1	323	99	422
Strongly Agree		38.8	21.8	32.8
	2	421	230	651
Agree		50.5	50.5	50.5
	3	73	90	163
Neutral		8.8	19.8	12.7
	4	16	35	51
Disagree		1.9	7.7	4.0
	5		1	1
Strongly Disagre			.2	.1
Column Total		833 64.7	455 35.3	1288 100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 11

Q9 Best practices is good way to bring abou by Q13 Rank

Q9		O-7 and Above	SES	Row Total
	1	242	92	334
Strongly Agree		29.2	20.4	26.1
	2	435	251	686
Agree		52.5	55.7	53.6
	3	120	94	214
Neutral		14.5	20.8	16.7
	4	27	10	37
Disagree		3.3	2.2	2.9
	5	4	4	8
Strongly Disagre		.5	.9	.6
Column Total		828 64.7	451 35.3	1279 100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 20

Q10 Cooperation exists across Services by Q13 Rank

Q10		O-7 and Above	SES	Row Total
	1	64	32	96
Strongly Agree		7.7	7.1	7.5
	2	322	137	459
Agree		38.8	30.4	35.8
	3	338	255	593
Neutral		40.7	56.5	46.3
	4	98	25	123
Disagree		11.8	5.5	9.6
	5	8	2	10
Strongly Disagre		1.0	.4	.8
Column Total		830 64.8	451 35.2	1281 100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 18

Q11 Ldrship has provided resources to suppor by Q13 Rank

Q11		O-7 and Above	SES	Row Total
	1	93	41	134
Strongly Agree		11.2	9.1	10.4
	2	465	178	643
Agree		55.8	39.5	50.0
	3	171	170	341
Neutral		20.5	37.7	26.5
	4	97	55	152
Disagree		11.6	12.2	11.8
	5	8	7	15
Strongly Disagre		1.0	1.6	1.2
Column Total		834 64.9	451 35.1	1285 100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 14

Q12 We have to accept that accidents will oc by Q13 Rank

Q12		O-7 and Above	SES	Row Total
	1	50	12	62
Strongly Agree		6.0	2.6	4.8
	2	232	92	324
Agree		28.0	20.2	25.2
	3	88	70	158
Neutral		10.6	15.4	12.3
	4	324	209	533
Disagree		39.0	45.8	41.4
	5	136	73	209
Strongly Disagre		16.4	16.0	16.3
Column Total		830 64.5	456 35.5	1286 100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 13

Appendix G – Response Distributions by Category

Q1 Leadership sincere in efforts to ensure by Q14 Service

Q14 Page 1 of 2

Q1	Count / Col Pct	Army-Active 1	Army-Guard 2	Army-Reserve 3	Army-Civilian 4	Navy-Active 5	Navy-Reserve 6	Navy-Civilian 7	Air Forc e-Active 8	Air Forc e-Guard 9	Air Forc e-Reserv 10	Air Forc e-Civili 11	Row Total
1 Strongly Agree	Count	181	57	61	61	77	14	74	154	43	14	35	911
	Col Pct	78.4	68.7	77.2	67.0	68.1	77.8	66.1	83.2	82.7	73.7	55.6	70.6
2 Agree	Count	49	24	18	27	36	4	31	28	8	5	24	353
	Col Pct	21.2	28.9	22.8	29.7	31.9	22.2	27.7	15.1	15.4	26.3	38.1	27.4
3 Neutral	Count			2			6	1	1		1	14	
	Col Pct			2.2			5.4	.5	1.9		1.6	1.1	
4 Disagree	Count	1	2		1		1	2			3	11	
	Col Pct	.4	2.4		1.1		.9	1.1			4.8	.9	
5 Strongly Disagre	Count											1	
	Col Pct											.1	
Column Total		231 17.9	83 6.4	79 6.1	91 7.1	113 8.8	18 1.4	112 8.7	185 14.3	52 4.0	19 1.5	63 4.9	1290 100.0

(Continued)

Q1 Leadership sincere in efforts to ensure by Q14 Service

Q14 Page 2 of 2

Q1	Count / Col Pct	Marines-Active 12	Marines-Reserve 13	Marines-Civilian 14	DoD-Civilian 15	Row Total
1 Strongly Agree	Count	41	5	7	87	911
	Col Pct	66.1	100.0	63.6	52.4	70.6
2 Agree	Count	21		4	74	353
	Col Pct	33.9		36.4	44.6	27.4
3 Neutral	Count				3	14
	Col Pct				1.8	1.1
4 Disagree	Count				1	11
	Col Pct				.6	.9
5 Strongly Disagre	Count				1	1
	Col Pct				.6	.1
Column Total		62 4.8	5 .4	11 .9	166 12.9	1290 100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 9

Q2 Safety goals set annually by leadership by Q14 Service

Q14 Page 1 of 2

Q2	Count / Col Pct	Army-Active 1	Army-Guard 2	Army-Reserve 3	Army-Civilian 4	Navy-Active 5	Navy-Reserve 6	Navy-Civilian 7	Air Forc e-Active 8	Air Forc e-Guard 9	Air Forc e-Reserv 10	Air Forc e-Civili 11	Row Total
1 Strongly Agree	Count	92	26	25	28	37	8	29	83	21	8	20	434
	Col Pct	40.2	31.3	31.6	30.4	32.7	44.4	25.9	44.9	40.4	42.1	31.7	33.7
2 Agree	Count	114	50	41	46	59	9	50	75	29	9	25	627
	Col Pct	49.8	60.2	51.9	50.0	52.2	50.0	44.6	40.5	55.8	47.4	39.7	48.6
3 Neutral	Count	20	5	8	15	10	1	32	22	2	2	11	181
	Col Pct	8.7	6.0	10.1	16.3	8.8	5.6	28.6	11.9	3.8	10.5	17.5	14.0
4 Disagree	Count	2	2	4	3	7		1	5			6	41
	Col Pct	.9	2.4	5.1	3.3	6.2		.9	2.7			9.5	3.2
5 Strongly Disagre	Count	1		1								1	6
	Col Pct	.4		1.3								1.6	.5
Column Total		229 17.8	83 6.4	79 6.1	92 7.1	113 8.8	18 1.4	112 8.7	185 14.4	52 4.0	19 1.5	63 4.9	1289 100.0

(Continued)

Q2 Safety goals set annually by leadership by Q14 Service

Q14 Page 2 of 2

Q2	Count / Col Pct	Marines-Active 12	Marines-Reserve 13	Marines-Civilian 14	DoD-Civilian 15	Row Total
1 Strongly Agree	Count	16	3	2	36	434
	Col Pct	25.8	60.0	18.2	21.7	33.7
2 Agree	Count	33	2	8	77	627
	Col Pct	53.2	40.0	72.7	46.4	48.6
3 Neutral	Count	8		1	44	181
	Col Pct	12.9		9.1	26.5	14.0

```
                +--------+--------+--------+--------+
              4 |      4 |        |        |      7 |    41
  Disagree      |    6.5 |        |        |    4.2 |   3.2
                +--------+--------+--------+--------+
              5 |      1 |        |        |      2 |     6
  Strongly Disagre |    1.6 |        |        |    1.2 |    .5
                +--------+--------+--------+--------+
           Column       62        5       11      166     1289
            Total      4.8       .4       .9     12.9    100.0

Number of Missing Observations:  10
```

Q3 Ldrship demonstrates positive commitment by Q14 Service

```
                 Q14                                                                                                Page 1 of 2
           Count |Army-    Army-    Army-    Army-    Navy-    Navy-    Navy-    Air Forc Air Forc Air Forc Air Forc
         Col Pct |Active   Guard    Reserve  Civilian Active   Reserve  Civilian e-Active e-Guard  e-Reserv e-Civili   Row
                 |     1  |     2  |     3  |     4  |     5  |     6  |     7  |     8  |     9  |    10  |    11  | Total
Q3       --------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
              1  |   147  |    48  |    47  |    45  |    58  |    10  |    50  |   138  |    33  |     8  |    28  |   706
  Strongly Agree |  63.6  |  58.5  |  59.5  |  49.5  |  51.3  |  55.6  |  44.6  |  75.0  |  63.5  |  42.1  |  44.4  |  54.9
                 +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
              2  |    81  |    29  |    29  |    43  |    50  |     8  |    51  |    39  |    19  |    11  |    25  |   508
  Agree          |  35.1  |  35.4  |  36.7  |  47.3  |  44.2  |  44.4  |  45.5  |  21.2  |  36.5  |  57.9  |  39.7  |  39.5
                 +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
              3  |     2  |     2  |     2  |     2  |     5  |        |     9  |     6  |        |        |     6  |    53
  Neutral        |    .9  |   2.4  |   2.5  |   2.2  |   4.4  |        |   8.0  |   3.3  |        |        |   9.5  |   4.1
                 +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
              4  |     1  |     3  |     1  |     1  |        |        |     2  |     1  |        |        |     4  |    19
  Disagree       |    .4  |   3.7  |   1.3  |   1.1  |        |        |   1.8  |    .5  |        |        |   6.3  |   1.5
                 +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
           Column      231       82       79       91      113       18      112      184       52       19       63    1286
(Continued)  Total    18.0      6.4      6.1      7.1      8.8      1.4      8.7     14.3      4.0      1.5      4.9   100.0
```

Q3 Ldrship demonstrates positive commitment by Q14 Service

```
                 Q14                          Page 2 of 2
           Count |Marines- Marines- Marines- DoD-
         Col Pct |Active   Reserve  Civilian Civilian   Row
                 |    12  |    13  |    14  |    15  | Total
Q3       --------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
              1  |    27  |     5  |     7  |    55  |   706
  Strongly Agree |  43.5  | 100.0  |  63.6  |  33.5  |  54.9
                 +--------+--------+--------+--------+
              2  |    32  |        |     3  |    88  |   508
  Agree          |  51.6  |        |  27.3  |  53.7  |  39.5
                 +--------+--------+--------+--------+
              3  |     2  |        |     1  |    16  |    53
  Neutral        |   3.2  |        |   9.1  |   9.8  |   4.1
                 +--------+--------+--------+--------+
              4  |     1  |        |        |     5  |    19
  Disagree       |   1.6  |        |        |   3.0  |   1.5
                 +--------+--------+--------+--------+
           Column      62        5       11      164    1286
            Total     4.8       .4       .9     12.8   100.0

Number of Missing Observations:  13
```

Q4 Supvrs consider safety when rating perso by Q14 Service

```
                 Q14                                                                                                Page 1 of 2
           Count |Army-    Army-    Army-    Army-    Navy-    Navy-    Navy-    Air Forc Air Forc Air Forc Air Forc
         Col Pct |Active   Guard    Reserve  Civilian Active   Reserve  Civilian e-Active e-Guard  e-Reserv e-Civili   Row
                 |     1  |     2  |     3  |     4  |     5  |     6  |     7  |     8  |     9  |    10  |    11  | Total
Q4       --------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
              1  |    41  |    12  |     9  |    12  |    13  |     1  |     9  |    22  |     6  |        |     9  |   152
  Strongly Agree |  17.7  |  14.6  |  11.4  |  13.2  |  11.6  |   5.6  |   8.2  |  12.0  |  11.5  |        |  14.5  |  11.9
                 +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
              2  |    96  |    39  |    38  |    40  |    45  |     6  |    32  |    84  |    34  |    10  |    12  |   502
  Agree          |  41.6  |  47.6  |  48.1  |  44.0  |  40.2  |  33.3  |  29.1  |  45.9  |  65.4  |  52.6  |  19.4  |  39.2
                 +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
              3  |    72  |    23  |    21  |    31  |    40  |    10  |    45  |    60  |     9  |     8  |    26  |   451
  Neutral        |  31.2  |  28.0  |  26.6  |  34.1  |  35.7  |  55.6  |  40.9  |  32.8  |  17.3  |  42.1  |  41.9  |  35.2
                 +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
              4  |    21  |     8  |    11  |     5  |    13  |     1  |    22  |    17  |     3  |     1  |    14  |   168
  Disagree       |   9.1  |   9.8  |  13.9  |   5.5  |  11.6  |   5.6  |  20.0  |   9.3  |   5.8  |   5.3  |  22.6  |  13.1
                 +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
              5  |     1  |        |        |     3  |     1  |        |     2  |        |        |        |     1  |     9
  Strongly Disagre |    .4  |        |        |   3.3  |    .9  |        |   1.8  |        |        |        |   1.6  |    .7
                 +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
           Column      231       82       79       91      112       18      110      183       52       19       62    1282
(Continued)  Total    18.0      6.4      6.2      7.1      8.7      1.4      8.6     14.3      4.1      1.5      4.8   100.0
```

Q4 Supvrs consider safety when rating perso by Q14 Service

```
                 Q14                          Page 2 of 2
           Count |Marines- Marines- Marines- DoD-
         Col Pct |Active   Reserve  Civilian Civilian   Row
                 |    12  |    13  |    14  |    15  | Total
Q4       --------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
              1  |     4  |        |     1  |    13  |   152
  Strongly Agree |   6.6  |        |   9.1  |   7.8  |  11.9
                 +--------+--------+--------+--------+
              2  |    28  |     2  |     4  |    32  |   502
  Agree          |  45.9  |  40.0  |  36.4  |  19.3  |  39.2
                 +--------+--------+--------+--------+
```

3	18	1	5	82	451
Neutral	29.5	20.0	45.5	49.4	35.2
4	11	2	1	38	168
Disagree	18.0	40.0	9.1	22.9	13.1
5			1	9	
Strongly Disagre			.6	.7	
Column Total	61 4.8	5 .4	11 .9	166 12.9	1282 100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 17

Q5 Safety takes back seat to mission by Q14 Service

Q5	Q14 Army-Active 1	Army-Guard 2	Army-Reserve 3	Army-Civilian 4	Navy-Active 5	Navy-Reserve 6	Navy-Civilian 7	Air Forc e-Active 8	Air Forc e-Guard 9	Air Forc e-Reserv 10	Air Forc e-Civili 11	Row Total
1	2	2	2	3	1		1	5	1		4	22
Strongly Agree	.9	2.5	2.6	3.3	.9		.9	2.7	1.9		6.3	1.7
2	8	5	3	5	8		3	9	2		4	69
Agree	3.5	6.2	3.8	5.4	7.1		2.7	4.9	3.8		6.3	5.4
3	13	6	5	9	6	6	19	2	2	1	16	126
Neutral	5.7	7.4	6.4	9.8	5.3	33.3	17.1	1.1	3.8	5.3	25.4	9.8
4	117	36	48	43	51	7	55	60	24	11	27	601
Disagree	50.9	44.4	61.5	46.7	45.1	38.9	49.5	32.8	46.2	57.9	42.9	46.8
5	90	32	20	32	47	5	33	107	23	7	12	465
Strongly Disagre	39.1	39.5	25.6	34.8	41.6	27.8	29.7	58.5	44.2	36.8	19.0	36.2
Column Total	230 17.9	81 6.3	78 6.1	92 7.2	113 8.8	18 1.4	111 8.7	183 14.3	52 4.1	19 1.5	63 4.9	1283 100.0

(Continued)

Q5 Safety takes back seat to mission by Q14 Service

Q5	Q14 Marines-Active 12	Marines-Reserve 13	Marines-Civilian 14	DoD-Civilian 15	Row Total
1			1	22	
Strongly Agree			.6	1.7	
2	9	2	11	69	
Agree	14.8	40.0	6.6	5.4	
3	6		35	126	
Neutral	9.8		21.1	9.8	
4	33	2	8	79	601
Disagree	54.1	40.0	72.7	47.6	46.8
5	13	1	3	40	465
Strongly Disagre	21.3	20.0	27.3	24.1	36.2
Column Total	61 4.8	5 .4	11 .9	166 12.9	1283 100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 16

Q6 Safety funding adequate in budget proces by Q14 Service

Q6	Q14 Army-Active 1	Army-Guard 2	Army-Reserve 3	Army-Civilian 4	Navy-Active 5	Navy-Reserve 6	Navy-Civilian 7	Air Forc e-Active 8	Air Forc e-Guard 9	Air Forc e-Reserv 10	Air Forc e-Civili 11	Row Total
1	19	3	1	9	9		5	23	4	1	4	88
Strongly Agree	8.3	3.7	1.3	9.9	8.1		4.5	12.4	7.7	5.3	6.3	6.9
2	78	37	32	26	41	4	31	74	24	7	14	447
Agree	33.9	45.1	41.0	28.6	36.9	22.2	27.7	40.0	46.2	36.8	22.2	34.8
3	72	31	24	33	42	10	52	60	13	8	31	482
Neutral	31.3	37.8	30.8	36.3	37.8	55.6	46.4	32.4	25.0	42.1	49.2	37.5
4	50	8	18	20	17	3	22	24	9	3	11	229
Disagree	21.7	9.8	23.1	22.0	15.3	16.7	19.6	13.0	17.3	15.8	17.5	17.8
5	11	3	3	3	2	1	2	4	2		3	38
Strongly Disagre	4.8	3.7	3.8	3.3	1.8	5.6	1.8	2.2	3.8		4.8	3.0
Column Total	230 17.9	82 6.4	78 6.1	91 7.1	111 8.6	18 1.4	112 8.7	185 14.4	52 4.0	19 1.5	63 4.9	1284 100.0

(Continued)

Q6 Safety funding adequate in budget proces by Q14 Service

Q14 Marines-Active	Marines-Reserve	Marines-Civilian	DoD-Civilian	Row

	12	13	14	15	Total
Q6					
1	2			8	88
Strongly Agree	3.2			4.8	6.9
2	15	3	3	58	447
Agree	24.2	60.0	27.3	35.2	34.8
3	20	1	6	79	482
Neutral	32.3	20.0	54.5	47.9	37.5
4	22	1	2	19	229
Disagree	35.5	20.0	18.2	11.5	17.8
5	3			1	38
Strongly Disagre	4.8			.6	3.0
Column Total	62 4.8	5 .4	11 .9	165 12.9	1284 100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 15

Q7 Decreasing rate by 50% is achievable by Q14 Service

Q14	Army-Active	Army-Guard	Army-Reserve	Army-Civilian	Navy-Active	Navy-Reserve	Navy-Civilian	Air Forc e-Active	Air Forc e-Guard	Air Forc e-Reserv	Air Forc e-Civili	Row
Count / Col Pct	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	Total
Q7												
1	18	13	4	6	13	3	6	15	9	4	4	109
Strongly Agree	7.8	15.7	5.1	6.6	11.6	16.7	5.5	8.1	17.3	21.1	6.3	8.5
2	80	40	33	42	52	6	43	63	29	7	27	498
Agree	34.6	48.2	41.8	46.2	46.4	33.3	39.1	34.1	55.8	36.8	42.9	38.8
3	51	15	22	31	22	6	45	45	9	1	20	351
Neutral	22.1	18.1	27.8	34.1	19.6	33.3	40.9	24.3	17.3	5.3	31.7	27.3
4	72	10	16	11	23	2	14	51	5	5	11	280
Disagree	31.2	12.0	20.3	12.1	20.5	11.1	12.7	27.6	9.6	26.3	17.5	21.8
5	10	5	4	1	2	1	2	11		2	1	47
Strongly Disagre	4.3	6.0	5.1	1.1	1.8	5.6	1.8	5.9		10.5	1.6	3.7
Column Total	231 18.0	83 6.5	79 6.1	91 7.1	112 8.7	18 1.4	110 8.6	185 14.4	52 4.0	19 1.5	63 4.9	1285 100.0

(Continued)

Q7 Decreasing rate by 50% is achievable by Q14 Service

Q14	Marines-Active	Marines-Reserve	Marines-Civilian	DoD-Civilian	Row
Count / Col Pct	12	13	14	15	Total
Q7					
1	1			13	109
Strongly Agree	1.6			7.9	8.5
2	15	1	4	56	498
Agree	24.6	20.0	36.4	33.9	38.8
3	9	2	3	70	351
Neutral	14.8	40.0	27.3	42.4	27.3
4	29	2	4	25	280
Disagree	47.5	40.0	36.4	15.2	21.8
5	7			1	47
Strongly Disagre	11.5			.6	3.7
Column Total	61 4.7	5 .4	11 .9	165 12.8	1285 100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 14

Q8 Making changes is high priority for ldrs by Q14 Service

Q14	Army-Active	Army-Guard	Army-Reserve	Army-Civilian	Navy-Active	Navy-Reserve	Navy-Civilian	Air Forc e-Active	Air Forc e-Guard	Air Forc e-Reserv	Air Forc e-Civili	Row
Count / Col Pct	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	Total
Q8												
1	93	31	24	25	40	4	25	80	18	5	14	419
Strongly Agree	40.4	37.3	30.4	27.5	35.4	22.2	22.3	43.2	35.3	26.3	22.2	32.5
2	112	41	47	45	60	10	58	90	28	10	30	650
Agree	48.7	49.4	59.5	49.5	53.1	55.6	51.8	48.6	54.9	52.6	47.6	50.5
3	22	9	7	15	10	4	21	13	3	4	11	165
Neutral	9.6	10.8	8.9	16.5	8.8	22.2	18.8	7.0	5.9	21.1	17.5	12.8
4	3	2	1	6	3		8	2	2		7	53
Disagree	1.3	2.4	1.3	6.6	2.7		7.1	1.1	3.9		11.1	4.1
5											1	1
Strongly Disagre											1.6	.1

Column	230	83	79	91	113	18	112	185	51	19	63	1288
(Continued) Total	17.9	6.4	6.1	7.1	8.8	1.4	8.7	14.4	4.0	1.5	4.9	100.0

Q8 Making changes is high priority for ldrs by Q14 Service

Q14 Page 2 of 2

Count / Col Pct	Marines-Active 12	Marines-Reserve 13	Marines-Civilian 14	DoD-Civilian 15	Row Total
Q8 1 Strongly Agree	25	3	3	29	419
	40.3	60.0	27.3	17.5	32.5
2 Agree	27	2	6	84	650
	43.5	40.0	54.5	50.6	50.5
3 Neutral	7		2	37	165
	11.3		18.2	22.3	12.8
4 Disagree	3			16	53
	4.8			9.6	4.1
5 Strongly Disagre					1
					.1
Column Total	62	5	11	166	1288
	4.8	.4	.9	12.9	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 11

Q9 Best practices is good way to bring abou by Q14 Service

Q14 Page 1 of 2

Count / Col Pct	Army-Active 1	Army-Guard 2	Army-Reserve 3	Army-Civilian 4	Navy-Active 5	Navy-Reserve 6	Navy-Civilian 7	Air Forc e-Active 8	Air Forc e-Guard 9	Air Forc e-Reserv 10	Air Forc e-Civili 11	Row Total
Q9 1 Strongly Agree	56	24	23	20	44	9	19	59	14	5	11	333
	24.5	29.3	29.1	21.7	38.9	50.0	17.0	32.2	27.5	26.3	17.5	26.0
2 Agree	126	46	40	49	56	7	67	97	34	7	38	687
	55.0	56.1	50.6	53.3	49.6	38.9	59.8	53.0	66.7	36.8	60.3	53.7
3 Neutral	37	11	14	20	11	2	21	21	2	7	11	214
	16.2	13.4	17.7	21.7	9.7	11.1	18.8	11.5	3.9	36.8	17.5	16.7
4 Disagree	8	1	1	3	2		3	5	1		2	37
	3.5	1.2	1.3	3.3	1.8		2.7	2.7	2.0		3.2	2.9
5 Strongly Disagre	2	1					2	1			1	8
	.9		1.3				1.8	.5			1.6	.6
Column Total	229	82	79	92	113	18	112	183	51	19	63	1279
(Continued)	17.9	6.4	6.2	7.2	8.8	1.4	8.8	14.3	4.0	1.5	4.9	100.0

Q9 Best practices is good way to bring abou by Q14 Service

Q14 Page 2 of 2

Count / Col Pct	Marines-Active 12	Marines-Reserve 13	Marines-Civilian 14	DoD-Civilian 15	Row Total
Q9 1 Strongly Agree	8	3	3	35	333
	13.6	60.0	27.3	21.5	26.0
2 Agree	27	1	7	85	687
	45.8	20.0	63.6	52.1	53.7
3 Neutral	16	1	1	39	214
	27.1	20.0	9.1	23.9	16.7
4 Disagree	8			3	37
	13.6			1.8	2.9
5 Strongly Disagre				1	8
				.6	.6
Column Total	59	5	11	163	1279
	4.6	.4	.9	12.7	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 20

Q10 Cooperation exists across Services by Q14 Service

Q14 Page 1 of 2

Count / Col Pct	Army-Active 1	Army-Guard 2	Army-Reserve 3	Army-Civilian 4	Navy-Active 5	Navy-Reserve 6	Navy-Civilian 7	Air Forc e-Active 8	Air Forc e-Guard 9	Air Forc e-Reserv 10	Air Forc e-Civili 11	Row Total
Q10 1 Strongly Agree	24	9	9	8	5		11	6	3	2	3	96
	10.4	10.8	11.5	8.9	4.4		9.8	3.3	6.0	10.5	4.8	7.5
2 Agree	89	45	29	31	45	4	35	63	19	4	13	457
	38.7	54.2	37.2	34.4	39.8	22.2	31.3	34.2	38.0	21.1	20.6	35.7

3	90	23	35	46	46	11	61	84	19	10	40	594
Neutral	39.1	27.7	44.9	51.1	40.7	61.1	54.5	45.7	38.0	52.6	63.5	46.4
4	24	6	4	4	17	2	5	28	9	3	6	123
Disagree	10.4	7.2	5.1	4.4	15.0	11.1	4.5	15.2	18.0	15.8	9.5	9.6
5	3		1	1		1		3			1	11
Strongly Disagre	1.3		1.3	1.1		5.6		1.6			1.6	.9
Column	230	83	78	90	113	18	112	184	50	19	63	1281
(Continued) Total	18.0	6.5	6.1	7.0	8.8	1.4	8.7	14.4	3.9	1.5	4.9	100.0

Q10 Cooperation exists across Services by Q14 Service

Count / Col Pct	Q14 Marines-Active 12	Marines-Reserve 13	Marines-Civilian 14	DoD-Civilian 15	Row Total
Q10					
1	7		9	96	
Strongly Agree	11.3		5.5	7.5	
2	25	1	5	49	457
Agree	40.3	20.0	45.5	30.1	35.7
3	26	3	6	94	594
Neutral	41.9	60.0	54.5	57.7	46.4
4	4	1		10	123
Disagree	6.5	20.0		6.1	9.6
5				1	11
Strongly Disagre				.6	.9
Column Total	62 4.8	5 .4	11 .9	163 12.7	1281 100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 18

Q11 Ldrship has provided resources to suppor by Q14 Service

Count / Col Pct	Q14 Army-Active 1	Army-Guard 2	Army-Reserve 3	Army-Civilian 4	Navy-Active 5	Navy-Reserve 6	Navy-Civilian 7	Air Forc e-Active 8	Air Forc e-Guard 9	Air Forc e-Reserv 10	Air Forc e-Civili 11	Row Total
Q11												
1	26	6	7	10	11		10	34	6	1	6	134
Strongly Agree	11.3	7.2	8.9	11.1	9.7		8.9	18.5	11.5	5.3	9.5	10.4
2	119	58	45	41	59	9	43	99	32	13	21	644
Agree	51.5	69.9	57.0	45.6	52.2	50.0	38.4	53.8	61.5	68.4	33.3	50.1
3	51	15	14	27	29	6	38	35	8	5	22	342
Neutral	22.1	18.1	17.7	30.0	25.7	33.3	33.9	19.0	15.4	26.3	34.9	26.6
4	33	3	12	11	13	3	18	16	6		11	150
Disagree	14.3	3.6	15.2	12.2	11.5	16.7	16.1	8.7	11.5		17.5	11.7
5	2	1	1	1	1		3				3	15
Strongly Disagre	.9	1.2	1.3	1.1	.9		2.7				4.8	1.2
Column	231	83	79	90	113	18	112	184	52	19	63	1285
(Continued) Total	18.0	6.5	6.1	7.0	8.8	1.4	8.7	14.3	4.0	1.5	4.9	100.0

Q11 Ldrship has provided resources to suppor by Q14 Service

Count / Col Pct	Q14 Marines-Active 12	Marines-Reserve 13	Marines-Civilian 14	DoD-Civilian 15	Row Total
Q11					
1	2	1		14	134
Strongly Agree	3.2	20.0		8.6	10.4
2	31	3	5	66	644
Agree	50.0	60.0	45.5	40.5	50.1
3	16	1	5	70	342
Neutral	25.8	20.0	45.5	42.9	26.6
4	11		1	12	150
Disagree	17.7		9.1	7.4	11.7
5	2			1	15
Strongly Disagre	3.2			.6	1.2
Column Total	62 4.8	5 .4	11 .9	163 12.7	1285 100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 14

Q12 We have to accept that accidents will oc by Q14 Service

Count	Q14 Army-	Army-	Army-	Army-	Navy-	Navy-	Navy-	Air Forc	Air Forc	Air Forc	Air Forc

Col Pct	Active 1	Guard 2	Reserve 3	Civilian Active 4	Reserve 5	Civilian 6	e-Active 7	e-Guard 8	e-Reserv 9	e-Civili 10	11	Row Total
Q12												
1 Strongly Agree	17	3	4	3	3	1	2	14	1		3	62
	7.4	3.6	5.2	3.3	2.7	5.9	1.8	7.6	1.9		4.8	4.8
2 Agree	72	20	24	26	14	5	13	58	12	5	18	323
	31.3	24.1	31.2	28.3	12.4	29.4	11.6	31.5	23.1	26.3	29.0	25.1
3 Neutral	25	10	10	11	9	2	16	19	2	1	9	157
	10.9	12.0	13.0	12.0	8.0	11.8	14.3	10.3	3.8	5.3	14.5	12.2
4 Disagree	83	30	30	35	60	6	60	73	26	9	24	534
	36.1	36.1	39.0	38.0	53.1	35.3	53.6	39.7	50.0	47.4	38.7	41.6
5 Strongly Disagre	33	20	9	17	27	3	21	20	11	4	8	209
	14.3	24.1	11.7	18.5	23.9	17.6	18.8	10.9	21.2	21.1	12.9	16.3
Column Total	230	83	77	92	113	17	112	184	52	19	62	1285
(Continued)	17.9	6.5	6.0	7.2	8.8	1.3	8.7	14.3	4.0	1.5	4.8	100.0

Q12 We have to accept that accidents will oc by Q14 Service

Count / Col Pct	Q14 Marines-Active 12	Marines-Reserve 13	Marines-Civilian 14	DoD-Civilian 15	Row Total
Q12					
1 Strongly Agree	7		4	62	
	11.3		2.4	4.8	
2	17	3	4	32	323
Agree	27.4	60.0	36.4	19.3	25.1
3 Neutral	10	1	2	30	157
	16.1	20.0	18.2	18.1	12.2
4 Disagree	20	1	4	73	534
	32.3	20.0	36.4	44.0	41.6
5 Strongly Disagre	8		1	27	209
	12.9		9.1	16.3	16.3
Column Total	62	5	11	166	1285
	4.8	.4	.9	12.9	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 14

Appendix H – Response Distributions by Organization

Q1 Leadership sincere in efforts to ensure by Q15 Org. Assign.

Count / Col Pct	OSD Staff	JSC Staff	DoD Agencies	COCOM and other	Service Secreta	Service HQ Staff	MAJCOM/M ACOM/CLA	Major Subbord	DoD Fld Activit	Joint Service	Other Sc	Row
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	Total
Q1												
1 Strongly Agree	25 39.1	21 72.4	60 64.5	64 77.1	49 62.8	120 69.4	151 79.9	263 74.9	34 70.8	15 83.3	101 67.3	903 70.8
2 Agree	34 53.1	8 27.6	32 34.4	18 21.7	27 34.6	51 29.5	34 18.0	83 23.6	14 29.2	3 16.7	43 28.7	347 27.2
3 Neutral	3 4.7				2 2.6	1 .6	1 .5	3 .9			4 2.7	14 1.1
4 Disagree	1 1.6		1 1.1	1 1.2		1 .6	3 1.6	2 .6			2 1.3	11 .9
5 Strongly Disagre	1 1.6											1 .1
Column Total	64 5.0	29 2.3	93 7.3	83 6.5	78 6.1	173 13.6	189 14.8	351 27.5	48 3.8	18 1.4	150 11.8	1276 100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 23

Q2 Safety goals set annually by leadership by Q15 Org. Assign.

Count / Col Pct	OSD Staff	JSC Staff	DoD Agencies	COCOM and other	Service Secreta	Service HQ Staff	MAJCOM/M ACOM/CLA	Major Subbord	DoD Fld Activit	Joint Service	Other Sc	Row
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	Total
Q2												
1 Strongly Agree	7 10.9	8 27.6	31 33.3	31 37.3	25 32.5	52 30.1	81 42.9	135 38.5	14 29.2	7 38.9	39 26.0	430 33.7
2 Agree	29 45.3	15 51.7	46 49.5	43 51.8	32 41.6	83 48.0	90 47.6	169 48.1	23 47.9	8 44.4	81 54.0	619 48.5
3 Neutral	23 35.9	6 20.7	13 14.0	7 8.4	19 24.7	29 16.8	11 5.8	35 10.0	7 14.6	3 16.7	26 17.3	179 14.0
4 Disagree	4 6.3		2 2.2	2 2.4		9 5.2	7 3.7	10 2.8	3 6.3		4 2.7	41 3.2
5 Strongly Disagre	1 1.6		1 1.1		1 1.3			2 .6	1 2.1			6 .5
Column Total	64 5.0	29 2.3	93 7.3	83 6.5	77 6.0	173 13.6	189 14.8	351 27.5	48 3.8	18 1.4	150 11.8	1275 100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 24

Q3 Ldrship demonstrates positive commitment by Q15 Org. Assign.

Count / Col Pct	OSD Staff	JSC Staff	DoD Agencies	COCOM and other	Service Secreta	Service HQ Staff	MAJCOM/M ACOM/CLA	Major Subbord	DoD Fld Activit	Joint Service	Other Sc	Row
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	Total
Q3												
1 Strongly Agree	11 17.2	11 37.9	43 47.3	47 56.6	37 48.7	88 50.9	123 65.1	219 62.4	27 56.3	10 55.6	81 54.0	697 54.8
2 Agree	41 64.1	18 62.1	42 46.2	34 41.0	34 44.7	70 40.5	59 31.2	121 34.5	19 39.6	8 44.4	59 39.3	505 39.7
3 Neutral	9 14.1		5 5.5	2 2.4	3 3.9	12 6.9	5 2.6	8 2.3	1 2.1		6 4.0	51 4.0
4 Disagree	3 4.7		1 1.1		2 2.6	3 1.7	2 1.1	3 .9	1 2.1		4 2.7	19 1.5
Column Total	64 5.0	29 2.3	91 7.2	83 6.5	76 6.0	173 13.6	189 14.9	351 27.6	48 3.8	18 1.4	150 11.8	1272 100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 27

Q4 Supvrs consider safety when rating perso by Q15 Org. Assign.

Count / Col Pct	OSD Staff	JSC Staff	DoD Agencies	COCOM and other	Service Secreta	Service HQ Staff	MAJCOM/M ACOM/CLA	Major Subbord	DoD Fld Activit	Joint Service	Other Sc	Row
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	Total
Q4												
1 Strongly Agree	3 4.7	1 3.4	10 10.8	12 14.5	8 10.3	18 10.5	23 12.2	43 12.3	7 14.6	7 38.9	18 12.2	150 11.8
2 Agree	9 14.1	10 34.5	23 24.7	29 34.9	17 21.8	66 38.4	80 42.6	179 51.3	19 39.6	5 27.8	61 41.5	498 39.2
3 Neutral	30 46.9	14 48.3	47 50.5	35 42.2	33 42.3	58 33.7	61 32.4	96 27.5	18 37.5	5 27.8	47 32.0	444 35.0
4 Disagree	22 34.4	4 13.8	12 12.9	7 8.4	19 24.4	29 16.9	22 11.7	29 8.3	3 6.3	1 5.6	20 13.6	168 13.2

5			1		1	1	2	2	1		1	9
Strongly Disagre			1.1		1.3	.6	1.1	.6	2.1		.7	.7
Column	64	29	93	83	78	172	188	349	48	18	147	1269
Total	5.0	2.3	7.3	6.5	6.1	13.6	14.8	27.5	3.8	1.4	11.6	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 30

Q5 Safety takes back seat to mission by Q15 Org. Assign.

Count / Col Pct	OSD Staff 1	JSC Staff 2	DoD Agencies 3	COCOM and other 4	Service Secreta 5	Service HQ Staff 6	MAJCOM/M ACOM/CLA 7	Major Subbord 8	DoD Fld Activit 9	Joint Service 10	Other Sc 11	Row Total
Q5												
1		1	2	1	2		1	9		1	4	21
Strongly Agree		3.4	2.2	1.2	2.6		.5	2.6		5.6	2.7	1.7
2	5	3	8	2	3	12	10	13	5		11	72
Agree	7.8	10.3	8.7	2.5	3.9	7.0	5.3	3.7	10.4		7.4	5.7
3	17	5	12	6	10	16	10	25	6	2	11	120
Neutral	26.6	17.2	13.0	7.4	13.0	9.3	5.3	7.1	12.5	11.1	7.4	9.5
4	31	14	36	49	39	78	80	171	20	6	68	592
Disagree	48.4	48.3	39.1	60.5	50.6	45.3	42.6	48.7	41.7	33.3	45.6	46.7
5	11	6	34	23	23	66	87	133	17	9	55	464
Strongly Disagre	17.2	20.7	37.0	28.4	29.9	38.4	46.3	37.9	35.4	50.0	36.9	36.6
Column	64	29	92	81	77	172	188	351	48	18	149	1269
Total	5.0	2.3	7.2	6.4	6.1	13.6	14.8	27.7	3.8	1.4	11.7	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 30

Q6 Safety funding adequate in budget proces by Q15 Org. Assign.

Count / Col Pct	OSD Staff 1	JSC Staff 2	DoD Agencies 3	COCOM and other 4	Service Secreta 5	Service HQ Staff 6	MAJCOM/M ACOM/CLA 7	Major Subbord 8	DoD Fld Activit 9	Joint Service 10	Other Sc 11	Row Total
Q6												
1	2	1	9	7	3	14	16	20	3	3	8	86
Strongly Agree	3.1	3.4	9.8	8.4	3.9	8.1	8.5	5.7	6.3	16.7	5.3	6.8
2	13	9	46	22	22	56	63	131	15	7	60	444
Agree	20.3	31.0	50.0	26.5	28.6	32.6	33.3	37.6	31.3	38.9	40.0	35.0
3	37	10	28	33	33	73	80	101	21	7	49	472
Neutral	57.8	34.5	30.4	39.8	42.9	42.4	42.3	29.0	43.8	38.9	32.7	37.2
4	10	9	9	17	14	24	28	80	8	1	30	230
Disagree	15.6	31.0	9.8	20.5	18.2	14.0	14.8	23.0	16.7	5.6	20.0	18.1
5	2		4	5	5	2	16	1		3	38	
Strongly Disagre	3.1		4.8	6.5	2.9	1.1	4.6	2.1		2.0	3.0	
Column	64	29	92	83	77	172	189	348	48	18	150	1270
Total	5.0	2.3	7.2	6.5	6.1	13.5	14.9	27.4	3.8	1.4	11.8	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 29

Q7 Decreasing rate by 50% is achievable by Q15 Org. Assign.

Count / Col Pct	OSD Staff 1	JSC Staff 2	DoD Agencies 3	COCOM and other 4	Service Secreta 5	Service HQ Staff 6	MAJCOM/M ACOM/CLA 7	Major Subbord 8	DoD Fld Activit 9	Joint Service 10	Other Sc 11	Row Total
Q7												
1	4		8	5	10	11	22	30	3	1	14	108
Strongly Agree	6.3		8.6	6.0	13.0	6.4	11.6	8.6	6.4	5.6	9.3	8.5
2	18	12	32	33	31	63	81	137	16	6	64	493
Agree	28.6	41.4	34.4	39.8	40.3	36.6	42.9	39.1	34.0	33.3	42.7	38.8
3	29	6	37	14	22	51	35	92	12	7	39	344
Neutral	46.0	20.7	39.8	16.9	28.6	29.7	18.5	26.3	25.5	38.9	26.0	27.1
4	11	8	16	27	12	41	42	78	14	4	27	280
Disagree	17.5	27.6	17.2	32.5	15.6	23.8	22.2	22.3	29.8	22.2	18.0	22.0
5	1	3		4	2	6	9	13	2		6	46
Strongly Disagre	1.6	10.3		4.8	2.6	3.5	4.8	3.7	4.3		4.0	3.6
Column	63	29	93	83	77	172	189	350	47	18	150	1271
Total	5.0	2.3	7.3	6.5	6.1	13.5	14.9	27.5	3.7	1.4	11.8	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 28

Q8 Making changes is high priority for ldrs by Q15 Org. Assign.

Count / Col Pct	OSD Staff 1	JSC Staff 2	DoD Agencies 3	COCOM and other 4	Service Secreta 5	Service HQ Staff 6	MAJCOM/M ACOM/CLA 7	Major Subbord 8	DoD Fld Activit 9	Joint Service 10	Other Sc 11	Row Total
Q8												

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	Total
1 Strongly Agree	9	7	25	21	27	56	72	136	11	10	44	418
	14.1	24.1	26.9	25.3	34.6	32.4	38.1	38.9	23.4	55.6	29.3	32.8
2 Agree	29	14	51	54	37	90	93	165	27	5	76	641
	45.3	48.3	54.8	65.1	47.4	52.0	49.2	47.1	57.4	27.8	50.7	50.3
3 Neutral	19	7	11	5	10	19	19	41	4	3	23	161
	29.7	24.1	11.8	6.0	12.8	11.0	10.1	11.7	8.5	16.7	15.3	12.6
4 Disagree	7	1	6	3	4	8	5	7	5		7	53
	10.9	3.4	6.5	3.6	5.1	4.6	2.6	2.0	10.6		4.7	4.2
5 Strongly Disagre							1					1
							.3					.1
Column Total	64 5.0	29 2.3	93 7.3	83 6.5	78 6.1	173 13.6	189 14.8	350 27.5	47 3.7	18 1.4	150 11.8	1274 100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 25

Q9 Best practices is good way to bring abou by Q15 Org. Assign.

Q9	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	Total
1 Strongly Agree	12	6	26	18	20	44	60	97	11	7	30	331
	19.0	20.7	28.6	21.7	26.0	25.9	31.7	27.9	22.9	38.9	20.0	26.1
2 Agree	31	14	49	54	45	90	98	183	24	8	84	680
	49.2	48.3	53.8	65.1	58.4	52.9	51.9	52.6	50.0	44.4	56.0	53.7
3 Neutral	19	6	12	7	7	25	30	58	12	3	31	210
	30.2	20.7	13.2	8.4	9.1	14.7	15.9	16.7	25.0	16.7	20.7	16.6
4 Disagree	1	3	2	3	4	9	1	8	1		5	37
	1.6	10.3	2.2	3.6	5.2	5.3	.5	2.3	2.1		3.3	2.9
5 Strongly Disagre		2	1	1	2		2					8
		2.2	1.2	1.3	1.2		.6					.6
Column Total	63 5.0	29 2.3	91 7.2	83 6.6	77 6.1	170 13.4	189 14.9	348 27.5	48 3.8	18 1.4	150 11.8	1266 100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 33

Q10 Cooperation exists across Services by Q15 Org. Assign.

Q10	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	Total
1 Strongly Agree	2	3	6	6	7	15	14	28	4	2	7	94
	3.2	10.3	6.5	7.2	9.1	8.7	7.4	8.0	8.5	11.1	4.7	7.4
2 Agree	18	15	36	37	26	53	72	128	18	5	46	454
	29.0	51.7	38.7	44.6	33.8	30.6	38.1	36.7	38.3	27.8	31.1	35.8
3 Neutral	41	8	43	28	37	91	85	147	21	8	78	587
	66.1	27.6	46.2	33.7	48.1	52.6	45.0	42.1	44.7	44.4	52.7	46.3
4 Disagree	1	3	7	12	7	12	17	41	3	3	16	122
	1.6	10.3	7.5	14.5	9.1	6.9	9.0	11.7	6.4	16.7	10.8	9.6
5 Strongly Disagre			1			2	1	5	1		1	11
			1.1			1.2	.5	1.4	2.1		.7	.9
Column Total	62 4.9	29 2.3	93 7.3	83 6.5	77 6.1	173 13.6	189 14.9	349 27.5	47 3.7	18 1.4	148 11.7	1268 100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 31

Q11 Ldrship has provided resources to suppor by Q15 Org. Assign.

Q11	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	Total
1 Strongly Agree	3	2	12	8	8	19	28	34	3	5	10	132
	4.8	6.9	13.0	9.6	10.4	10.9	14.8	9.7	6.3	27.8	6.7	10.4
2 Agree	16	11	48	42	30	87	98	188	22	12	83	637
	25.8	37.9	52.2	50.6	39.0	50.0	51.9	53.9	45.8	66.7	55.3	50.1
3 Neutral	36	9	27	18	23	49	46	68	14	1	43	334
	58.1	31.0	29.3	21.7	29.9	28.2	24.3	19.5	29.2	5.6	28.7	26.3
4 Disagree	7	7	5	14	14	16	15	53	9		13	153
	11.3	24.1	5.4	16.9	18.2	9.2	7.9	15.2	18.8		8.7	12.0
5 Strongly Disagre				1	2	3	2	6			1	15
				1.2	2.6	1.7	1.1	1.7			.7	1.2
Column	62	29	92	83	77	174	189	349	48	18	150	1271

Total	4.9	2.3	7.2	6.5	6.1	13.7	14.9	27.5	3.8	1.4	11.8	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 28

Q12 We have to accept that accidents will oc by Q15 Org. Assign.

Q12	Count / Col Pct	OSD Staff 1	JSC Staff 2	DoD Agencies 3	COCOM and other 4	Service Secreta 5	Service HQ Staff 6	MAJCOM/M ACOM/CLA 7	Major Subbord 8	DoD Fld Activit 9	Joint Service 10	Other Sc 11	Row Total
1 Strongly Agree	Count	2	1	4	4	6	7	8	22	2	2	3	61
	Col Pct	3.1	3.6	4.3	4.8	7.7	4.0	4.3	6.3	4.2	11.1	2.0	4.8
2 Agree	Count	15	14	21	25	16	50	55	81	13	2	28	320
	Col Pct	23.4	50.0	22.6	30.1	20.5	28.7	29.3	23.2	27.1	11.1	18.9	25.2
3 Neutral	Count	13	7	13	8	9	15	25	34	5	3	23	155
	Col Pct	20.3	25.0	14.0	9.6	11.5	8.6	13.3	9.7	10.4	16.7	15.5	12.2
4 Disagree	Count	21	5	43	32	31	81	77	147	19	7	64	527
	Col Pct	32.8	17.9	46.2	38.6	39.7	46.6	41.0	42.1	39.6	38.9	43.2	41.5
5 Strongly Disagre	Count	13	1	12	14	16	21	23	65	9	4	30	208
	Col Pct	20.3	3.6	12.9	16.9	20.5	12.1	12.2	18.6	18.8	22.2	20.3	16.4
Column Total	Count	64	28	93	83	78	174	188	349	48	18	148	1271
	Col Pct	5.0	2.2	7.3	6.5	6.1	13.7	14.8	27.5	3.8	1.4	11.6	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 28

Appendix I – Respondent Comments - Suggested Actions

U.S. DoD Survey Results - Senior Leader Survey

In the first of two open-ended written comment questions, respondents were asked, "If you were to suggest one action that would improve safety in DoD, what would it be"?

We deleted the names, units and locations to preserve respondent anonymity, and edited out inappropriate language, but otherwise the comments are verbatim.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
1	A comprehensive program that addresses the safety of our soldiers while operating motor vehicles off duty. Statutory authority to impose more rigid requirements like helmets for motorcycle riders, even if the state does not require them. End of duty week safety briefings that include vignette films like the one of the Ft Hood POV accident a few months ago that shows the leadership on the scene the evening the accident occurred. Suspension of drivers license upon identification of unsafe actions.
2	A real incentive/rewards program for achieving safety goals.
3	Active leadership that mitigates risk as part of the every day mission and a support system that responds to requests from leaders.
4	Additional funding for safety programs and staffs. Most staffs are woefully thin and don't have the personnel authorized; in an era of constrained resources, safety often takes a back seat. As I understand it, most Army fatalities seem to occur off-duty. There seems to be a recent rash of motorcycle death; we need to figure out better ways of discouraging unsafe motorcycle operation. Perhaps a required course of instruction for a motorcycle license in which the soldier must pay $400 or so to attend a one-week motorcycle safety course; hit them where it hurts,, the wallet and free time. Force the soldier to make a significant effort to be licensed on a vehicle that is killing dozens of great young soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines every year.
5	Adequately fund training sets of equipment and associated simulation(s).
6	Aggressively work programs; small group sessions to address risk taking behavior off duty.
7	Align programmatics with safety policy and execution in DoD.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
8	All Agencies and Military Departments develop a motor vehicle safety campaign plan that focuses on education and training of everyone from top to bottom. Certain safety awareness skills should be demonstrated. In addition, monthly or quarterly leader-led safety seminars [10-12 people in a seminar] to get everyone focused on the dangers and hazards and the expected conduct of every DoD employee--both on and off duty. To operate safely should be recognized as a good American citizen's obligation/duty to himself/herself and every other citizen whose life or property he or she may affect.
9	I believe we have the guidance and requirements clear from senior leadership. We must keep focus on first line supervisors and junior leaders. All of my efforts in safety are directed towards this level of leadership. They are at the decision point many times in terms of effects and situational awareness about their soldiers and families.
10	Better cross-service exchange of ideas and initiatives (best practices).
11	Better integration with program managers as requirements are established, designs requested, testing, training, and fielding. Lastly, more on the ground analysis after fielding/employment. Things are better now, but could be even better.
12	Better sharing of best practices.
13	Carefully analyze the troop to task factors in Army formations to assess vulnerabilities generated by a comparatively high task and equipment to soldiers available ratio.
14	Change focus on safety from a programmatic approach to one of active leader involvement and responsibility at all levels.
15	Constantly emphasize individual responsibility for good safety conduct and individual/buddy risk management actions in advance of all activities
16	Continue to educate Service members that they should behave responsibly at all times.
17	Continue to educate the leadership and all of the members of DoD on the hazards of unsafe acts--down to the most junior level. When rolling up the numbers, it is truly staggering to see our losses due to preventable accidents. These statistics do not often reach the first line supervisor nor the Service members who take the unnecessary risks that often lead to preventable accidents.
18	Continue to have senior DoD leaders reinforce the imperative of safety-focused mission execution in all that we do. Emphasis from the top leadership is essential.
19	Continue to push hard at institutionalizing risk assessment in all that we do. It truly makes a difference when leaders at all levels proactively take action to prevent accidents.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
20	Continue to resource and reinforce leader training in risk mitigation at the junior leader level.
21	Continue to stress driving safety -- drinking and driving, speed, rest, seat belts, etc. Each must be continuously reinforced because we bring into the Services so many young people each year.
22	Continue to stress the need to apply common sense risk assessments in all we do.
23	Continued emphasis on safety both in planning and execution.
24	Create one DoD safety center, vice service safety centers and insure timely dissemination of mishaps from all Services...not just the US Army. We must have visibility of all safety mishaps, etc., and all DoD members, military, civilian, active, and reserve should undergo a rigorous safety course once a year.
25	Direct safety stand-downs periodically that show that safety is part of the mission and requires focus.
26	Emphasize the risk assessment process in officer and non-commissioned officer education programs to inculcate the idea that every operation, in training, garrison or combat requires a leader's assessment.
27	Empower soldiers with the authority to stop any action that appears unsafe. Non-negotiable
28	Enforce penalties for undisciplined behavior. We must find a way to get soldiers, civilians and family members to do what is right when leadership is not present. It must be engrained in our culture.
29	Ensure every Army Brigade has a fully deployable civilian safety expert as part of the brigade staff. When we have funded these in the past, they have made clear and direct positive impact with the chain of command. Accidents have gone down.
30	Ensure personnel get adequate rest and exercise.
31	Establish crew rest standards for operators of ground vehicles just as we do for aviators.
32	Establish baselines of performance and establish goals. Measure safety performance against those goals and hold unit leaders accountable.
33	Find an effective way to deter youngsters (soldiers under 28) from drinking and driving.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
34	First line supervisor requiring their subordinates to take the common behavior assessment tests - particularly for those subordinates who portray common safety risks in their life styles.
35	Focus on individual responsibility instead of red dots for safety. A good safety program starts with the individual and moves up the complete chain of command.
36	Focus on POV accidents.
37	For military vehicles, reduce speed by the use of governors which control max speed. Also, seat belt connection that then allows engine operation.
38	For rotary wing aviation, adequately resource flight data recorders across our fleets.
39	From the beginning, we need to treat soldiers as adults who have entered into an adult profession that has real threats, demands and challenges that requires their active participation to manage so that safety is an integral part of military life. Recognizing that most of our young soldiers, as they enter service, are just that, young, frequently immature and not completely formed, we need to integrate into our training bases the best of behavior modification and influencing science in order to produce young men and women who understand that safety is but one integral portion of the daily life of a soldier. Nothing will help reduce safety incidents in our military more than making everyone in it a situationally aware safety officer, themselves. Not that this is completely achievable, but should be the goal.
40	Fund the authorized positions to a level equal to other type positions. Not asking to fund above other programs, but safety personnel authorizations should be filled.
41	Highest risk areas for safety incidents are soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines returning from deployment. Focus at the highest levels must occur.
42	Hold leaders more accountable for the actions of their soldiers. Make a commander's safety record relative to his peers part of his evaluation. Do a better job teaching junior leaders how to conduct accident and tactical risk mitigation. Educate the senior leaders of DoD that despite our best efforts to ensure the safety of our soldiers, we are in a dangerous business.
43	Hold leaders more responsible for the safety of their Service members!
44	Hold people accountable for indiscipline.
45	I am afraid I have no silver bullet to provide. We conduct risk managements, safety stand down days, safety alerts and notices, and I have had battalion safety talks to our soldiers on a weekly basis. First line supervisor involvement is key; I think the standard has been set, enforcing the standard requires constant emphasis.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
46	I believe DoD has already done a lot to achieve giving its employees a sense of security by increasing guards, implementing stricter rules, etc. Given the 9-11 disaster, there will always be a number of employees who lived through it wary, and it will always be difficult to make them feel safe.
47	Immediate supervisors conduct personal risk mitigation with each direct subordinate.
48	Implement a safety program as part of the basic training process. I am not sure if this has been done in either Army or other Service programs. I do believe it would have a positive affect on young Service members who tend to have higher accident rates.
49	Implementation of risk management practices and tools across the department. Awareness is 90% of the challenge.
50	In my opinion, we need to move the ideas of safety and risk management/risk mitigation into the joint world. As a soldier, I am convinced that the Air Force has some of the best safety practices, yet (except in Army Aviation) I am not sure we have adopted those best practices that might make sense for the ground force. A truly joint border bureau could serve as a forcing function if properly resourced/empowered. The net result would at least be that each Service would get a different set of eyes looking at safety issues.
51	In this command, safety has been, and remains a major focus of the commander. We have had this emphasis through two successive commanders. We have fully funded quarterly safety council meetings, and I have seen the results when you have senior commanders and non-commissioned officers focused on the issue. When the commander believes, and communicates to subordinates that safety is a major concern and interest of his, then things happen. Any successful force protection program will not achieve success unless it is a well known concern of the senior commander, and he plays a major role in developing and communicating the command's safety program.
52	Increase force structure. In today's contemporary battlefield, operations will occur around the clock. We must have the personnel resources to conduct 24/7 operations. The history of the Red Ball Express has shown that you can't run 24 hour logistical operations with only one driver per truck over sustained time periods. We have to resource more personnel.
53	Increase Safety budgets, mandatory comments in efficiency reports of commanders at all levels.
54	Increase safety awareness as a matter of ethos and link good safety practice directly to mission accomplishment.
55	Increase the end strength of the Army ; manage OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO better.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
56	Increased funding for local commands to strengthen their safety awareness programs.
57	Inculcate the concept of first echelon leader risk assessments – non-commissioned officer or officer first line leaders empowered to withhold liberty for high to unacceptable risk soldiers.
58	Larger penalties for those riding in vehicles without seat belts.
59	Leader checks at the first line supervisor level (Squad Leader / Staff Sergeant) with engagement by entire chain of command to ensure leaders trained to do checks. All accidents require after action review.
60	Leader emphasis must be continuous and personal at the highest levels.
61	Leadership accountability.
62	Look at emergency escape hatches from up-armored HMMWVs that fall into canals in places like Iraq.
63	Major area still not well understood is in the area of mental and behavioral health, particularly post traumatic stress, but also in general prevention of suicide and/or violence directed towards others. As we get army soldiers and marines back out of some fairly intense ground conflict, I think we have much to learn and probably more requirements to resource to adequately understand and control post traumatic stress.
64	Make safety an integral part of the overall evaluation criteria of a supervisors/commander's annual performance rating. And supervisors and commanders must enforce compliance from the top down!
65	Make the safety office a special staff officer to the commander, gives them better access to the command group.
66	Mandatory driver training for all DoD personnel.
67	Mandatory safety stand-down day for every class A accident in a unit.
68	Mandatory safety education quarterly.targeted at younger soldiers.
69	Marketing research into best techniques to get the attention of the most at risk portion of the DoD population.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
70	Migrate more of the safety considerations, practices, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from the aviation community to the ground side. We have historically accepted minor accidents on the ground side as a price of doing business and not being a big deal because it might have resulted only in cosmetic damage to an armored combat vehicle. I believe that mindset sets the conditions for more serious accidents later. In the aviation community, cosmetic damage to aircraft usually results in some type of structural damage, so every accident (ground handling, maintenance or flight related), regardless of how minor is required to be fully documented and investigated.
71	Money and resources for safety education and awareness has to be fully funded and the material needs to be impact loaded. The old boring classes on risk assessment will not work; it needs to be interactive and action packed. Ask people to make choices and then accept the consequences when they do not do a good analysis and risk mitigation; teach them how to think not what to think. Additionally, this should be a mandatory part of counseling and it should be included as a block check or a comment on efficiency reports.
72	More emphasis on the elements of crew coordination for ground crews. The aviation community has led this effort for air frames. It has a huge potential payoff for ground systems.
73	More experienced first line leaders, trained to standard, who understand how to supervise their Soldiers in the performance of their duties and how to positively influence their off duty behavior. The trend toward younger non-commissioned officers, lieutenants, captains means less experienced first line leaders.
74	More formal training for leaders; could be web based. Recommend the use of the case studies as the basis for the training. The safety centers could be the resource for developing the case studies.
75	More junior leader engagement with high risk populations at critical times such as when troops are about to be released after a long deployment, before a holiday where people are likely to travel long distances, troops with motorcycles - particularly new owners and young troops, allowing time for and emphasize/stress rehearsals prior to risky field training exercises/events, pairing experienced troops within experienced troops (buddy teams) for learning new duties. Junior leaders must know and care about their troops as individuals both on and off duty. Constant reinforcement at the junior level.
76	More overt award programs for units and installations with best overall safety record and most improvement in the focus on our biggest problem area (s) like POV accidents and aviation.
77	Motorcycle certification courses and strict enforcement of legal age to consume alcoholic beverages.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
78	Move to an effects based safety program. Apply all the elements in the kit bag... kinetic non kinetic; some more applicable than others. Chain of command from squadron leader on up must get to know soldiers and identify high risk soldiers in their formations...and document risk history in squad book. Platoon sergeants should know and document high risk squad leaders etc. They must understand full range of options in the kit bag to deal with high risk soldiers...but equally important recognize and reward low risk soldier behavior. Privileges and missions ascertained based on risk assessment.
79	Need to fund more folks at the unit exercise level. Safety folks are overworked at the division level. In the new design safety folks went away --- we need to add them into the TDA ASAP. Continue to keep at BCT level too. They are worth their weight in gold.
80	Need to keep safety and costs of not keeping safety on our leader's scope. Hard to do with high OPTEMPO but doable with global net; easiest thing to do is shotgun something hot to the unit leaders. Package high impact, gory post mortem photos with simple lessons learned and distribute to every E-7/8/9 and every O-3/4/5/6/7/8 and every WO (all grades) in out Army. My sense is that a lot is already available but gets hung on a web page that most of us don't read. If we do a better job of sharing the electrons, more of it will turn into effective posters and email that folks will look at and show to their folks to overcome the way a lot of our young folks think about this issue (e.g. they're immortal). This will help keep leaders sensitized to horrific costs of inaction, help with reinforcement training. When I was in the 82d Airborn we used to have folks who had recently suffered static line burn accidents to be testimonial speakers down at green ramp to address soldiers about to jump.
81	Need to take a closer look at the cause of accidents. If it is excessive driving distance because Service members live too far from base/post due to high cost of living, then we need to look at taking steps to mitigate that long drive, for example, construct of additional on base/post housing.
82	Not sure of the specifics, but it would involve focusing on the factors that contribute to the majority of our accidents: off duty time, privately owned vehicles, alcohol, or illegal activity, for example, excessive speed, and reckless operation.
83	Nothing significant to add. Many good initiatives presently ongoing that will require application and assessment over time to determine their respective value to the preservation of the lives of soldiers.
84	OPTEMPO and lack of dwell time are major contributors. Reintegration efforts are good but need specific revisitation at 90 day and 120 day marks for redeploying soldiers. We need a system to track and reinforce the individual requirements for that after they return from theater and hop around the world with different chains of command.
85	Outlaw cell phone use while operating motor vehicles.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
86	Ownership of this problem by individual soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines instead of placing the entire responsibility on the leaders. It all comes down to individual decision making, and we need to start enforcing that right from the day these young men and women enter the military.
87	Personal liability--as tough and traumatic as it is, we need to emphasize personal responsibility and hold people accountable for their failures. I have conducted too many safety violation after action reports with chain of command to discover all the leaders did the proper leading and soldier knew the standard, leaders enforced the standard but Soldiers ignored the standard. Dealing with I am invincible youth, levy real punishment for failures.
88	Place more stress on initial entry Service men and women on safety and personal responsibility.
89	POV/military vehicle are the greatest cause of accidents...require OPTEMPO to incorporate a waiting period before departing on leave or pass to ensure soldiers are provided appropriate opportunity to rest prior to driving. Supervision in military vehicles must be enforced, especially if it is a troop transport vehicle. Must have a policy that requires non-commissioned officers to do an appropriate risk assessment prior and during operations. The aviation community has the example for the Army to follow. Army needs to get on board and demand appropriate analysis and supervision at all levels. Unless there is a spotlight on leaders, we have little chance of reducing the accidents. We need to employ a better parachute with slower rate of decent.
90	Promulgate the data base of accidents (location, circumstances, primary contributing factors) so unit commanders can conduct an "IPB" and operationalize their risk assessment.
91	Properly fund-- rhetoric is not enough.
92	Provide more resources to award good safety practices at all levels of the organization. We still do not have a good enough incentive program to leaders to pursue safe operations.
93	Provide more tools for small unit leaders. We have great safety internet programs/questionnaires but do not have internet access down at the level where the leaders actually interact with the soldiers. Briefs well, tough in execution, suggestion, ensure internet access and computers at the small unit level where sergeants are interacting daily with soldiers.
94	Publish actions taken against leaders who fail to ensure adherence to standards that affect individual safety.
95	Queriable database on accidents and near misses with trend analysis to find commonalities of causes so that actionable prevention strategies can be implemented.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
96	Rapid situational awareness for safety lessons learned.
97	Reduce OPSTEMPO in the force, with increased Active Force end strength.
98	Reduce personal and OPSTEMPO.
99	Reduce the task overload across the force. Add force structure and equipment to the appropriate force levels that are in overload. Best safety practices in operational zones (OEF/OIF) would lead to less mission accomplishment in the time and quality most units expect. Instill the type of leadership that allows an openness in their commands where in soldiers and leaders can tell them when they can't do what they are being asked to do in the time frame they are being tasked. The can do and roger that to everything ego/ attitude gets in the way of smart operating procedures to include the general wants stuff so leaders must be smart enough to recognize this effect and have some balance.
100	Resource safety at the lowest level. Do not create a large overhead for safety. Must be accomplished at small unit level.
101	Resources; both money and people.
102	Rewards for units and individuals that practice safe operations. Hold first line supervisors accountable for safe training in units.
103	Risk Management training from top to bottom.
104	Safety and force protection are closely related. I believe we have made great strides in the area of force protection since 9/11, and continue to get better. We need to find a way to increase safety awareness through force protection...when it comes down to it, they are actually one and the same.
105	Safety down day across the commands and services where the safety issues are covered. I would also do what the 1st Cavalry Division does and institute the power thought concept...it works!!
106	Safety is currently a stove pipe. It is not integrated into everything we do. We are teaching and acting as if it is some separate process.. It insures under funding and under talented manning and separates it from the forces and soldier who have the accidents. We have excellent programs for risk analysis in combat and training. They need to be applied to soldier life, including. driving and recreational habits. At my last post we made is so difficult to ride a motorcycle (cheapest form of transport with current fuel rates), that troops rode off post with no training because it wasn't required. You cannot legislate and make policies to make folks safe, it needs to be an imbedded value for their own life and the well being of their family, make it a value.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
107	Safety must be a part of a leader's culture. Only then can the leader inculcate it into his own organization's culture. To do this requires a consistent, organized effort in order to raise the level of safety awareness and, hence, the level of safety performance. Once safety becomes a part of the culture, it becomes more of a way of doing business, and safety performance should improve in the long run.
108	Safety must be a part of everyday planning and execution. It is a learned mental habit that must be a significant part of everything a soldier and their families do. We must help everyone to understand that safety check lists or risk evaluations are not just for ranges, road marches or fast roping training. They should and must be a mental process that every person goes through every time they do anything. If it is not as preconditioned a response or thought process as parachute training then it will never get the level of attention we intend or want. It must be so much a part of everyday thought that even if you are just going to the gas station 5 minutes down the road you think of all the possibilities of problems or accidents automatically. Only when thinking of risk as just part of every single thing we do will we begin to achieve the kind of result we desire.
109	Safety must be embedded and not an after thought. It must be considered starting with receipt of the mission all the way through execution.Accidental risk and tactical risk must be analyzed to determine acceptable level of risk or mitigation techniques.
110	Safety stand-down days.
111	Safety training integrated into all levels of professional development.
112	Since POV accidents are the biggest killer of soldiers (I have to assume that this trend spans all services, based on the demographics), we should consider some type of mandatory practical, hand-on POV drivers' training for our most vulnerable Service members, similar to what the Army requires of all motorcyclists.
113	Slow down and prioritize.
114	Slow the op tempo.
115	Standardize risk management and resource it appropriately. Constantly changing names and bumper stickers will not make us safer. Accidents are not the cost of doing business and realism in training.
116	Standardize training; establish standards, TTP's that are nonnegotiable.
117	Stop being the world's policeman. Fight wars that truly threaten our security.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
118	Strengthen financial accountability to units and activities, rather than individuals for accidental damage to equipment.
119	Tactical drivers training for operating in a combat environment.
120	Talk about it daily and constantly enforce rules.
121	Teach how to make risk assessments very early in institutional training for all services.
122	The risk assessment process must be ingrained in all our leader programs. We must incorporate a culture of risk assessment into our planning and decision making processes that make it an instinctive and integrated part of everything we do. Preserving combat power is a leader responsibility at all levels.
123	There are a lot of good ideas being brought up to improve safety but in most cases it is not funded. In many cases we are told to fund it out of our present budgets thus degrading training and war fighting capabilities.
124	Tie safety related performance to evaluation reports. That would force commanders and senior non-commissioned officers to take safety seriously.
125	Earnestly and adequately budget through multiple FYs the activities of all commands especially the joint and sub-unified commands, where the majority of the high risk operations are planned and executed.
126	To truly be effective, a safety program has to be personalized, therefore it is imperative that we have the squad leader, platoon sergeant and platoon leader doing individual risk assessments on their soldiers and talking to them face to face. Generals standing on platforms giving speeches or sending out emails have absolutely no effect.
127	Train as you fight, fight techniques, driving techniques, weapons handling.and so on. Strong supervisor review/supervision of service members traveling in POVs over long distances.
128	Understand that we can never stop trying to prevent accidents that cause harm, pain, death etc. but also understand that, sadly, accidents happen no matter what we do. We should never give up!!

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
129	We do a fairly good job of advertising safety failures. These tend to work to scare us into safety awareness. We do less well at advertising safety successes. I'm not talking about safety awards programs; I'm talking about vignettes that illustrate actions of leaders and supervisors--normally at the first line level--that result in saved lives and accidents prevented. The platoon sergeant who discovers the unlicensed driver in his convoy pre-combat checks. The battalion commander who restricts road movement due to adverse weather conditions. The mechanic who discovers the broken brake line during service inspections. There are plenty of positive vignettes that might inspire greater safety awareness.
130	We have to have a larger Army to run at a slower pace. We have to run at a slower pace to truly make a dent in the accidents with the good programs available out there. We must set aside the time necessary to conduct the most effective programs on a regular basis. Train and educate our people to mitigate safety risks as a real part of everything they do.
131	We must develop a more focused program to prevent motor vehicle accidents, both POVs and GOVs. Most of the fatalities are young people, so we've got to change their awareness and decision-making regarding risks, and their attentiveness and focus on driving skills.
132	We need a program that stresses standards for accomplishing combat-related tasks and the leadership to enforce discipline to meet the standards.
133	We need to provide more funding to our safety program. Safety is something that is continuous and it must be engrained early on in basic training with our soldiers.
134	While I am not aware of what the other services do to influence safety in training and operations, I firmly believe that the Army, as a Service and a culture, places strong emphasis on safety in all operations. We have commanders who conduct risk assessments and mitigation, and we are appropriately applying composite risk management to all we do. Our safety center is ensuring the field and commanders get good, appropriate and timely information...in fact, the new general is unbelievable in the way he has turned the center around to provide better service to the field. I am concerned about the statements made by many in DoD that we will reduce accidents by 50 percent. While this might be an admirable, it is also a sad commentary about how little is understood by our civilian leaders about the operational tempo, the dangers related to combat operations, and compounded stress levels we are feeling in the field, and how those issues contribute to accident rates.
135	Fund current year initiatives and stop trying to use the POM process for safety. We can't provide new aggressive programs without resources, and the funding needs to be timely. It does no good to talk about the issues and solution sets, then say, we will find the money in a few years.
136	Adequate funding for both training and safety!

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
137	Always allow adequate time for performance of duties and keep reminding soldiers at every level.
138	Apply the same budget and modernization actions across the total force in a fair and equal manner. In other words, when we deploy active duty and reserve component soldiers give the reserve component soldiers the most up-to-date and or modern equipment as you give the AD. If all deployed equipment for active duty has total up-armored packages to include ballistic glass then reserve component soldiers should have the same. In most cases, NG equipment is suitable for the mission; however, add-on armor kits and appropriate updates are not available for the older equipment. We usually give the AD new and modern trucks or vehicles which have factory up-armor and or ballistic glass.
139	As we alert, mobilize, train and deploy, involving safety officers in every phase of developing the OPLANS & OPORDERS I believe would have a more positive influence on making everyone aware of safety, risk management, and mitigation of risks. Also, involving spouses & family readiness groups in safety briefings and risk mitigation strategies would develop more of a team approach across our formations, particularly as it relates to POV accidents.
140	Commanders and senior non-commissioned officers need to actively and personally stress and ingrain in our subordinate leaders and personnel the fact that safety is a force multiplier, and that, in almost all cases, accidents can be prevented if procedures are known, understood, followed and enforced.
141	Conduct mandatory two hour safety classes annually for all personnel at all levels.
142	Continue effort to make safety a way of life, a natural part of our values and warrior ethos.
143	Continue to emphasize wearing seat belts!
144	Continued command emphasis all the time with regard to every activity.
145	Email a DoD safety oriented message daily to senior leaders in the same way the Army is emailing the stand-to to Army senior leaders daily.
146	Fully fund all mandated programs and provide personnel resources necessary to accomplish the expansive training and compliance mission.
147	I believe that safety and force protection are closely linked. If we say that we are doing all that we can to provide the proper training and providing the proper equipment for safety and force protection, check both up and down the chain to insure that it is being ordered and that it is being fielded.
148	Improve replacement of 998's with 1114's in theater of operations.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
149	In every organizational formation of 500 or more personnel, a designated safety officer must be assigned either as TOE or TDA structure and funded by DoD. Their focus must be solely on safety practices; safety information; safety training; and soldier safety integration operations.. Current data will show that those organizations with organized and dedicated safety structure and personnel assigned, realize and demonstrate operational and training safety improvements. This must be carried down to all formations affecting similar results. Once assigned, safety must be their primary focus and not additional duty and responsibility. If we are serious about safety, this is a manpower bill we must accept and pay.
150	Include safety statistics in the supervisor's performance appraisal and in the subordinate's evaluation and rate them accordingly.
151	Insure risk management is a well defined leader capability. Too often I see risk assessment with no attempt to ameliorate the risk. Too often I see risk decisions made at an inappropriate level. We have mounds of after-the-fact cover-your-butt investigations but little before-the-fact conscious and conscientious process to lower the risk of preventable accidents.
152	It appears that safety is important to all leaders throughout the chain of command. However, it is not evident to me that it is paramount to the organization. I feel that safety is taken into consideration when assessing the mission; not sure about other times.
153	It's not just about training safety. It is also about behaviors in general. Educating responsibility and decision making as contributory dynamics is important.
154	Keep hammering home to wear seat belts!
155	Keep the word going out to all that safety is our first mission as leaders and commanders.
156	Keep things simple in the safety arena. Too much admin and CYA can get in the way of common sense. If we can't make it simple, let's at least make it clear.
157	Like anything else. We reward supply excellence, deployment excellence, and maintenance excellence -- why do we not recognize the best in Active, Reserve and National Guard? Bring the best to DC and recognize the best.
158	Make first line supervisors conduct a pre-activity safety brief for all actions, have safety discussed in all after action reports, and debrief soldiers on safety as they end their duty day (POV, alcohol impairment, and off-duty safety) daily.
159	Make safety a rated item on all performance reports with mandatory comments by the rater as to how the individual performed in accordance with current safety guidelines and how successful the individual was in reducing accidents or initiating new concepts to protect our soldiers.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
160	Make safety improvement a required goal on the performance support form.
161	Make the risk assessment process be taken seriously and not just given lip service in preparing for training events. My experience has been that no one really takes interest in Risk Assessment until after we've had an accident.
162	Mandatory vehicle driver training. I can't believe all the automobile wrecks you see and hear about everyday in the DC area!
163	Most POV accidents occur while soldiers and airmen are traveling to and from weekend training drills. Many weekend drills begin Friday evening which requires Guardsmen to travel directly from their place of work (8 hrs). These Guardsmen are already tired before the first formation. Additionally, at the conclusion of the weekend drill they are usually dismissed 1630-1700 hrs to travel home, again fatigued. Leadership must rethink how it trains on weekends both at home station and in the field.
164	New and improved seat belts in our High Utility -purpose Mobile Wheeled Vehicle (HUMMWV). The seat belt must be able to be worn with body armor, tactical load bearing equipment and a quick release. Many occupants do not wear their seat belts because they cannot get the straps around their bodies when wearing body armor and tactical load bearing equipment.
165	Pay attention to what you are doing.
166	POV driver safety program. Advanced drivers safety is an excellent program that all new enlistments must complete as part of IADT.
167	Provide drivers training with actual up-armored HUMMWV to the battalion level. Currently no armored HUMMWV are being used as a training set. A unit is mobilized and gets no training on the equipment until they arrive in theater and then only on the job training but nothing formal. There is no systematic training on a heavy high center of gravity auto. If we want to stop roll-overs and deaths we need to train with actual equipment; not just talk about it.
168	Reduce the very high OPTEMPO, it has all of us running around at a high rate of speed with little time to plan or reflect.
169	Require that safety be a stated part of every commander's performance narrative.
170	Resources to fund safety personnel down to at last battalion level. Safety has been around forever and a few years ago environmental came on the scene and if you use that as a request for resources, you get it no matter what, i.e. people, equipment, material etc. Safety on the other hand gets no resources even though everyone knows and agrees that it should. Do something to take care of our soldiers.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
171	Reward commanders who demonstrate sincere and meaningful commitments to accident prevention and discipline those who do not.
172	Safety as a value and not priority. Values are never compromised while priorities change depending on the moment and situation. Safety must be imbedded in all soldiers.
173	Safety must be made as high a priority as training accomplishment or any other mission assignment. Safety must be rated in a leader's career development equally with other tasks. There must be a real assessment of a leader's commitment to safety in planning and executing missions, so that a leader that ensures risk mitigation of tasks but does not accomplish as many tasks as a leader, who drives his soldiers without regard other than lip services to risk mitigation, is truly rated the superior leader. Currently, we reward the hard charger with a risk analysis chart who is lucky during his command and downgrade the leader who through risk mitigation accomplishes less on paper, but who truly practices safety in mission accomplishment.
174	Since we have safety news letters/magazines, call bulletins, and so on, perhaps what we need is a significant part of our conferences (i.e. TRADOC, NGB, FORSCOM, etc.) dedicated to safety and safety issues. This should entail serious discussions on safety issues, not a slide presentation given by senior personnel. These discussions need to be preceded with preparatory material to make them effective.
175	Take away the cars from DoD employees that break the speed laws. I live in Atlanta, and am passed on the interstate everyday by people in DoD vehicles that are flying low.
176	The national safety objectives should be reviewed annually and passed down to the field. There should not be reductions in budgeting in this area.
177	The US Army Combat Readiness Center does not provide a usable product for the M-Day (traditional guard member) safety officer/ non-commissioned officers in a guard unit. Their entire focus is active duty. NGB safety has made very little progress in this area either. Ninety percent of our safety officer/non-commissioned officers are traditional guard members (M-Day) who get almost no training and have nothing provided to them to do their job.
178	We all must understand that safety.is not a program; it is a way of doing business. The key to a safe environment is through strong leadership and a caring command climate. The one action that I would recommend is that safety be strongly emphasized in all leadership professional development training with strong emphasis on risk management. You don't do safety, you do your business safely.
179	We have to keep safety on the service member's mind.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
180	We should always include hands on training with new equipment under conditions where the equipment will be used. Because of the shortages of up-armored HUMMWVin theater, soldiers did not get the opportunity to drive these vehicles prior to arriving in Kuwait. Conditions in the combat zone included narrow dirt roads along canals. These were extremely hazardous conditions especially with night vision googles. The most effective mitigation is practice. The organization must be willing to go beyond normal training environments to insure soldiers gain the experience necessary to mitigate the hazards.
181	A safety video should be made that shows the after effects of non-safe behavior. A video trainer similar to a playstation2 or x-box game could also created for use by new and younger soldiers to stress the importance of safety.
182	Accidents occur when people don't think ahead. Leadership must model, not just talk about safety. Modeling occurs with on the spot corrections, creating a climate of safety, and inoculating soldiers by talking about safety specifics before and after any field events or deployments.
183	Add safety, risk assessment analysis, to each soldier's performance evaluation.
184	Adherence to standards.
185	Admittance to the influence of alcohol on safety matters. In my opinion, some military leaders are in denial when it comes to the relationship between misuse of alcohol and accidents. I don't have data, but I wouldn't be surprised if we looked at accident data, particularly when off duty, and found that a substantial portion of our accidental injuries and deaths are associated with alcohol use.
186	Adopt the best practices from the loss prevention efforts of the American insurance industry to improve work place safety.
187	All new entries would get a one hour driver safety course.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
188	All officer and leader schools from the earliest schools should have a safety and risk management requirement that is relevant for that level of leadership. Consistent with this, commanders and top non-commissioned officers, from CG/CSM to CPT/1SG should be required to periodically conduct a session with their direct reports and their staff to discuss safety and risk assessment as a leader, with focus on leadership, truly demonstrating caring for the welfare of their soldiers. Fatigue, repetitiveness, poor lifestyle practices, fitness issues, and OPTEMPO conspire against the most prudent commanders. In the context of leadership and loving our soldiers, however, commanders and top non-commissioned officers must be required to slow down and reflect upon the consequences of accidents and to not consider safety and risk assessment as a program. This program is part of a larger bureaucracy that has too many programs and too many checked boxes. It does not sufficiently relate the potential for human loss back to the leader.
189	Assure every man and woman understands the risk assessment process and applies it to daily activities as well as mission.
190	Back to basics risk analysis prior to activities that have inherent dangers, with appropriate mitigation actions identified and taken to prevent accidents.
191	Change the attitude/behavior of soldiers to make prudent driving decisions with their POVs when they are off duty and off the installation.
192	Conduct more safety training in the school house to young soldiers--the ones who most need it and where it will be presented to them in a positive way at an early point in their careers.
193	Continue to emphasize safety as a primary responsibility of all DoD personnel, reinforced via all media outlets.
194	Continue to recognize units that are the leaders in maintaining safety standards.
195	Continue to update the safety posters for distribution. Continue the competition for best unit safety awards and mile driven accident free.
196	Continued awareness of trends and best practices.
197	Current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as preparations for these action officers, makes safety much more challenging and requires increased attention by senior military leadership.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
198	Emphasize safety training at the first line supervisor level. Emphasis at the higher levels of US Army Reserves (USAR) has increased greatly in the last three years. Quarterly risk assessments are greatly improved. The US Army Reserve's geographical dispersion and temporal dispersion (periodic assemblies/formations) dosn't provide for the continuous repetition necessary to create and instill the habit of safety. The publication of the Army Preliminary Loss Reports by email is a good effort to power down the awareness.
199	Enforce sleep plans in the field.
200	Ensure all soldiers see the individual/family impacts (physical, emotional, financial) of accidental injuries/deaths.
201	Fully man the force with appropriate ranks and experience.
202	Fund more safety training
203	Get more scientific and psychological realism into the goals and methodologies. We just do statistical analysis on events and then say change the statistics. I have seen little meaningful human factors info that can be used, especially in a reserve environment where we exercise so little day-to-day influence and control over the behaviors/attitudes of our forces.
204	Greater emphasis on the problems created by alcohol. Close the class VI stores on all military posts. If we're serious about drinking and driving then we must discourage drinking at every opportunity instead of selling alcohol at discount prices.
205	I believe we are working hard on emphasizing safety in the workplace. However, expanding the emphasis to the families (family readiness groups) can also provide needed re-enforcement. The more information passed in a relentless approach could create an embedded awareness. It becomes a disciplined thought process in individuals that is habitual. Safety awareness overload can only be positive,
206	If we require training in safety, use it wisely especially in Reserve Component elements. The need for classes on driving in winter weather held in a northern command seems a bit redundant to soldiers. It needs to be conducted but tailor it to winter driving in Germany or overseas not in a climate or conditions that soldiers already do almost three quarters of the year around. Training time is precious so make the most of it. And finally be realistic about it. Now that we have up armored equipment, we need to provide a type of each in all motor pools for Soldiers to train year round on the roads. You can not do it by going to mobilization site and do it for only two days etc. Not effective.
207	Incorporate safety into all leader training top to bottom, also all operations!!
208	Increase safety awareness and accident prevention.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
209	Integrate off-post traffic violations into our counseling programs. Establish visibility through police reporting scrubbed against personnel databases to ensure commanders are aware when their soldiers violate traffic laws. We do a good job with violations on-post but not off-post. Since by far the largest category of fatalities is off-post POVs due to fatigue, alcohol, speeding, reckless driving, we need visibility of those infractions. The best method for prevention is direct counseling up to and including administrative discipline for repeat violations. The commander's guidance, training, intent, scheduling activities to facilitate safety and First Sergeant and Platoon Sergeant safety briefing is not going far enough. We must get into soldier's face when a violation occurs and need the information to do it. I don't believe, based on the continuing POV fatality numbers, which continually beating up the chain of command is working effectively to cut rate by 50 percent within 2 years. We need a better program to get to the soldier.
210	Lead safety by personal actions.
211	Make safety performance a mandatory evaluation report entry.
212	Make sure that safety is part of everyday business, taking every opportunity to emphasis its importance in every formation, training session and briefing. Ensure that visual materials are made available as reminders. Every leader must make safety a priority.
213	Match the suspension and steering of the HMMWV to the weight it is expected to carry at the speeds required for survivability in Theater.
214	Placement of a FTS to manage and administer safety programs and training at brigade level.
215	POV safety briefings weekly on active and monthly for reserve. Discuss all of the reasons for accidents. Make the briefings interactive and interesting and current!!
216	Provide more equipment and opportunities for training in areas where accidents are more prevalent, such as up armor HMMWV training.
217	Provide Medical Service Corps with more trained safety and occupational health professionals.
218	Rate all service members on their commitment and participation in safety programs.
219	Regularly scheduled refresher training at all levels of safety and risk assessments.
220	Resource actual positions for dedicated safety professionals in all O-6 level commands and above. Aviation puts the right level of professional attention and diligence to their programs. All units should take a clue from them if they're resourced.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
221	Review/revamp the safety awards recognition program. Create different award for deployed units. Recently, a deployed truck company received an industry award for safety. No equivalent DoD award.
222	Safety awareness training annually via the web or other means with safety standup talks periodically by organizational heads presenting relevant data and statistics to create an ongoing awareness.
223	Safety is a first line leader's direct responsibility. It must be made a part of everyday work and cannot be made to be special. Only by making it part of everyday work will it get the attention that it deserves.
224	Safety is an attitude and consists of many small actions, not one action. Constant awareness is a good thing. If DoD had installations inspect cars for safety when they gave out decals, that should have some small positive impact on accidents.
225	Safety must be consistently emphasized from the top and sharing of best practices across the Services where there are similar type of operations.
226	Sharing best practices to broadest audience possible.
227	Slow down.
228	Standardize the risk management process across services and incorporate it into every operational plan, training event. This needs to become a habit of the mind.
229	Talk about the risk factor with every event.
230	Teach, practice, and emphasize safety from the very start of military training basic and advanced individual training through Office Candidate School and initial officer training. I was taught safety was the sixth paragraph of my field order, it has always made a difference.
231	Use the risk assessment properly and take mitigating actions to reduce risk.
232	We must get the message across to our younger soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines. The message must be something that clearly focuses them on safety at home, at work, and in travel but must be tailored more to how they think and look at life (the Gen X/Gen Y people of our services). Our standard safety briefings for holiday periods and when they go on leave obviously are not getting things done.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
233	Adequate budget is not included for acquisition. As a result, project manager/program executive office are not willing to be a bill payer for the safety aspect of weapon research development test and evaluation activity. I suggest that a budget item/line for safety be included in every major acquisition system!! Otherwise, I fail to see how you can improve safety at DoD.
234	Adequate garrison funding to improve the quality of installation services such as snow plowing, sanding, and general maintenance of floors and walkways would significantly decrease the occurrence of slips, trips and falls.
235	Adequate training.
236	Apply adequate resources.
237	Broader education regarding benefits of safety to programs and to the Army in general. The culture needs to shift to a safety minded culture. Too often, safety like quality is added after the fact instead of built in.
238	Commanders and leaders care about safety, but it seems there is no institutional reinforcement. Chain of commands are not being held responsible at the lowest levels and recognition for successful safety programs are not apparent. Seems most of the accidents are vehicular - especially motorcycles. Having to respond (Respond by Endorsement) to every accident my have an impact of leaders to enforce safety philosophy in their command philosophy. Want to get this into our psyche without breaking the spirit of soldiers, leaders and commanders.
239	Continue the safety awareness programs now in use and continue to fund those programs at all costs.
240	Do not accept that accidents and mishaps have to occur. Make safety best practices a routine part of business and owned by all.
241	Don't assume that people know the rules of the road (and traffic laws) just because they have been driving a while. Actually, the better thing to do, but beyond the scope of DoD, is to change the focus of TV ads from adventure and speed to safety.
242	Focus DoD more on safety of our soldiers/military/civilians/contractors in combat zones and recognize the huge efforts being put forth by Army to protect lives.
243	Focus on standard operating procedures, and review/update whenever new or modified equipment comes into use, not just when an accident occurs.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
244	Focus safety attention and activities on those portions of the community for which safety is an issue. In my activity, we do nothing but office work, and perform studies. Raising safety issues for us seems somewhat irrelevant.
245	Imbed the risk analysis process down to the squad level.
246	Improved vehicle safety training.
247	Increased land vehicle safety.
248	Keep up the visibility so that awareness stays fresh!
249	Make it a standard in the manager's professional development.
250	Make safety program funding a must fund item.
251	Make sure soldiers are adequately trained in the use of their vehicles and other equipment.
252	More awareness.
253	More emphasis on traffic safety. Still the number one killer of our soldiers!
254	Pareto chart of safety versus causes on impact on mission, dollars or time lost that shows operational impact of safety improvement, also gives sense of safety versus. other priority factors.
255	Properly maintain roads, buildings, and infrastructure.
256	Put full time safety civilians in all urine analysis. They are needed to assist the commander in his safety program and risk assessment process.
257	Recognize that prolonged high OPTEMPO stresses the force and families. Regular reminders about safety are very helpful to avoid complacency.
258	Regular safety messages that describe in very short stories messages about safety and the consequences of being unsafe, to keep people conscious that safety is an individual personal responsibility. It is not the organization's responsibility. It is each individual's responsibility.
259	Remove the major cause, namely the pressure to achieve more than is possible, consistent with resources (personnel and financial).

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
260	Require people to look at the goriest of accidents and discuss how they could have been prevented. This one thing had the most profound impact on me when I was a teenager. Watching the gore from foolish accidents was a sobering eye opener.
261	Require safety performance measures to be included in military and civilian support forms.
262	Safety falls in the category of, you can lead a horse to water but can't make him drink. Young people feel invulnerable; it is always going to happen to someone else.
263	Safety in work place is the responsibility of each and every individual.
264	Secretarial level commitment to welfare of civilian employees with a corresponding commitment by the CSA or VCSA for military employees.
265	Shut down activities that fail safety inspections, have safety violations, and lack safety training program, either one or all of the above.
266	Sufficient funding at the tactical level which allows positive incentives to be developed.
267	Tell everyone they cannot ride motorcycles.
268	This is a leadership issues. Make commanders at every level responsible and this will get done.
269	Unfortunately this one is a tough issue to solve. It is agreed that there must be a viable and achievable safety program throughout DoD. However, when you categorize it as safety, it doesn't get the attention it should. If it was looked at in the light of force preservation or workforce preservation (or protection) it would take on the meaning that it is believed the DoD is trying to achieve. It is talked about, it is presented in forum after forum, and everyone is aware that "safety is important"--which it is--but to have the safetyofficer, who is usually an additional duty in most organizations, (and under resourced at that) running the safety program; it misses the mark. On the flightline, safety is inherent. In a vessel, safety is inherent. It would be simple to lock everyone into an office building, orderly room, or hanger and exercise positive control over their off duty time and that might reduce accidents by 50 percent. However, there is a real world out here and some things are just going to happen.
270	Use email to alert us to present or recurrent dangers.
271	We lose more individuals in driving accidents. We should improve driver's ed and require individuals with speeding/poor driving records to attend remedial driver training for base access.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
272	A set of easy to use tools that can be provided to all commands to address critical safety concerns.
273	Align the Services with common clearly defined terminology and metrical development systems.
274	Awareness and that accidents don't just happen.
275	Be more simple and specific about what categories of mishaps for which categories of personnel in the Navy have which specific tangible goals to be achieved. On the other hand, it appears that the only form of safety incidents that are truly being measured for 50 percent reduction are those that happen to a civilian GS only and then only if it leads to cash claims against the government. Clearly no leaders will stand up in front of their troops and tell only part of their troops to safe because they are the only ones that count against us.
276	Become more proactive in the prevention actions. Requires focus on" near miss" or even first aid incidents as strongly as lost time accidents are tracked now.
277	Better visibility into best practices from other services and industry. My service does an excellent job pushing our best practices. It is not clear if they include those from other services/sources.
278	Bring the same drive to reducing mishaps on duty to off duty safety considerations.
279	CJCS/DEPSECDEF needs to take to the tank and baseline the service programs
280	Communicating the lessons learned.
281	Connective alcohol responsibility education and training, starting with source and throughout.
282	Continue our operational focus on safety, and increase our off-duty safety education
283	Continue to communicate the importance of safety, and provide frequent updates on the achievement of goals. Heavily advertise our target and our progress toward achieving it.
284	Continue to stress auto education.
285	Create a pervasive, top-driven, mandatory program akin to those we have created in drugs, women in the service, and alcohol. Cultural change is simply the hardest thing, and this is cultural change.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
286	Creating a climate that clearly recognizes that safety is everyone's responsibility not just that of the safety officer and his/her staff.
287	Culture needs to be addressed; safety needs to be part of our very fiber.
288	Define minimum safety levels.
289	Development of linked metrics among mission accomplishment, safety, personnel evaluations.
290	Don't tolerate those who knowingly violate good safety practices. Establish a joint safety office and streamline Service safety organizations. Reduce the differences between Service reporting formats. Push meaningful help down the chain of command.
291	Echelon II reviews of safety performance across the respective Claimancies.
292	Ensure our sailors are getting an opportunity to sleep by monitoring the required workweek hours.
293	Ensure resource allocation and actual leadership commitment matches rhetoric.
294	Full court press on educating and communicating the need for personal vehicle safety.
295	Fully understand the cause/effects which drive unsafe practices. We often put in place initiatives to improve safety, without knowing whether those initiatives will drive to the behavior we are looking for. We can generally design systems to be safe. The unsafe nature of those systems typically comes in the inappropriate operation of them. Office safety is similar, in that offices and the work we do in the Pentagon is typically safe. The unsafe nature of being here is mostly driven by the unsafe behavioral practices exhibited by the members working here. Knowing what the target of improvement is should be the fundamental focus of our analysis, to ensure we focus on the right improvement.
296	Get internet access to all units, especially onto the piers. Our submarines cannot get the bandwidth to access NAVSAFECEN info and surveys. Also they cannot download files, such as safety notes, notice to mariners, and so on. This is a safety issue of the first magnitude.
297	Give every Service member a breathalyzer key ring that is checked on-person each day.
298	Have everyone in DoD, military and civilian, top to bottom, teach classes on safety. We usually only have middle/top management teach safety. We need our newest personnel, not only training but also teaching safety as well. If they are responsible for safety, they will have a higher degree of safety awareness.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
299	Hold regular safety fairs, symposia, demonstrations and such. to keep safety on the forefront. The Pentagon channel should have regular, informative programs on recreational and home safety. Distribute information on ways to improve safety at home and work. Set meaningful goals, equip people to achieve them and provide feed back. Merely pronouncing a 50 percent reduction goal has no analytical basis, nor likelihood of being achieved. Apply some analytical rigor to the problem, understand where to apply resources, set realistic, analytically based goals and then provide feedback to all.
300	I believe we have to make safety a personal issue. We have made safety a very personal issue at this command soliciting the active participation of every member and their families. We stress watching out for oneself first and then watching out for others on and off the job. We talk about it at every opportunity, reemphasizing the personal nature of accidents and that no one is immune.
301	I firmly believe that establishing a consistent set of principles (as opposed to simply urging that we be safe, and certainly in addition to ongoing good work in best practices and statistical tracking) is a solid way to attack this problem. We use the following principles to, what I believe, is great effect: integrity, level of knowledge, procedural compliance, formal communications, forceful backup, questioning attitude, and risk management.
302	I think we are talking the talk, but not walking the walk. Need a communications campaign to all leadership and need to include safety as a performance appraisal metric. I think leaders and Commanders can do more, but are not oriented correctly. Leadership can help orient correctly.
303	Increase resources in some areas.
304	Institutionalize operational risk management (ORM) as a core competency within DoD.
305	Institutionalize ORM throughout DoD. We use it, but it's not understood and it definitely isn't part of our culture.
306	Keep the organizational safety goals in full view of the workforce everyday.
307	Keep the press on motor vehicle safety!
308	Keep the pressure on to reduce our overall mishap rate. Continue to focus equally on job and non-job related safety issues.
309	Keep working on metrics--metrics that could better measure prevention success.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
310	Leadership is the key, specifically, intrusive leadership by the superiors of junior personnel is the most effective tool. Non-commissioned officers and chief petty officers questioning what their junior personnel are doing and how they are executing their plans in a constant drumbeat manner gets the point across. The same goes for the executive officer and junior officers.
311	Let's get with it on aligning around tools for the forces to improve how we operate. Safety is a by product of operating to high standards of effectiveness. I believe ORM is about the best tool I've personally seen used effectively.
312	Looking at very recent trends in naval aviation mishaps it is apparent that continuous communications pertaining to safety, and ORM best practices, can help focus aircrew and supporting personnel on the importance of prevention, and directly influence mishap reductions attributable to human factors. At the same time, technology insertion, such as MFOQA, can further assist aircrew and support personnel in addressing both material and human factor contributors to mishaps. Investment in MFOQA technologies must occur, and OSD can contribute to this undertaking.
313	Make it clear that mishaps that occur when a member is in violation of a standing order (DUI, not wearing seat belts, not wearing helmet on motorcycle) will result in loss of all benefits to survivors. We are not serious if we reward bad behavior.
314	Make it consistent across DoD from a priority. It appears that we only get lathered about safety after a rash of accidents. It is a simple formula leading change and how to get senior leadership to buy-in as the top priority. Safety is everyone's concern (bottom to top) on a daily basis 24/7. Leadership is the execution agent to enforce these standards.
315	OSD provide funding for those programs which OSD recognizes as safety enhancements. A program budget decision which focuses on safety would provide funds and focus to support the 50 percent requirement.
316	Periodic safety stand downs.
317	Place it on everyone's radar screen, do better marketing!
318	Prohibit motorcycle operation by our personnel.
319	Prohibit motorcycles on DoD bases.
320	Prohibit the use of motorcycles at overseas locations. I would recommend in CONUS as well, but I don't think we could get away with this level of intrusion stateside.
321	Prohibit the use of motorcycles by US military members in CONUS as we do for personnel stationed overseas.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
322	Protect and emphasize the privileged status of mishap investigation testimony and evidence.
323	Put your money where your mouth is! Safety is under funded from my viewpoint.
324	Reducing variation by targeting commands/activities with high rates of problems. 1. Reducing variation is the real key to near-term gains in either quality or safety programs. 2. It follows the Willie Sutton rule, go where the money is. 3. It provides focus for commanders.
325	Reward commands and individuals for achieving organization safety goals financially with an increase in organizational budgets or individual pay. The recognition needs to be meaningful and substantial, something all command and individuals have the opportunity to compete for. Example: zero flight incidents for 12 month period, increase the command's operating budget by $10K or $1K for an individual effort. If this type of safety record is maintained for five consecutive years, the command should be rewarded with a $50K increase in its operating budget. (This is cheap considering they will have saved DoD millions over the 5 year period.)
326	Safety is not a stand alone category or action for us to turn on or off or address at convenient times. It is inextricably woven into all we do, and most importantly is a critical subset / by product of professionalism. Change that mindset and you will ingrain that belief into a whole new generation of leaders.
327	Safety needs to be better resourced and manned. We do not place the front runners in the safety officer billets or our safety organizations. The safety program is manned just enough to check the block. I am guilty of this as well. When faced with difficult choices to fund and man an operational war fighting program or the safety office, safety places second. I think a separate line in the DoD budget to provide the level of funding necessary is required. In the long run it is cheaper to pay for the preventative safety program than to replace damaged equipment and bury good men and women.
328	Safety organizations should provide real tools for commanders to use in promoting safety rather than simply keeping the numbers.
329	Set realistic, achievable goals towards reducing mishaps. In the Navy our goal is too high, a lofty, unachievable ambition. I predict it will only serve to frustrate and discourage those who are held accountable for achieving the goal. Let's be realistic. Take a better look at DoD accident rates compared to civilian rates. You will find that we are doing pretty well in comparison.
330	Share methods with everyone on what has been successful in reducing mishaps.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
331	Since we can not be with the troops 24/7, we must continue to instill a safety mindset within our troops. Creating a safe environment does not preclude us from performing our mission; however, we must continue to ensure our sailors know that focus and education (knowledge about tactics, aircraft, mission) are the keys to preventing mishaps.
332	Stress the 5S aspects of LEAN/6 SIGMA for our industrial activities. In other words, getting our industrial organizations to make their areas neat, orderly, get rid of excess material and all the other aspects of not having an exact place to put things. Messy areas invite accidents.
333	Stress the universal application of ORM. ORM does not say we won't accomplish the mission; it says we must find a safe way to accomplish the mission, and it provides a process that all can understand that forces everyone to think through how they achieve the safe accomplishment of the mission. Everything we do is a mission of one sort or the other, so everything we do can be managed under an ORM umbrella. Too many programs/processes are difficult to manage and make stick. I would recommend focusing on this one.
334	Sustain the momentum being generated by the current program.
335	Thoroughly indoctrinate our recruits in basic training to create a mindset of personal safety from the beginning of their careers. Help them recognize their vulnerabilities and the need to think safety as they make decisions on and off duty.
336	Tie performance in safety and answers/goals to the above questions to an individual's performance report.
337	Top down enforcement of ORM.
338	Train ORM at more levels, apprentice, journeyman and supervisor. ORM needs to be a core competency.
339	Training simulation investment. Attempt to reduce accidents in training exercises for active forces.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
340	Understanding safety in relationship to cohort factors and science of learning/psychological development. For instance, in the youngest cohort of the military it has recently been widely published that brain research reveals that young men's brains are not fully developed as it relates to prudent risk management (versus risk taking) until mid-20s. On the other hand, the distractions of life and responsibilities will make an older person look at risk differently. Too often we seem to teach safety toward the reasonable and the rational rather than geared toward how the respective cohort really sees risk and risk-related behavior. Additionally, I believe that some of this is related to how important safety is viewed relative to real success. For instance, it is conceivable that, for example, an aviator is prudent and safe in his aviation practices but reckless in his personal life because he isn't being "graded" as such. This is also effective and needs to be understood more than we do now.
341	Use the lean concept of visual management where the timely status on safety trends is always in front of everyone. Example: UPS has a stoplight as trucks return into the garage from their routes. If it is other than green drivers immediately know a safety incident has happened that day. Their safety results are always in front of them.
342	We still tend to focus on workplace safety, an area in which we already are doing very well. The tough nut to crack is off duty behavior, particularly driving safety. The gains are now to be had in cutting the losses we suffer due to automobile and motorcycle accidents among our young folks.
343	Conduct a mandatory semi-annual safety stand-down.
344	Continue to address alcohol consumption of young military personnel.
345	Determine a range of costs in terms of dollars, schedule impacts, and crew impacts when an officer or enlisted personnel is involved in a fatal or major injury accident. It should include officers from O1 to O10, and enlisted E1 to E9 and in each of the different communities. This information can be used in training and counseling sessions.
346	Focus on junior enlisted and immediate supervisors.
347	Have every organization visited by a Flag/SES during the coming year, with an unannounced stand own of about one hour, emphasizing our sincerity on the subject. Too many of our personnel think we give the subject lip service only. Second, make the safety department part of every department and every decision we make, not just the safety program.
348	Hold people personally accountable for willfully putting themselves at risk, especially in the use of alcohol. Finding someone who's had an alcohol-related accident to be in the line of duty and fully compensating them only serves to perpetuate irresponsible conduct.
349	Keep getting the attention of the E7-E9 leadership and add a data point on officer fit reps.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
350	Serious application of the principles of operational risk management.
351	We should establish a target of no accidents/mishaps, and should make safety performance an element of annual performance ratings. If you look at companies who pride themselves on safety, they establish a culture of safety awareness where employees look after one another, and where there is inherent peer pressure to not make a safety mistake.
352	Adequate funding of troop protection, including crashworthy seating on troop carriers (particularly rotary wing transports).
353	Adequately fund preventative maintenance and training programs for all ordnance handling facilities including RDT&E sites.
354	Apply Lean/6 Sigma approaches to the rules and processes in place to determine which ones are value-added, eliminating the rest so the resources can be more effectively applied.
355	Appropriately resource improvement goals.
356	Arbitrary goals like cut accidents by 50 percent are for show. Why is half the current accident rate acceptable? More meaningful goals should be used, rather than easy, get-safe-quick sound bites.
357	As is done in our arena: To maintain an intense focus on safety, consider having a very rigorous accident definition that includes essentially any unplanned event in any critical operation whether or not injury or damage occurs. The basic strategy should be that all accidents (regardless of severity) must be reported to ensure we benefit from the lessons learned to prevent more serious accidents from occurring. By maintaining such a wide aperture perspective and classifying essentially any unplanned event as an accident to be reported/investigated for lessons learned, we capture the "leading indicators" to proactively address the behaviors that can lead to more serious events.
358	Create a culture where mishaps are not tolerated, allow time to talk about safety frequently, and celebrate success in safety program. Okosuka has a model program where they invest time and attention on safety. I think too often, especially as resources and staff reduce, while workload increases, we get rushed to get the job done.
359	Demonstrate the political will to hold leaders responsible when safety goals are not achieved. For executives, that might mean some percentage reduction in any bonus or pay increase achieved. For military, it might serve as a tie breaker for promotion boards.
360	Develop and administer a drug that would make alcohol taste extremely bad since alcohol consumption is primary cause of many accidents.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
361	Embed quantitative safety measures in personnel evaluations at activities where safety is a prevalent concern (industrial sites, military bases).
362	Ensuring that adequate, large signs exist to alert personnel to high voltage, toxic chemicals, and such.
363	Establish metrics that are meaningful by type of command so that managers can communicate intent and measure progress. Case in point: Navy had a safety stand down some number of years ago, but for headquarters/administrative commands it was hard to develop action plans. It needs to be clear whether we are talking about off the job auto accidents or hazards in the work place and the relative priority/management accountability for each.
364	Establish one safety office at the DoD level rather than having the current split of some responsibility in P&R and some in ATL (ESOH) and provide proper resources, both people and funding, to that office.
365	Expect the unexpected! Keep an eye out for your fellow worker. Safety is everyone's responsibility.
366	Fund safety improvement programs.
367	Have our very senior leadership openly and aggressively address safety by means of a strategic communications plan. Ensure safety is given priority in all guidance and directives. Follow up words with resources---Safety always seems to be in the resource trade space, which does not send a very strong or positive signal to our work force.
368	I provide leadership in the area of Navy/Marine Corps weapons systems and explosives safety. An area that would improve safety in this technical area would synergize safety efforts through process leveraging across the services. As our nation's conflicts are fought in a more joint process, we need to ensure that war fighters can take weapons from other services into broad conflict areas without sacrificing safety.
369	I work in an office environment. Accidents increase due to slips and falls when we have ice or snow storms. At times, the base is not adequately prepared for pedestrians especially at the beginning of the work day. We need to make sure bases are safe before we open.
370	I would institute a disciplined risk management process with probabilities based on standardized analytical procedures, hazard criteria that are numerically based, resourcing based on risk avoidance decisions by DoD leadership, risk acceptance authority limited to DoD leadership, process transparency via a public website that presents the details of risk accepted, risks mitigated, incident data, and a running tally of DoD performance history.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
371	If we could encourage DoD employees to take a few minutes, before undertaking a function/duty/activity, to consider the potential risks/health hazards/etc. and best practices then I think the DoD could significantly reduced the number of accidents and injuries.
372	Implement Voluntary Protection Program (VPP) at all sites.
373	Increased educational outreach regarding identifying hazardous waste issues and proper mitigations.
374	Leadership should review safety metrics regularly and publish regularly.
375	Make periodic safety reminder/refresher courses mandatory for all employees.
376	Make safety officer an accountable position.
377	Mandatory designated drivers at military clubs serving alcohol.
378	Metrics, visibility of goals, and status.
379	More complete and rapid snow/ice removal. Slips and falls on icy patches constitute most of what has happened to my staff.
380	Safety must receive a higher priority. In the Navy where I work it is discussed far less than cost savings and lean. Hence my conclusion it is not a high priority.
381	My Command recently achieved OSHA VPP star status. This accomplishment was achieved by teaming between management, labor, and the employees. We all had one common goal, cut our injury and illness rate (down by 50 percent in the last 5 years) and send everyone home every day safe and healthy. The team approach is critical to safety success. Both management and labor must have a united visible leadership role in the effort.
382	Only purchase vehicles with side air bags.
383	Put additional emphasis on systems safety as part of the systems engineering plan and the emphasis at SE reviews and DAB's. This level of attention would focus efforts, create positive tension in the program offices, and demonstrate top level leadership commitment to improving safety.
384	Recognize people (monetarily and otherwise) for conducting their duties accident free at appropriate times (yearly, end of tour, end of career).

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
385	Recognize that organic knowledge coupled with R&D of technological solutions can make the most difference in improving safety.
386	Reduce unnecessary and ineffective security services supplied by contracting firms. Use the money saved for reducing accidents.
387	Safety modifications to equipment should not compete financially with capability enhancements.
388	Safety rules placed on simple readable signs at the appropriate locations (rather than in manuals).
389	Say it is important, we rarely hear that safety is important by our leaders at OSD or NAVY. By just saying it delivers a message and starts many other actions.
390	Spend funds on safety programs vice surveys.
391	Step up the communications about safety. Keep the issue in front of employees and their leadership.
392	Support technologies that enable safe operations by minimizing the man-in-the-loop.
393	Yearly mandatory stand down for a day to refresh everyone.
394	Safety Days to emphasize training and safety awareness/sensitivity.
395	Adequate resourcing so people don't have to make do with what they have.
396	Agree on specific metrics and demand performance.
397	All aspects of safety have been stressed during my career. Best demonstrated by the dramatic decrease in on-duty accidents over the past 20 years. By the continuation of senior leadership interest/focus on safety issues and emphasis by commanders at all levels across each of the Services we will continue to see a decrease in accidents and incidents both on and off duty. The military has historically had the best safety program of any industry, and the record of the past 20 years is the proof. Commanders are the key.
398	Balance - balance between safety, mission, attitudes, risk and resources.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
399	Ban motorcycles from military bases. This would not prevent airmen from owning motorcycles, but it would prevent using them to travel to and from work, and it would also require a motorcyclist to find some way to store it off base. This would turn the airman's cycle into more of a special use vehicle like an off-road vehicle or a boat rather than a commonly-driven vehicle.
400	Better balance of resources to tasking. The most important risk factor to us all is the increasing ops tempo in the face of shrinking personnel and financial resources. We continue to do more and more with less and less. The people toll is significant and increasing.
401	Better cross-Service cooperation (particularly regarding aviation safety standards and enforcement).
402	Better job of using cross service, cross unit best practices.
403	Better manning of career fields such as aircraft maintenance, civil engineers, and transporters who are among those we ask to do more and more with less and less. With better manning, we could share the load better, allowing for fewer people to have to work extremely long hours and therefore be more prone to accidents from mental lapses and fatigue. The stressed career fields efforts that have taken place are steps in the right direction, but not nearly enough. If we are really going to reduce accidents significantly, we must keep the pressure on!
404	Better supervision and attention to detail at the workshop level. Too many immediate supervisors don't take on the parental role of intervening in risky practices in the work place.
405	Better visibility of DoD goals coupled with accountability for attainment of those goals. While we currently have mishap reduction goals established, the perception is that they do not command top-tier attention.
406	Centrally distribute more dramatically illustrative videotapes or DVDs that show consequences of poor safety practices. When viewed, these often provide greater impact to military and civilian members of units. These videos should not need to be produced by the US military as scores of them already exist through assorted state agencies, federal agencies, or private orgs.
407	Conduct life-cycle analysis of the high accident potential vehicles (aircraft) to ensure the proper parts are ordered/structures or engines overhauled before in-flight failures begin to occur.
408	Continue to build a culture of risk management vice safety as a stand alone.
409	Continue to discuss safety in open forums.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
410	Continue to focus on safety at the highest levels. Air Force flight mishaps were at the lowest levels in our history last year. Constant attention by leaders at the highest levels keeps us all focused on safety 24 hours a day.
411	Continued attention to detail to avoid the clear accidents that should be avoided.
412	Creation of a lessons-learned or best practices program that is shared among all Services.
413	Cross talk between Services is spotty at best. Most of our ground mishaps and off duty accidents share common elements. Determining the common elements and working to solve the behavior that contributes to off duty accidents could benefit all our safety efforts.
414	Deglamorize motorcycle riding and you will save many lives this year!
415	Develop one or two measures that are looked at by all levels of command on a regular basis...and ensure we have good root cause analysis...not just an enumeration of symptomatic causes.
416	Do not set unrealistic goals. The proclamation on the SecDef, while admirable, has resulted in major subordinates setting goals so high that when they translate to the field units that our people see them as not relevant, or achievable, and therefore the effort is marginalized at the most important level of accomplishment.
417	Emphasize awareness.
418	Empower people. Reward those that stop a mission activity to ensure an unsafe action is prevented--often safety is compromised by a misplaced set of priorities that pushes mission accomplishment "at any cost."
419	Ensure O & M shortages do not decrease training and readiness.
420	Ensuring that equipment is properly designed/funded/modified to incorporate/correct deficiencies and mitigate/reduce human error.
421	Everyone must focus on the mission, know their part in the mission, and know their craft well. If you do your job smart, know your procedures, follow guidelines, practice good techniques, then safety will be a natural by-product.
422	Focus on fundamentals and compliance coupled with sound solid training.
423	Fully fund and man the service safety centers that train and educate our safety staffs.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
424	Get a handle on alcohol and binge drinking.
425	Get commanders to demonstrate that it is a top priority.
426	Get the word out to stress the importance of taking care of each other. Supervisors can't watch over their troops 24/7. If they (especially the young airmen) truly watch out for each other using the Air Combat Command Wingman Concept, we could prevent a huge number of accidents.
427	Give first-line supervisors more authority to impose limited disciplinary punishments (especially extra duty) in order to correct the behavior of young troops who make poor choices in safety matters.
428	Give the services a little more leverage in bringing back personnel and aircraft from OIF/OEF. CENTCOM has the last vote, and our concerns for safety and readiness/training continue to be ignored. We are going down the wrong road, and it will take years to recover because we haven't been able to keep enough aircraft home to properly train our crews. I know the war has top priority, but we are not in balance at this time.
429	Give us the right number of personnel in our various career fields, especially those that are stressed by low numbers and high deployment rates.
430	I believe we have a good program. I'm sure there are a lot of contractors out there who think they can make it better. We work in a dangerous business, and the best can do is manage risk and minimize our troops to unnecessary risks.
431	If we are serious about improving safety we need to benchmark off of industry leaders, and then invest in the education and training just like industry.
432	Implement ORM across all services.
433	Implementation of ORM as a leadership/supervisory process. It has become a function rather than an approach to leadership and supervision. In other words, it has become a mechanical process. We need to find a way to make it part of the way we think.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
434	In my experience, safety has been treated as a separate and distinct topic; parsed out from mission performance. We have safety meetings, safety days, Chiefs of Safety, Safety non-commissioned officers safety stovepipes, in other words, I think that has been a mistake. It is my belief that we learn by example and repetition. If safe practices are repeatedly demonstrated and demanded by commanders, instructors, and other unit leaders (both formal and informal) they will become the norm. This is nothing more than human nature. By definition, we will follow the example of our leaders, and at its core, leadership is about persuasion. Persuasion is about logos, ethos, and pathos, as Aristotle put it. It is in that context that our leaders must be held accountable for weaving safety into the fabric of everything we do. They set the example...not the safety officer.
435	In my perspective, safety is both a mindset and cultural commitment. The mindset needs to be cultivated at the earliest opportunity, much like parents teach their children sound safety principals. With that said, safety and compliance to safety principals needs to start in basic training environments and then emphasized throughout the course of one's career. As we continue to do more with less we need to adjust expectations and timelines for production that allow safety principals to be adhered to. Most mishaps and violations of safety occur when the workforce is under pressure, either perceived or actual, anything that can be done to distance the workforce from this perception will translate into enhanced safety compliance.
436	Incentivize good safety performance through generous funding awards to organizations who meet the DoD safety goals. Provide an additional bigger award to organizations who achieve the DoD goal for five years in a row (indicates sustained superior safety performance; they really get safety) DoD will have to define the criteria and the program requirements. Share the best practices from these successful organizations across the DoD to provide less successful organizations with insights needed on how to improve their safety programs to compete more effectively with the winners.
437	Integrating ORM and safety training at every level, from military basic training to officer accession sources. You can never start too early to help people develop decision-making skills and assess risk in on and off duty activities.
438	Keep after it in all discussions so it is a part of our culture. Sometimes it appears we are chasing ourselves over the past accidents.
439	Leadership at all levels more directly accountable for the safety record in their area of responsibility.
440	Looking for one golden BB here is not realistic, but let me suggest a comprehensive approach: reduce stress on the force by providing adequate manning and TEMPO management, breath ORM into our daily tasks, make safety a high priority (sometimes over the peacetime mission), hold recurring safety down days to internally focus on safety, and the very hard one--have our military practice ORM and sound judgment while off base in POVs and recreational vehicles.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
441	Make a corporate effort to reduce alcohol related incidents move away from the strict focus on DWI and attempt to establish a norm for our new recruits.
442	Make alcohol abuse by young airmen, soldiers, sailors and marines a much more serious offense than it currently is. As I review recent mishaps a common thread is alcohol.
443	Make operational risk management apply to all areas of DoD workplaces and workforce.
444	Make safety reflected in commanders performance evaluation Examples: Best way to prevent malaria is to take prophylaxis. Marines in Africa did not take and 100+ evacuated, 44 hospitalized unit ineffective for preventable disease because the commander did not think it was important to ensure safety of his troops. High rate of eye injuries in theater. Protective safety glasses available, but not worn in nearly all injuries. Commanders fail to enforce protective measures.
445	Mandatory training by physical therapists before individuals are permitted to engage in organized sports. Could even make the argument that such training should be part of every member's orientation at first duty station. Sports injuries, after all, represent a significant cause of lost duty time.
446	Modernization of the force.
447	Modernize the equipment so that the at home extended PERSTEMPO can be reduced. Long hours required by our airmen to meet operational requirements for the training schedule.
448	More direct, face to face emphasis from commanders/directors to their subordinates on the importance of safety in personal actions as well as military operations.
449	Need to focus across the services with a standard approach to safety. Safety approach varies significantly between services and it shows in contingency operations.
450	Never accept the idea that accidents will just happen as a way of life.
451	Outlaw motorcycles! I realize that cannot be done, but we could discourage the use of motorcycles.
452	Outlaw the use and driving of motorcycles for all DoD personnel including active duty, guard, reserve, and civilian personnel!
453	Pay a bonus for employees who execute accident free for a year.
454	Prohibit military personnel from riding motorcycles.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
455	Proper equipment for the troops.
456	Properly man the career field.
457	Provide adequate funding for flight data recorders.
458	Provide adequate funding for safety-related initiatives; driving simulators, skid courses and vehicles, purchase of ESC systems on all new government-owned vehicles.
459	Provide SE training at all PME courses.
460	Put more substance in safety inspections, inspect what you expect. If we want 50 percent less accidents/incidents, we need to put 50 percent more effort in preventing them.
461	Put the most capable people in our safety positions and fund them to fix known discrepancies and mishap board identified recommendations.
462	Quit doing more with less. Resources and manning continue to reduce, yet mission demand increases; the natural, but unacceptable tendency is to cut corners, a safety nightmare. Services/MAJCOMs/DoD have to learn how to say no to increased missions unless they are properly funded and staffed.
463	Raise drug & alcohol awareness and counter abuse.
464	Recapitalize the geriatric aircraft force structure (greater than 15years average age) in the Services that is increasing the cost and probability of mishaps while decreasing mission capability.
465	Recognize that some units people deploy but the unit mission increases or stays the same while those people are deployed. These units need additional people to maintain a safe pace of activity and number of hours on duty for those left behind.
466	Reduce OPSTEMPO and PERSTEMPO. Fatigue is a factor way too much.
467	Reduce OPSTEMPO.
468	Reduce unnecessary exposure to dangerous situations.
469	Reflect the support of safety initiatives through the budget.
470	Resource safety offices from the unit up to the operational level with sufficient numbers and experience levels of personnel.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
471	Resources allocated to safety programs, especially authorized manpower is inadequate. Funding for equipment, both major end-items and ancillary equipment, is inadequate; result is more mishaps due to failed equipment.
472	Safety can't be a once or twice a year emphasis item; it's important that leadership constantly send the signal that safety, and the well being of our people is an everyday job. We have smart people who will catch on quickly if we ask them to be aware of the risk management they should employ on a day-to-day basis.
473	Safety consciousness has a short half-life. Must constantly find new and innovative ways to get the message across; never let up.
474	Safety, or risk management is a mindset (like a core value) that is not just a result of program but a value which must be inculcated at basic training and reinforced throughout one's career. I do feel that my Service understands this, and I feel there is great emphasis on Safety throughout our installations and units. But we must also accept that we deal with a young population of airmen and we deal with complex weapons and a stressful lifestyle. Our task is to manage down the number of mishaps. We can strive for zero accidents and we should. We must unfortunately accept that accidents do occur and will always occur. This does not mean we keep from trying to reduce them.
475	Scheduled protected time off.
476	Share best practices between services.
477	Slow the OPSTEMPO.
478	Slow the pace of demand.
479	Some of the regulations in SE need to be revamped. During known problems, too many resources are dedicated to conduct class B or class A mishaps when it was a previously identified problem. Also, the money levels are too low. We need to keep up with inflation.
480	Specific metrics tied to each MAJCOM/unit's strategic plan down to the shop/flight level, and resourced appropriately. When is the last time you heard anyone in the Pentagon give a safety brief, manage stress, exercise? And if so, does senior leadership practice what is being communicated?
481	Start the culture of safety when people first come in the service. Make it part of mission accomplishment and not a goal unto itself.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
482	There is no magic pill to ensure the troops conduct themselves in a safe manner. Our challenge is to constantly balance mission demands with safety. We use operational risk management to make the risk/benefit tradeoffs that doing a demanding mission entails. The only way to be 100 percent safe in this business is to sit in your office and never fly a sortie, or drive a car; not an option in our business. But we can work to ensure a culture of safety exists in our organizations, thus minimizing the unnecessary risks.
483	This is a suggestion from my fighter operations background so I'm not sure how widely it applies, but here it is. Some units had a mission focused operational cadre and a rules focused safety and standardization cadre. The operators were pushing the edges of the rules in order to achieve more realistic training; the safety checkers were trying to tighten the rules to give the operators less wiggle room to hurt themselves. It became an arm wrestling contest between realistic training and safety--it bred disrespect for the rules and a culture where your best young leaders sometimes expressed disdain for the safety mafia and safety rules in general. By contrast, at the USAF Weapons School, the safety objectives were more broadly drawn, but were incorporated as basic mission elements, training tasks to be accomplished; parameters to be met, etc. They were rigorously briefed and debriefed, the same as other mission elements, whenever possible they were built into training scenarios.
484	Tie safety to risk management and mission accomplishment better. You cannot view safety without also viewing the risk/reward tradeoff. Safety is a result of good planning, risk assessments, complete communication of the plan to the individuals involved, execution of the plan and reassessments of the plan when the assumptions change. If we execute a good plan, it is inherently safe.
485	Train depot maintenance technicians (principally wage grade and contractor technicians) to the same standards that we train military maintenance technicians in the operational forces. Military technicians get screened for aptitude before their entry into service and undergo extensive academic technical training before hands-on qualification training both in training units and in their first duty assignments. Depot level technicians typically get the most general of introductions to the workplace before they are informally apprenticed to a more experienced technician for an unspecified period before they are trusted with working solo.
486	Train first-level commanders. Although we culturally condition officers as they mature, there is no purposeful grooming of command skills concerning safety. There is a substantial dimension to safety dealing with the psychology and conditioning of your people. It requires very well-developed skills in seeing the leading indicators of safety downturns and upturns. We need to train to recognize problematic scheduling, equipage, discipline and attitude, physical condition, etc. As it is, we simply acquire this skill enroute to rank; some get it good, many do not. We know leaders don't get it right when officers refer to safety programs as programs, give ownership of safety to a safety office or staff agent, or thinks in terms of bumper stickers rather than the increasingly complex dynamics of a military organization. Train these guys. Train us. Bumper stickers are good devices--they don't replace educated and competent commanders.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
487	Walk the talk.
488	Walk the talk. Put resources as well as ideas against the problems.
489	Watch out for each other; situational awareness for yourself and those working with you.
490	We lose the most people in off-duty mishaps, primarily POVs. We need to put even more emphasis on driving safety, especially for young people. This would include more mandatory education, rewards and incentives, simulating the effects of alcohol on reaction time, etc.
491	We need a consolidated game plan to address safety -- it is currently fragmented in a way that mishap reports are not shared, lessons are not universally addressed, and funding to fix and prevent is not auditable to the safety results. The SecDef needs a safety chief and mechanisms to consolidate lessons, communicate with the field, and fix common issues and problems.
492	We need more communications to our uniformed and civilian personnel on safety matters. This would start with public discussion of safety issues by all levels of leadership. The Navy has a quarterly all-hands message they put out that actually gets read because it's entertaining, yet the message is clearly there. When I was in a joint HQ, everyone I knew wanted to see it, and I believe it made an impression. As a commander, I always made safety a personal issue. I made alcohol offenses a matter of public record and was very vocal on motorcycle safety as both a commander and a rider. As a result, I felt the troops knew I was serious. Unfortunately, I have seen little of that kind of leadership involvement in my time in the military, and virtually none from any of our civilian leadership. Until the civilian leadership gets involved and the troops see that their leaders are giving this more than lip service, we will only achieve marginal reductions in accidents at best.
493	We need to design in safety in all our acquisitions and make this a high priority or even a KPP in all our acquisition programs. We could afford to increase funding for research into modeling and simulation that helps us predict how our systems might harm humans in the loop. Human systems integration could benefit from more leadership attention.
494	When the POM goes in it should be the number one priority.
495	Actively promote a culture in which safety is an unconsciously integrated part of all actions and decisions.
496	Besides emphasizing the value of our people, I believe we need to emphasize the value of our equipment. With declining resources, we need to encourage our people to treat our resources as if they are a cherished gift that needs to be preserved for a long time to come. Tech orders can be followed and fliers can fly by the rules but that doesn't always equate to really taking care of the equipment for the long term.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
497	Constant discussion and focus on safety by senior leaders in any organization is critical to creating the right environment. Focus needs to be on culture of an organization.
498	Continue safety emphasis on national level with reminders to never let our guard down.
499	Continued emphasis on operational risk management (ORM) and the fact that safety is in fact about combat capability and preservation of our most precious assets on and off duty.
500	Definition of mission in mission first, safety always.
501	Do not cut flying hour programs.
502	Do not turn a blind eye to the responsibility to resource this effort. Everything costs money and a 50 percent reduction in mishaps over 2 years will cost us. Has that been assessed?
503	During these times of high ops tempo, it is imperative that we care for our people, and do so without burdening them with non-mission essential distractions. It should help them stay focused on the mission as well as safety. We must be careful of what we ask them to do. Unnecessary ancillary activity and program changes during these times are a primary cause of these distractions. I would not consider the Air Force Wingman program a distraction but a very essential part of what we should do. The bottom line is good, effective leadership at the Wing level, leadership that is encouraged at the AF and ANG HQ level.
504	Have it specifically recognized in the annual appraisal cycle.
505	Increase manning to decrease OPSTEMPO. The increased stress of doing more and more with the same or fewer numbers of people to accomplish the work/mission of the global war on terrorism is wearing out our force which inevitably will lead to more and more mistakes and the accidents that accrue from these mistakes.
506	Increase the awareness of off duty related accidents and stress their reduction. Utilize safe driving courses for automobiles and motorcycles. The injury rates in ATV's and other off road accidents are increasing at alarming rates.
507	Increase the level of supervision where the work is taking place to include swing and grave shift as well as weekends.
508	Insure Service men and women get sufficient rest during deployed operations to reduce accidents caused by fatigue.
509	Live it and fund it.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
510	More focus on ORM during daily operations.
511	OPSTEMPO! I think our ever increasing pace at times compromises safety. Training is a driver here along with deployments. Increased numbers of events and shorter currencies, increased deployments with less actual time for training, increased complexity of missions, along with greatly increased ground training requirements. Tempo is not just an aircrew issue but one across the board. Increasing requirements to the point of saturation results in poor performance which leads to accidents, whether they are on the flight line, the back shops or airborne. Not to say we can't stay busy and maintain a low accident rate. Statistics show a very low accident rate during major combat operations, but I suggest that's because the focus is totally on that operation. Not true during normal operations. Training, PME, families, inspections, etc. all are detractors and help individuals to lose focus.
512	Provide a safety related funding stream. At the unit level we prioritize unfunded requirements and include a safety related category. These items almost always get funded with fallout money, depending on the RAC category of the item. However, as the budget process gets tighter, commanders will be forced to spend operational money on safety items, a tough decision with high levels of operational demands.
513	Require every DoD Wing/Brigade to report safety readiness just as we do combat readiness with SORTS (Status of Readiness Training). Metrics should be well defined with little room for subjective measurement.
514	Risk management and safety would be part of every school curricula.
515	Senior leaders in all Services have to make safety a priority and follow through with their actions and resources. In a joint environment one service can not have the necessary impact needed to get everyone onboard.
516	Showcase beneficial safety programs more frequently. More visibility on superior safety programs in use today.
517	Suicide Prevention. Personnel who are demobilized, for the better part, do not have a healthcare professional from whom they might seek assistance. Suicides among Service members in this state are increasing as a result.
518	The active Services must provide required training schools, in all areas, in sufficient numbers to ensure our military members are trained quickly, and not have to wait up to a year to get into a required school. I believe well-trained individuals increase safety for all.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
519	To provide processes and flexibility to identify and implement best practices from all sources. Many times, obstacles prevent use of best practices, unless they are within your specific branch of service. We are a joint Service and there are best practices used by one Service and we cannot use them in other Services because of funding, not viewed as a best practice" by the other Service, or like roadblocks.
520	Better educate mid-level leadership about operational riskmanagement and its implications.
521	Create, or better publicize, a suggestion program, with significant monetary awards, for changes in processes which increase safety.
522	Emphasize operational risk management (ORM) at every level from top to bottom. Teach simple six step approach to all situations at work, at home or at play: 1. Identify the Hazard; 2. Assess the Risk; 3. Consider Risk Control Measures; 4. Make Control Decision; 5. Implement Risk Controls; 6.Supervise and Review.
523	Ensure safety manning at the unit level is consistent with the unit's missions.
524	Fund it, fund it, fund it; advocate it; live it everyday, every mission, every theatre, every Service.
525	I attended the USAF Accident Investigation School at Norton AFB in the spring of 1986. From this training I learned to take safety programs very seriously and to incorporate safety into everything we did in operations and training throughout my organization. I supervised fighter operations at the squadron, group and wing level for over 20 years, including 11 years as a Wing Commander at three locations. During that time my units had almost a zero accident rate including zero class A mishaps. My safety officer was always one of the strongest officers available, and my safety programs were second to none. I have lost track of the number of safety awards my safety personnel, programs, and mishap rates have won, but it is at least 3-8 per year. At an average of about 5 per year would make it over 100! The best action that would improve safety in DoD is formal training for leaders and managers at the earliest point in their careers.
526	Increase experience level of operators in high risk jobs/weapon-systems. Increase training and proficiency for operators in high risk jobs/weapon-systems. Make sure regulations pertaining to operational high risk jobs/weapon-systems make sense and are understood by those bound by them. Stress risk management. Stress crew/team resource management in support and operations.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
527	Make safety a rating/performance factor and incorporate more proactive requirements. Safety can be seen as ancillary to the mission and that is the root. From my unit days, safety was a huge concern at inspection time and on the holidays, Sword of Damocles effect. We have the stick but not much of a carrot - have a mishap and you can be crucified, have a spotless safety record and you get an attaboy that doesn't have a great reward.
528	On the job modernization and recapitalization of the aircraft fleet. It is depressing to think that we are planning to send our forces to wars in the future in aircraft that are older than the current naval fleet. These aircraft are already falling apart in peacetime conditions contributing to accidents. The lack of funding and the very visible OSD staff opposition to modernization also communicate a lack of concern for these issues to the troops in the field. Off the job, we have too many demands on our overstressed force, which leads to fatigue. Excessive deployments contribute to a reckless enthusiasm and risk taking behavior when not deployed among our youngest troops. We need to back away from some of the lesser commitments for our force to ease the burden they are carrying -- because we can't afford to keep adding force structure when budgets are already tight.
529	Provide tangible awards for safety successes.
530	Safety ought to be mentioned by leadership in every speech they make, immediately adjacent to the mandatory core values comments. We need to enforce safety procedures and walk the talk everyday.
531	To emphasize the mindset of safety in the expeditionary environment, such as the operating locations in the CENTCOM AOR. The suggestion is to move a portion of the DoD safety workforce into a "tactical safety" focus -- with specific training, information sharing tools, and authority.
532	Use the extensive system of safety databases for more than merely summarizing what happened last month/quarter/FY. Use the data to do real trend analysis; when a certain type of mishap is most likely to occur, look for correlations; before/after a big deployment/exercise/inspection; experience levels; mission types etc. I think this work should be contracted out to real experts who do analysis for a living..
533	A healthy and fit work force would significantly reduce injuries. Fitness centers are available to military personnel; however, they typically are not adequate to accommodate the civilian work force particularly at depots where the civil service population is relatively large. Recommend funding be made available to construct additional fitness centers where needed to provide on-installation access for the civilian work force.
534	Better cross-Service communication and coordination.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
535	Better cross talk, and better release of safety reports. Twenty-five years ago, safety messages were standard reading in a unit. Today with email and electronic distribution one would think it would be better, but policy constraints actually make it more difficult to get access to safety reports. In our desire to maintain privacy we have definitely kept the reports private.
536	Focus on organizations successfully performing the mission in the most effective way using best practices, not on having a great safety program.
537	Form voluntary (but well supported) motorcycle patrols with competitions for skillful formation driving. These should be led by some of the more senior (and mature) officers who are motorcycle proponents. This will help make a major impact on training the skills to successfully handle these vehicles which are a major problem for safety. The California Highway Patrol holds annual formation driving trials, I believe at Monterey.
538	Get it in their face! Many heard of Sec. Rumsfeld 50 percent reduction a few years back and that was it nothing more other than a few teams would work specifics. So for 95 percent of the populous they are absolutely clueless as to the drive and who or what is being targeted to improve Safety.
539	Include safety compliance as a required element in performance reports.
540	Include workforce safety as an element of the President's Management Agenda.
541	Leadership emphasis on a periodic basis (weekly?) that reminds and recommends safety planning. This should include appointing a safety supervisor for any unusual event in the workplace or at a social event (picnic, softball etc). Always have someone in the environment that thinks ahead and monitors for hazards or hazardous situations.
542	Leadership support.
543	Let us know what the problem is! We have no visibility into safety/mishap events until the straw breaks the camel's back and we move into the over-react mode. We don't know if we're trying to attack ground safety, acquisition safety, flight safety or office, industrial, highway, or deployed environments? Calmly approach the problem, let us know what the problem is, let us learn from (and read about) other's misfortune so we can apply the information to our own environments. Don't think folks want to do stupid things? And mandatory training for 1.6 million folks isn't the answer.
544	Make commanders accountable for safety and its effectiveness within their areas of responsibility.
545	Make personnel availability rates the metric (stop managing the accidents and start managing the mission).

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
546	More aggressive operational risk management (ORM) approach/exercise at all levels of DoD. Not just a field activity, but everyone's responsibility.
547	More investment in training for those involved in activities with moderate to high risk of loss or damage.
548	More publicity and statistics.
549	Periodic discussions at staff meetings, and town hall meetings.
550	Provide adequate funds to accomplish mission. Corners are often cut when funds are tight to ensure mission success (these cut corners may compromise safety).
551	Provide dollars for safety programs. Real change doesn't happen until, and unless, there is an organizational re-alignment that is funded.
552	Raise it in to a higher level of senior leadership attention. Make sure the needed activities are adequately funded.
553	Rate safety in performance assessments and provide incentives (recognitions, cash awards) for those who clearly excel because of measurable actions.
554	Recognize that the severe funding cuts in infrastructure over the last decade have impacted the quality of the work environment. Safety-related incidents are a natural result.
555	Safety programs should be tailored to the organization. A program that is appropriate for the flight line is probably not appropriate for an office environment. Many safety programs are not effective because they are not appropriate for the organization or the personnel. Safety programs that don't treat people as intelligent adults turn people off.
556	Standardize processes and religiously adhere to tech orders and proven safety procedures.
557	Strong leadership emphasis from the top.
558	The safety and cleanliness of the Pentagon is improving with the renovations. However, the unimproved part is populated with rodents and insects. Also, there is considerable overcrowding in the Pentagon as additional contract support personnel are brought in and squeezed into existing workspace.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
559	We must continually emphasize safety to our personnel rather then when there is an actual accident. We are structured to give a safety briefing before 3 day week-ends, however, our people have accidents throughout the year. Make safety part of our workday every day, not a square filler.
560	All leaders, especially with GOs, must personally and genuinely engage with their direct reports in terms of how they are doing, how their families are doing, and yes...safety. It sets the standard for the organization and radiates down. As I got more senior, especially as a GO, very few of my seniors even made gestures about my well-being. There may be a connection with safety in this.
561	Better funding!
562	Bridge the gap for Service members on duty and off-duty. Instill the same focus and accountability for safety off-duty as we do on-duty. Accepting managed risk is an inherent aspect of our business. Find a way to change the mentality of accepting risk off-duty.
563	Build safety into the system: Incentivise weapon systems programs for building personnel safety system into their platforms. Put sunshine on safety but normalize the data for age and risk of activity. Hold commanders accountable.
564	Commanders have to be held accountable. I do feel that some accidents are unavoidable, but the vast majority result from a chain of events that are within our ability to manage. Where commanders do not have an effective safety program, fail to set the personal example, or exercise poor judgment and sacrifice safety for expedience, then I regret to say they must be relieved.
565	Continued focus on physical fitness that contributes to mental and emotional alertness.
566	Continuity across the Services in holding personnel accountable for safety violations.
567	Desegregate safety. Safety is really about protecting resources, people and material, while conducting operations, either combat or otherwise. Our culture segregates it, separates it from the operational flow and assigns people to it who do not understand that the reason to practice safety has an operational rationale. Safety should be integrated in all operational planning and execution as a basic element, not as someone looking at it as an outside QA factor.
568	Educate the force. Hold personnel accountable for knowingly conducting unsafe acts.
569	Ensure that your people have the knowledge, education, and/or tools to do the job safely and then hold people accountable at the lowest level feasible.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
570	Ensuring military police are funded, sourced and assigned to military installations instead of civilian security agencies.
571	Focus must be at the non-commissioned officer's level to reduce the first term safety issues. We must empower non-commissioned officers and give them ownership of the program. When they believe, everyone below them believes.
572	Give the safety programs, and the safety focus, back to the services.
573	Hold leaders at all levels accountable.
574	Hold supervisors accountable for safety mishaps in their units, air and ground.
575	I have been a school trained aviation safety officer at the squadron and aircraft group levels. I have had direct responsibility for five bases conducting aviation operations with 5000 of my own personnel and 15,000 tenant operators in dense airspace in the US southwest. My personnel and the tenants lived and worked in the high tempo ground environment of California interstates, alcohol, fatigue and combat training. Most senior civilians do not understand our environment. This is not my excuse to say we don't have problems. But, we need to better understand the why of the problems. Without understanding the environment that creates safe and unsafe practices, mandating a 50 percent reduction across DoD is an empty gesture. Even in aviation, the disparities are across the services, with significant Sigmas annually although there is a long term trend with major plateaus. Understanding short term trends and how to break through plateaus is part of the problem.
576	I suspect the biggest accident category is probably traffic accidents. Find a way to improve our record in that one area.
577	Implement a top down blue ribbon review of DoD safety programs.
578	Implementation of the non-commissioned officers leadership program. This program places accountability and responsibility down at the non-commissioned officers level in the unit. It fosters leadership, accountability and empowers the small unit leader to help us get the message down to the high risk Marines in the unit. Safety is a by-product of professionalism and doing things the right way. There are two types of Marines: leaders and those who want to be leaders. This program relies on the basics, good leadership skills. This is something every Marine understands.
579	Insist that leadership set the example for good safety practices. Traffic safety is in part learned from observing how others behave especially those in responsible positions. If their leader's behavior says I'm invincible in traffic, then how can we expect that they won't aspire to the same invincibility and drive accordingly? Stand at the front gate and watch traffic exit the base at the end of the day, seatbelts off, cell phones on, drive like you're in a video game!

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
580	Introduce a safety culture in the department, by indoctrinating safety into the lives of our men and women as early as possible.
581	It is important to get the junior non-commissioned officers and officers involved with the safety campaign plan in order to bottom up buy in to the plan.
582	Leadership is the key attribute that must be emphasized in reducing mishaps. At the same time you can't deny that the current high operating tempo increases risk and therefore accidents. To gloss over this fact impugns the credibility of OSD leadership when calling for reduced mishap rates.
583	Look for realistic goals and achievable methods consistent with the mission, and apply appropriate resources. Just putting out percentage goals is almost meaningless.
584	Make more resources available for safety programs, to include awareness and awards, both money and personnel.
585	Make safety a mandatory comment on performance reports.
586	Make safety management/leadership part of a supervisor's or leader's performance report.
587	More invasive actions to ensure younger members (18-22) are supervised and monitored in areas such as off-duty liberty, purchase of motorcycles, sale of alcohol aboard base.
588	Need to operationalize safety. programs tend to be add-ons and get special project status. Like transformation and change management, Safety should be matrixed throughout an organization and not just a Directorate's responsibility.
589	OSD provide sufficient funding for safety initiatives.
590	Properly budget safety programs in both personnel and money.
591	Provide additional manning to supervise safety.
592	Provide adequate funding to hire required professionals (civilian safety experts). Work to remove the stigma related to the assignment of ground safety billets.
593	Raise the age of unlimited driving privileges to 21 nation wide. Some states have restrictions up through 18, others for the first 6-12 months of driving.
594	Responsible alcohol consumption.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
595	Safety accountability all levels: we continue to have mishaps, but fail to remove poor leadership to include the command level. By not doing this, the lower ranks do not get the impression we are serious about changing the safety climate.
596	Safety is directly proportional to O&M dollars and to command resourcing for training and education. GWOT budget flows are heavy in terms of cost of war and manpower. This is understandable. That said, O&M dollars which support TAD/TDY for training are essential to improve safety. These do not compete well when POM debates rack and stack funding priorities. If safety (and mishap redux) is a DoD priority, then service requests for O&M dollars must be better supported.
597	Set realistic, achievable goals and address accountability.
598	Specifically fund safety programs at the unit level.
599	Standardize all state laws in regards to operating motorcycles. Licensing practices, helmet laws, and requirements to take motorcycle safety courses, are all different.
600	The best contribution DoD can make to improving safety is to ensure that adequate resources are available for training and equipping the force.
601	The Marine Corps is trying its best to reduce mishaps and deaths, both on and off duty. More needs to be done in the effort of reducing off duty fatalities and mishaps. Somehow we've got to get our young folks to believe that each Marine or soldier is a weapons system and that we need every weapons system with us in the war on terrorism. Right now our youngsters just think that its their own tough luck if they pile up their car or tear themselves up while home on leave. That is not the case, we need every one of them in the fight! We need to figure out how we make that point and make believers out of them.
602	The only thing which will improve safety is to provide more training prior to deployment. Mistakes will happen and only training will mitigate that. Reducing non-operational safety is a leadership issue and all the campaigns, safety officers, safety fairs, and bill boards will not improve safety due to the age of the force. We just need to keep talking to the force and try to make them understand how important they are and to use their best mature judgment.
603	There is no one thing that will dramatically improve the Service safety record. It will take a dedicated, broad front approach. Three primary aspects of this broad approach will have to be: 1. Empowerment and facilitation of unit commanders; 2. Education of each individual Service member; 3. Recognition for those who achieve and accountability for those who fall short. This will require both time and money to accomplish.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
604	Tighten up on seatbelt usage. If you get caught without a seat belt on a military base you lose your driving privileges for a month. Develop a means to protect the turret gunner in a HUMMWV if the vehicle rolls over. The gunner needs to be pulled into the vehicle to prevent from being ejected and crushed.
605	Understand that this is not a business and that business ways may not be the solution. We need to take the best from business, modify as necessary, and apply to our safety challenges. We need to recognize all the unique aspects of what we do.
606	Understanding all the legal issues involved in this suggestion, give the commander the authority to restrict who drives on and off base, much like we do in overseas locations.
607	We have been working hard to solve this problem within the Marine Corps. The issue appears to be one more of the lack of accountability and the absence of a 24/7 mindset among our personnel. The aforesaid is easier to talk about than to accomplish; however, I think we're at a critical juncture in the Corps, where an opportunity has presented itself. Due to the intensity of combat operations, the Corps is presently experiencing the strongest degree of combat cohesion that it has seen in decades. Combat focus, moreover, does not rest solely within the infantry and other combat arms fields; the entire Corps is engaged. Exploiting the aforesaid, the Corps will embrace active mentoring, initiated in the entry-level pipeline and carried throughout the entire Marine Corps. We will attack from bottom-up and top-down; we will orient on specific goals and lay out definitively success and/or failure in issues of accountability. The mentoring process will transcend safety and cover goals of personal and professional [conduct].
608	We need to find positive ways of rewarding good performance. Marines like most Service members react positively when presented a challenge or goal. By finding numerous and imaginative rewards for safe exercises, training and liberty, we can get buy-in at the junior levels. Safety performance or lack thereof is not a result of uninspired or disinterested senior leadership. On the contrary, by bringing in more peer pressure to meet the standard or achieve a mission with tangible rewards is one action, among many, that will help foster a comprehensive command climate with respect to safety. Things like time-off, unit awards/recognitions, special events are just a few of the many ideas that exist. We need to make our service members want to succeed where safety is concerned, beyond its obvious readiness implications.
609	We need to fully fund and resource our safety offices and programs.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
610	We should do a much better job in linking safety to operational readiness. We can do so by not treating safety as a stand alone issue, but rather as an integral part of the life cycle of all units. Reporting unit readiness must include safety statistics, and commanders should know that their own evaluations as leaders will, in no small part, be inclusive of their unit's safety record and this record should be composed of both on and off duty statistics. Too many commanders consider that off duty, or after hour, mishaps are not their responsibility, this is wrong. All commanders are responsible for all that their units do or fail to do; safety is a core value!
611	Hold leadership responsible and accountable for serious mishaps.
612	Make execution of safety plan a gradable item on fitness reports/evaluations.
613	Make safe behavior as a positive consideration in the calculation of promotion scores for E-4 and below, and mandatory in fitness reporting for E-5 through Flag officer.
614	Provide resources and operational control for hiring full time safety experts down to the Battalion level without impacting service budgets.
615	Work with and educate families, spouses, and local law enforcement on a continual basis in helping to reduce traffic accidents involving military personnel.
616	A well developed campaign/communications plan with visible rewards for those who achieve high levels of safety.
617	Annually, senior civilians must take an on-line ethics training course that takes about 30-45 minutes to complete. There are also mandatory on-line security training courses that all personnel must take. It would be beneficial if all personnel would be required to take an annual safety refresher training course on-line. In this course, I would recommend that some real life incidents relative to our daily work activities be incorporated to make us more aware of what could happen in our daily environments. For instance, working here in the Pentagon, I am sure there are numerous safety incidents throughout the building. Some of these should be summarized so we in the Pentagon can be made aware of the types of accidents that occur. This should make all personnel, supervisors and subordinates more conscious of safety measures that can be taken. At this level/locale, statistics on aviation accidents or mishaps at depot maintenance facilities mean little to our daily activities.
618	Leadership and accountability are the key to good safety. You can not always take the position that accidents will happen. When you put fire on friendlies or crash an airplane, consider holding the correct person responsible. Reflect their leadership and safety record in fitness reports and or assign Article 15 or an appropriate court-martial. Safety will improve quickly. This is based on nearly fifty years as a Marine, enlisted, commissioned Flag officer and now returned as an SES.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
619	Leadership at all levels walking the walk not just talking the talk, but leading by example, is the best way to influence the behavior of our young Marines. With regard to the civilian workforce, much of which is associated with our depot maintenance organizations, a carrot/stick approach with a definite requirement that supervisors rate their employees with regard to safety, and that supervisors up the chain be likewise held accountable for workplace safety within their area of responsibility..
620	Slow down the pace of transformation and increase the organizational constancy of purpose so people are more able to focus on mission performance. There are too many good ideas and new visions coming from too many organizations and at too fast a pace. The folks trying to implement all the transformation visions are the very same folks trying to get the normal mission done safely. This is not to say we shouldn't have transforming vision. Rather, it says we need to learn to control change without compromising our ability to train and execute our mission safely. Change should be governed so that only a few things that can be done well are initiated simultaneously, while permitting our limited personnel to safely accomplish their normal day to day missions. New ideas seem to be generated in functional stovepipes without reference to each other, but execution results in convergence of different change initiatives in the same shops and operating units. Change leaders too often are shooting in the dark.
621	Adequately resource troop support and force protection at an appropriate level with weapons systems acquisition. Renewed focus during OIF/OEF/GWOT is enabling this emphasis to occur, and it needs to be sustained once hostilities reduce as well.
622	All senior occupants (E-5 through O-10) of ground and air vehicles should be provided a one day refresher course for the type of vehicle(s) for which they will be the senior occupant. For an E-5, it may include a HUMMWV and 5-ton truck. For an O-3, it may include a HUMMWV, BFV, and M1A1 Tank. For an O-5, it may include a HUMMWV, BFV, and UH-60. For an O-10, it may include a government sedan, HUMMWV, UH-60 and C-21. Successful completion of this annual course would be entered in unit training files and subject to IG audit. There would be no exceptions authorized, even to those working in major commands and the Pentagon.
623	Awareness.
624	Better training for civilians.
625	Communicate safety top down with a focus on personal accountability for safety starting with the individual, but coalescing upward to supervision, management, and leadership.
626	Communication.
627	Consolidation of safety centers.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
628	Continue DoD efforts to train personnel and put in place programs that evaluate organization safety program.
629	Continue installing tracking devices on ground vehicles, coupled with sensors for speed, and load, linked to the dispatch or command center.
630	Continue to push operational risk management awareness and encourage people to think before they act.
631	Continued top leadership emphasis.
632	Continuous awareness of the importance of safety, including slogans, posters, and such.
633	Control OPSTEMPO across the Services and their Guard and Reserve Components.
634	Culture change to mainstream safety in the line manager function, as part of that function, instead of being considered the responsibility of the safety dept. Safety is line management responsibility, with the safety dept in a supporting role.
635	DoD focus on cyclical safety issues. Time of the year and typical weather should drive some of the safety training; summer, water safety and working outside.
636	Driver's education.
637	Each organization should have a safety officer who sustains a safety message and actively pursues education and awareness activities.
638	Education.
639	Emulate former Secretary of the Treasury O'Neill's actions when he was in industry in terms of the goals he set for improving safety for the workforce.
640	Encourage acupuncture.
641	Ensure individuals are not fatigued when performing critical tasks.
642	Ensure that Pentagon floor waxing and wet cleaning occur after midnight and that warning signs are always posted.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
643	Especially after 9/11, employee safety (other than terrorist attack precautions) and working environment has certainly taken a back seat in both priority and budget allocation to the terrorist threat, real and perceived. The level of safety concern also appears to me to be inconsistent across organizations and facilities, government owned and commercially rented and occupied. Even in determination of suitable properties for occupancy there seems to be more interest in size standards, need for security and cost versus safety. I would suggest that there were a consistent, well understood and universally communicated safety policy and standard, for which the supervisors were held partially responsible for enforcing.
644	Establish a proactive program that demonstrates safety practices during exercises. For example, in my organization we don't experience many safety issues other than falls. However, in mass evacuation or similar emergency situations we would be at more risk for safety mishaps. I believe it would be beneficial to practice safety measures during contingency exercises.
645	Establishing a list of agreed-upon causes of accidents and requiring a determination of cause for each accident/mishap will allow the organization to focus safety efforts and education to eliminate the acceptance of conditions that allow a cause to be present. If driving under the influence of alcohol is a cause, then an emphasis on programs which do not allow an individual who has been drinking to then drive will be successful.
646	Focus on the number one safety issue, auto accidents. By reducing the need to drive, safety will be enhanced. For our agency, this will take place when we consolidate in our new building, eliminating the need to drive back and forth for meetings. Flexible work schedules and telecommuting are also key elements to improve safety.
647	Have much better control over vehicles that run in the Pentagon. The operators are generally not careful and drive where they are prohibited.
648	Have people see a tape of horrendous accidents.
649	I agree that a best practices exchange program between organizations for safety ideas and procedures is a good idea to pursue.
650	I am concerned about the plethora of agencies in both the county, DoD and State levels that get involved in any type of incident, specifically the anthrax scare that happened in March 2005 in the Falls Church, VA area. I am not sure that adequate pre-coordination is done in advance of events or that adequate training is done.
651	I would install seatbelts on all DoD buses. I would check cars entering the Pentagon parking lot to see if seat belts are being used. Pass out warning first then tickets.
652	Improve the environmental conditions within the Pentagon Reservation.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
653	Integrate safety, occupational heath, and injury compensation under a single head.
654	Integration of safety should be accomplished with at least an Assistant Secretary of Defense of this mission and that is the sole mission. It should be removed from all other Under Secretary of Defense and Assistant Secretary of Defense programs and given to one Assistant Secretary of Defense. They should be empowered to leverage safety requirements globally with DoD, establish policy, be a MFP for safety and be part of the DepSecDef daily/weekly meetings.
655	It is difficult to isolate one thing. Here are several which I believe would improve overall safety within DoD: Increase awareness levels of safety related data, initiatives, and programs; More closely align the achievement of specific safety improvements with performance plans/appraisals/incentives; Better stratify, analyze and communicate safety data so that all employees could get a better picture of the safety related challenges and opportunities in their specific work areas; Establish a more visible mechanism for sharing successes and lessons learned throughout the Department.
656	Keep the focus on it.
657	Lobby to improve mass transit in Washington DC area. Better/more train/metro advantages to attract passengers. Need to get folks off the streets. Imagine the year 2020 and what it will be like!
658	Make it a higher priority for management.
659	Make safety a routine part of any operation and not just a committee to review what happened.
660	Make supervisors accountable for safety training, as appropriate to their organizations, in their evaluations and bonuses.
661	Make sure everyone knows the true cost of being unsafe: Lost workdays, equipment replacement costs, lost personnel (priceless).
662	Make sure that all staff are aware of what to do if an evacuation is ever necessary.
663	Mandate safety goals and metrics.
664	Marketing; develop a plan based on the mishap history, and tackle the top five causes with a campaign. We seem to be able to do very well on charitable contributions, why not safety? It is typical to do this in industry, so if you want it to happen sell it from the top. Don't rely solely on management word of mouth or initiatives, we have plenty of them. Make safety stand out with some heavy duty marketing, perhaps set standards, and track progress openly.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
665	Modify rules/regulations/laws to affect more personal liability for on the job injuries where individual judgment (or lack thereof) is a significant contributing factor. In other words, inject an element of personal accountability.
666	More frequent (and unannounced) safety inspections.
667	Nothing; I am not aware that we have a problem with safety in DoD.
668	Place, in DoD organization's public areas, easels with safety facts (use few words) that would be meaningful to the organization's personnel. Do it every once in a while, but not on a regular basis, so people will look at it and take in the message.
669	Provide concise safety training and reminders to all personnel.
670	Provision of ergonomic chairs. Provision of adequate sized work cubicles. A rule no cell phone use while driving or at least no non-hands cell phone free use while driving.
671	Raise visibility.
672	Safety is more achievable when a common sense approach is taken. Too many incidents happen because the rules become too stringent which preclude one from taking appropriate actions. Safety is everyone's responsibility and when it becomes dictated and strict procedures are instituted, one loses perspective of what is appropriate immediate action and what is not. There is a limit to safety requirements which go beyond the bounds of reasonable and therefore actually create unsafe conditions.
673	Safety must be a sixth sense and inculcated into individuals and organizations. Have organizations report out using balance scorecard.
674	Safety tips and reminder newsletter distributed by e-mail on a regular basis.
675	Safety training as part of getting military driver's license.
676	Set aside part of one workday each year to have a safety event. This may include training, review of office procedures for handling emergencies, general safety activities (cleaning up office areas, removing hazardous items that block hallways.).
677	Shorter work days.
678	Stop using such young enlisted and officers. They tend to do unsafe things. For that reason, the statement about emulating best practices of other organizations may not perfectly translate to safety in DoD. If there was a some yes/some no answer, I would have chosen it.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
679	Take actions to reduce POV accidents/deaths. For example, require all military motorcycle riders to wear helmets regardless of the state law. If military members are found not wearing seat belts take some type of punitive action. Do something about long hours and then driving home.
680	The Defense Commissary Agency has had much success implementing something referred to as the buddy system. The program encourages active involvement in improving the safety of the work unit by all team members. Key agency safety metrics have improved significantly over the past three years, as team members have become more aware and involved in their safety as well as the safety of others. The agency also conducts a safety awareness month in January each year for commissary operations worldwide which serves to increase focus on safety for our team members, industry partners, and our customers. Our agency has also developed a joint program in conjunction with OWCP to provide commissaries training to not only improve safety, but also reduce workers' compensation cost. In FY04, the agency reduced workers' compensation cost by $758K as a direct result of the programs discussed in my comments.
681	There is a need for a DoD standard for motorcycle safety. This would be especially useful in joint commands.
682	Try to make all personnel more aware that they can make a difference in accident prevention.
683	Visibly reward individuals for individual attempts to improve environments and safe practices.
684	We have too few people to do the missions so they are working too many hours on not enough sleep without proper rest and proper relief! Having three or four men in a Bradley in an urban environment is crazy. They cannot even protect the vehicle let alone dismount and chase a terrorist. What was fine for manning a Bradley in the cold war isn't ok in this war. After 6 months in a combat zone you are a safety risk because you are tired. Even WWII stats proved this. Even the people in garrison are stretched too thin. The most important way to achieve better safety is to have adequate manpower and PERSTEMPO for the mission!!! Even the maintenance folks are tired out!
685	Adequately resource safety requirements; salt and sand icy surfaces in the winter.
686	Clean out the air vents in the Pentagon. They're always dirty and continue to push out black soot. We called maintenance, months ago, to clean out the vents and no one has yet to come.
687	Emphasize that safety is a leadership and readiness issue. Emphasize that discipline is key to realistic training with safety inherent in all that we do.
688	Recognize that you cannot change the safety culture of an organization overnight. It takes years.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
689	1. Incentivise organizations with time off for accident/incident free time periods. For example, a training holiday for the unit that is accident/incident free for a month/quarter/six month period. 2. Recognized organizations at the unit level for accident/incident free training cycles.
690	Accident investigations point out the factors in the mishap and make recommendations for fixes. Often these fixes are fleet wide or weapon system wide. The funding available to make these fixes has to compete with budgeted requirements. Suggest a fenced pot of funding to address these enterprise fixes.
691	Add a safety comment to all efficiency reports.
692	As with anything preventable (diseases and non-battle injuries), there needs to be resources invested toward safety initiatives. Even though it is difficult to prove what we prevent, we need to put money where our mouths are.
693	Better lighting on roads.
694	Command accountability.
695	Create a process that holds both supervisors and the individual responsible for accidents. For instance if we see that many accidents have occurred but only a small number of specific areas were involved, check supervisor role. However if preventable, or a history of carelessness, some accountability to the individual. For instance, my organization did a best practice visit to a commercial company. For certain types of accidents, people were sent home; for others they were dismissed. Reason: These individuals were costing the company money and putting personnel at risk.
696	Declare alcohol an illegal substance and prohibit DoD employees from consuming it.
697	Dedicate funding at unit and installation level to support safety training and programs.
698	Dedicated money for safety training!
699	Empower the junior leaders of the Army to stop the training event if they observe something that is not safe. This pushes safety responsibility down to the lowest level. And when a junior leader or private first class stops the action, then the senior leaders need to honor that, develop mitigating actions and then resume the training. Safety is not top down driven, it is every soldier's responsibility.
700	Ensure that leaders lead from 1600 hours until stand-to/PT/0600. This is the period when most bad things happen; when soldiers need their leaders the most.
701	Focus on the important safety issues and don't try to cover everything.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
702	From my perspective one of the biggest issues is the OPTEMPO. We are stretching our soldiers in terms of endurance and capabilities. This leads directly to a lack of attention to safety on the job as well as off duty, traffic accidents caused by fatigue or speed. The more we can do to reduce the OPTEMPO, the more we will accomplish in improving safety.
703	Here are three: 1. Ensure adequate manning for the mission. It seems like we regularly experience unfunded mandates with regards to additional mission requirements. The result is less supervisory attention where it is needed; 2. Focus on the first level of supervision--E4/5s. They can make a real difference 3. Remove higher headquarters manning caps that limit effectiveness of planning and resourcing efforts.
704	Implement a policy that if a soldier dies due to irresponsible behavior, such as drinking and driving, no benefits will accrue to the beneficiaries.
705	Increase funding for safety programs at installation level to support training and meaningful demonstrations for troop units.
706	Linking safety related incidents to both pay and performance.
707	Manpower and time constraints exacerbate the mishap problem. If you have too few people doing the work, you increase mishap rates because they start taking shortcuts to get the work done. If they are working long hours consistently and are tired, the error/mistake rate increases. Additionally, in today's environment, we pile on more and more taskings and we burden everyone with ever-increasing administration requirements to the point that it impacts both workers' and supervisors' focus. One solution, control workload and prioritize, not everything needs to be done now. Eliminate administrative duties and reassign to admin personnel (which we have too few of).
708	More emphasis on driving safety.
709	More focus on lost time accidents and prevention. We track the catastrophic accidents and talk about them extensively (loss of life, limb, aircraft) but don't pay the same level of attention to slips/trips/falls/etc. that have a big impact on the workforce.
710	Mr. Rumsfeld and the Service Secretaries must work together to review analysis of trends data and promote best practices which have applicability across the DoD. A stretch goal of 50 percent reduction can only be achieved if every leader is engaged. It cannot be achieved by decree.
711	My command is experiencing success in identifying soldiers at risk. I recommend adapting a toolbox that enables junior leaders to identify their soldiers at risk and what tools they have at their disposal to intervene.

COMMENT NO.	IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST ONE ACTION THAT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY IN DOD, WHAT WOULD IT BE?
712	Need to be focused on the culture/mindset of the people.
713	Require semi-annual sessions (at least) to occur between leaders and subordinates. Develop a common approach such as films/information that shows accidents, what happens, why it happened, how to prevent, and maybe pictures of a funeral/grieving spouse/loved one! I've learned after many years in aviation that visual kinds of things coupled with leadership involvement can have a tremendous impact.
714	Seems that mishaps occur mostly in training and pre-deployment workups, rare to see mishaps in combat or at least the rates are low. We need to examine the demands on our commands relative to experience/resources in the training cycle.
715	Stop thinking about safety as a separate issue. Safety is the product of effective, well led, and expertly executed efforts.
716	Take a tougher stance: no seatbelt, not wearing the proper safety equipment, over the legal limit for alcohol: not in line of duty, no benefits to survivors.
717	The military needs to take safety seriously, but at times we, as an institution, take responsibility rather than making the individual responsible for their decisions/actions. In our quest to reduce accidents and save people from injuries/death, we have to ensure that we don't become so risk adverse that we lose our mission effectiveness. We also need to recognize that at times (stuff) happens despite our best efforts. While I applaud unraveling the chain of events to determine how it happened, we need to again ensure that we don't develop a zero defect/mistake mentality that cripples innovation.
718	Wide dissemination of safety pubs (magazines). In my younger career, the real life stories in those publications made quite an impression on me.

Appendix J – Respondent Comments - General

U.S. DoD Survey Results - Senior Leader Survey

In the second of two open-ended written comment questions, respondents were asked, "Please provide any other general comments you may have."

We deleted the names, units and locations to preserve respondent anonymity, and edited out inappropriate language, but otherwise the comments are verbatim.

COMMENT NO.	PLEASE PROVIDE ANY OTHER GENERAL COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE:
1	50 percent reduction of mishaps is so daunting a challenge as to be almost useless as an incentive at our level. We might want to look at a goal that is tied to improvement over time that gets us to something like the 50 percent level eventually, but is more focused on the benefit of sustaining steady improvement as opposed to attaining some absolute reduction.
2	A fine line between doing great risk management to increase force protection and reduce accidents, versus creating an environment where leaders stop conducting realistic, demanding training because they are afraid to fail to make their accident numbers. Prudent risk taking involves some risk, and we should be cautious we don't get into a zero defects mentality. Finally, our safety specialists, based on some of the critiques I've seen lately ought to deploy and ride a few patrols and fly a few missions where you get shot at, attacked by a improvised explosive device to induce a better understanding of the conditions our soldiers are coping with. They would be better if they had a more clear understanding of the combat challenges out there.
3	Accidents are going to happen no matter how intensive a program is planned or executed. The challenge to the leadership is constant awareness and personal involvement, as well as innovative ways to mitigate adverse conditions.
4	All of our leaders are committed to reducing accidental deaths/injuries. That is known and everyone respects it. But why is it so difficult to get automated safety boards? There needs to be specific funding for these types of assets; instead we are fighting to get monies for safety assets such as these. The key is the interaction at the sergeant level, and their peers. They know that awareness is key. Fund the items unit commanders are requesting like safety boards that are automated.

COMMENT NO.	PLEASE PROVIDE ANY OTHER GENERAL COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE:
5	In our efforts to improve, we cannot lose sight of the tremendous strides the Army has made regarding safety. In my 26 years, virtually every aspect of safety performance has significantly improved. A death or serious accident during training used to be commonplace, now a real rarity. That said, not sure how much lower we can go without degrading the training value of what we are doing. Military operations are inherently dangerous and soldiers need to be fully tested during training. Training must be tough, realistic, and, yes, dangerous, to ensure lives are not lost during combat operations. Also, we cannot mirror civilian workplace performance, nor should we. I saw a report on TV the other night in which students in public schools in some places were no longer permitted to jump rope due to concerns of safety. A commentator complained of the wussification of America; our nation cannot afford a wussified military. Thanks.
6	I appreciate the survey. In itself, the survey demonstrates leadership commitment. POVs are still the big killer from what I read. Many installations practice the buddy team. Many accidents seem to happen at 0200 and later. Keep preaching.
7	As the commander of a training center (and as a 3 time combat veteran), safety in training and in combat is critical. I believe the Army has the systems in place to train the right things to prepare our soldiers and ensure their safety.
8	As you suggest in your questions, safety is truly a command responsibility; it starts with the first-line leader and must be reinforced all the way up the chain of command. I would submit that we may not be involved enough from the bottom-up with safety based on the accident reports I see; too many of these accidents would appear to be preventable with some direct involvement and enforcement of standards. We know how to do this; we need to keep the chain of command fully involved. It will make a difference.
9	Being in a staff assignment, I am not sure the questions posed above are pertinent. I can say, however, that the office of the Director of the Army Staff is aggressive in getting the word out to the whole staff on issues of safety, especially summaries of casualty reports, mainly related to vehicle operation.
10	I believe there is a strong push within DoD to fix this significant challenge that we collectively face.
11	Concur that safety must be in your face. The Army is very busy and soldiers are being complacent and not listening to the leadership. We must stress personal responsibility to safety at all times.
12	Effective safety and force protection programs are essential in today's global war on terrorism environment. Every organization should implement the best possible integrated safety/force protection program they can and enforce compliance at the very lowest levels of the organization to ensure the workforce's safety and well being. It must start at the top!
13	Fire most of the people running safety organizations. They don't get it.

COMMENT NO.	PLEASE PROVIDE ANY OTHER GENERAL COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE:
14	For personal safety, we are sending the wrong message when the alcohol displays are the first thing that is encountered in the AAFES shoppettes and you have to hunt for the nonalcoholic beverages.
15	Good survey.
16	Great progress is being made at lower levels with new initiatives. Joint dialogue is the best it has ever been. The process for policy, oversight and resources is dated is not effective. I&E process across all Services needs to be viewed for value added. Defense Safety Oversight Council funding needs to get thru the process and in the hands of users. JSSC needs a more direct role in tying together DoD vision and output in terms of initiatives.
17	I am encouraged by seeing much more recent emphasis on safety issues. Continue to focus on problem areas rather than making policies that are generalized.
18	I believe good units have good safety awareness, low incident rates and high mission performance. The common factor is good, trusted leadership. I do not believe there is a magic rule or regulation that will guarantee good safety. This is a leadership and individual growth issue.
19	I noted that I did not think reducing accidents by 50 percent in the next 2 years is achievable. The Army's OPSTEMPO is so incredibly high and the specter of it increasing looms large. All senior Army leaders receive notification of every fatality within the Service, and from my perspective, many of the accidents are extended workday/workweek related. I believe the great efforts we're working to reduce the accident rate may well allow us to keep it level, but not reduce it.
20	I think that the number of young men and women that are lost to the Services and to their families due to POV and Motorcycle accidents is absolutely too high. I also think that operating HMMWVs has become a special mission over and above a standard AMV license. HMMWVs have become mini-armored vehicles with different center of balance; handling; and speed considerations when operating. I think the services should establish a separate cross country and urban certification for HMWWV operators prior to licensing.
21	It is unfortunate but people die due to unsafe acts. Carelessness is part of it but in my mind more often than not, accidents occur because our people are trying to do too much and are not ready or fit to drive.
22	Make risk management a required subject at all levels of PME both EM and Officers. Not just a class a real subject. Hold people accountable. Some Services try to pass the responsibility for an accident up the chain as high as they can to diffuse the accountability. In reality hold the individual that failed to operate by an established standard accountable.
23	Mandatory vehicle safety inspections, especially in states without an official inspection program. Identification of mode of transportation to be used on leave, allowing a safety inspection and safety brief if a POV is to be used.

COMMENT NO.	PLEASE PROVIDE ANY OTHER GENERAL COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE:
24	Members of units know who is at risk. They know which members of the organization take risks or are unsafe. An informal means of reporting or identification may help ID those in need of attention.
25	Most accidents require completion of a complex causal chain of events. These circumstances normally come together within organizations under great stress. Organizationally, our leadership can do a better job at providing adequate resources to ensure units are not forced to operate beyond safe limits unless absolutely necessary. Risk assessment can, and does, make a big difference. However, we are stacking the deck against certain high risk units operating with high PERSTEMPO, combined with personnel and equipment shortages. We clearly understand and recognize these dangers in the aviation world, we now need to make the leap to ground units.
26	Neutral ratings above reflect lack of information available to me to provide an informed answer. I didn't know enough to render an answer either way.
27	On the family side, there is much more to do. Part of problem is encouraging families to participate; part of problem is we are not well resourced to advocate and teach safety in the home to the extent I think necessary. We are tracking soldier safety but not family safety.
28	Overall this is a positive trend. The fact that the leadership is concerned is demonstrated by the execution of this survey.
29	Persistence is essential. We have seen significant improvements in safety but traffic violations continue to be the greatest single source of safety risk. While most infractions are not significant as they are presented (minor moving and non-moving), in total number they suggest a lack of awareness by our young troops. Our most successful measures have been presentations/testimony to formations by troops who violated safety and traffic regulations and were seriously injured. There is a definite drop in violations for weeks afterwards and then rates creep up again. Journey not a destination since new troops are joining us each day.
30	Q4. We have aviation/ground general officers that have an atrocious record of safety during their commands, but they are perceived as aggressive, highly motivated, and tactically sound officers. Their record of safety never enters into the equation. Yet, many with impressive records of safety commensurate with tactical accomplishments have been overlooked. Q6. Despite pleas for voice/data recorders in Army aircraft for over 6 years, we still have mishaps that can't get solved. Recent CH-47 mishap in Afghanistan is great case in point...no VADR. Thus, it will end up as pilot error due to bad weather. Possible that we'll never know if mechanical error contributed. Similar situation on groundside. I have lost many soldiers due to drowning in canals in Iraq, but no indication of changing any equipment. Improvements in safety are usually not made until catastrophic mishaps occur, and frequently it takes several to gain attention and funding. Q7. It can be achieved...stop flying and driving.

COMMENT NO.	PLEASE PROVIDE ANY OTHER GENERAL COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE:
31	In regard to the 50 percent reduction, while I certainly think we can, must, and will reduce safety accidents, I doubt that 50 percent is achievable. Unreasonable goals turn people off. This is about leadership not dollars and rules. We hire a young, aggressive, risk accepting population. Leader intervention in maturing our young population is where the focus should be focused along the lines described above. An action I have found to be useful is daily discussion of the past 24-hours, what we did and why it worked successfully, what we did well and then, how do we apply that to the next 24-hours.
32	Safe operations in everything we do in DoD is not only a function of well-trained and well-led Service members and civilians, it is also in large part a function of our cultural and social backgrounds as Americans. In addition, I have found in 37 years of military service that young men (almost universally) between the ages of about 18 and 24 simply have no real, visceral understanding of the hazards, the dangers or the potential consequences that are likely to flow from some simple act like not wearing a seat belt or driving too fast for conditions. Moreover, these young men are frequently encouraged in what amounts to reckless conduct by their peers, who are in very subtle ways in some sort of competition with their peers to demonstrate their masculinity and exactly how bulletproof they are. Attacking this biological proclivity among young men may be possible with a persistent and thoughtful information campaign that leverages the power of social pressure and peer pressure to behave in acceptable ways.
33	Safety awards program needs greater publicity and must be a commitment from the top to the bottom of the leadership chain. We need to emphasize the positive. All leaders must demonstrate a commitment to recognize individuals who are taking actions to change unsafe behavior and reduce risk in training and combat environments.
34	Safety has to be mission one.
35	Safety has to be taught as combat safety from day one of entry to the Service. A major part of our problem over my 29 year career has been a peacetime safety orientation which has inadvertently sent the message that in combat, we discard these procedures. That has been reinforced by some degree of zero risk taking approach to safety in peacetime rather than an acceptance of prudent risks. Our Army warrior ethos states upfront the mission comes first so arguing at DoD level for some misguided safety first approach for a military organization built for fighting wars automatically undercuts the message with both the leadership and rank and file who are warriors. Safety is not first, so if you argue that to military folks, you have zero credibility, which shows up in disregard for a zero-risk based safety first approach which is commonly the perception.
36	Safety in my current organization, Multi-National Forces-Iraq, is synonymous with force protection. This is the basis upon which my responses above are based--protection of the force in a volatile combat zone.

COMMENT NO.	PLEASE PROVIDE ANY OTHER GENERAL COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE:
37	Safety is the responsibility of both the leader and the individual. Both must accept that fact for prevention programs to work. We must dedicate resources and energy to insuring that junior leaders know how to mitigate risk, identify those subordinates who are high risk, and take action when they see high risk activities being planned and/or executed. As that effort increases, I believe we will see a corresponding decrease in our injury and losses of personnel.
38	Safety is very important and DoD senior leaders can never do enough to ensure it.
39	Safety, discipline, and leadership linked. We must ensure every Service member understands this principle!!
40	Senior leadership is committed but I don't think leadership at lower levels particularly at the non-commissioned officer level give safety enough consideration. I think part of this is due to lack of oversight and recognizing what conditions produce unsafe acts. Also, I don't think youthful Service personnel consider safety enough because of their mindset that they are invincible, which is what our culture engenders.
41	Survey problem: Question 12 - if accidents and mishaps include soldiers being injured while driving POVs (at a rate equal to the national population) or being injured playing sports, or being wounded or killed in action then the answer cannot be anything other than agree and yet I suspect the answer you'd like to see is disagree based on a cultural belief that all accidents or mishaps are preventable.
42	Thank you for looking into this important issue.
43	The Army's Combat Readiness Center is doing a great job making information and resources available to Army leaders to improve safety.
44	The chain of command is concerned about safety, but when all is said and done, the mission comes first, as it must.
45	The focus on decreasing accidents is important and the message is getting through. Over time, we will see a decrease in deaths. Stay the course. However, setting goals like 50 percent reduction will not produce results as it might in business. During this war, with the stress on leadership and with the increase in OPTEMPO, setting goals like this will not, in themselves, result in significantly on deaths or rates. The goals will simply result in frustration by the senior leaders because we didn't make it. Set reasonable annual goals for reduction. Say 10 percent a year for 5 years. Be reasonable and you will see results. 50 percent in one whack will not work I don't think, as it is a bridge too far for most leaders. Thanks.
46	The inevitability of accidents and our efforts to decrease them by 50 percent over 2 years are not mutually exclusive. Safety requires resources, education, and leadership. It is a constant process and there are no off days, times, or events.

COMMENT NO.	PLEASE PROVIDE ANY OTHER GENERAL COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE:
47	The safety program is not coordinated across the Services. Standards are not the same across the Services and there is no one of authority on the Joint Staff or OSD to coordinate the program.
48	The USA Corps of Engineers has a very good safety program and manual that has been used as a model by both US and foreign contractors. However, USA Corps of Engineers tries to continually learn and improve. This FY (FY05) it has implemented a new Safety Management Action Plan (SMAP) across the organization to try and improve safety performance even more - both for employees and for contractors.
49	There is sufficient leadership focus on safety at all levels, it permeates all we do. The nature of our operations and training results in some unpreventable accidents, but that is not where we lose most soldiers. It is in preventable motor vehicle related accidents. While we expend significant man-hours and resources to combat immature acts (speeding, drinking and driving, not wearing seat belts), most deterrent actions are only partially successful.
50	This was a badly designed survey, not sure your questions were meaningful. Waste of my time.
51	US Army Europe has worked this better than any command I have ever served with.
52	Want to clarify answer to question 12. Accidents, particularly vehicular, will occur in war based on the tremendous number of miles being driven, translating into accident exposure. They must be minimized to the maximum extent possible through rigorous risk assessments and the inculcation of safety in every facet of our operations. Risk, however, while being assessed and evaluated in the planning phase of a mission, does not imply failure to accomplish the mission. Rather it implies mitigation to the maximum. We don't have to accept accidents, but we do have to be realists and understand that, while unacceptable, they will occur. Bigger question is did we learn something from the accident so we don't have a continuation? Lessons learned.
53	We are a military at war, and there is a relationship between the combat environment and the mindset our troops have when they return from Theater. Forces Command has done an excellent job in their 1st quarter safety report of capturing some of these high risk characteristics. It is this kind of insight that is helpful to commanders as we design risk reduction measures and procedures.
54	We can and must do a lot better at eliminating accidents and mishaps among a population of soldiers who often feel themselves invulnerable.
55	We do not resource military and POV drivers training nor sufficient OPTEMPO mileage to gain experience in driving military vehicles. We should look at creating driving courses that expose operators to the environments that they will see during operations. This realistic training will expose them to the safety hazards that could be encountered as well as cause them to plan for contingencies in the future.

COMMENT NO.	PLEASE PROVIDE ANY OTHER GENERAL COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE:
56	We must always underwrite the honest mistake. Too often, we hammer young leaders for safety mistakes. Combat is inherently not safe, and we must learn how to deal with risk. That will include some errors, and even loss of life.
57	We're slowly getting better, and we can't afford to be slow.
58	While I say that we must accept that accidents will occur...which is true, as we are inherently a dangerous profession that is not meant to say we shouldn't try. Most procedures, executed to standard, will be safe even though inherently dangerous. And we must continue to emphasize the precise, disciplined execution to standard of our tasks, and reinforce good off duty behavior by our young soldiers.
59	While we must accept that accidents sometime happen in our business, we should never stop working to educate people about safety and resource safety programs, and surveys,. to constantly remove safety problems that can lead to accidents.
60	Appreciate the survey. Look forward to receiving the results along with any recommendations to the States.
61	Continue on with training to prevent POV and motorcycle accidents as well as DUIs.
62	Continue to emphasize safety across the board!!
63	Except for unforeseen equipment failures, most other accidents are preventable. It takes deliberate measures by leaders and soldiers to prevent mishaps.
64	I am totally impressed with the initiatives of the Combat Readiness Center. I literally read and distribute all communications to my subordinate commanders. Unfortunately, our Services mirror our population and it will be difficult to reduce accidents/deaths to zero. But that does not mean that we collectively should not try.
65	I believe that we can continue to increase our efforts to emphasize safety and to decrease accidents. However, I answered question #12 as I did because I believe there is simply some inherent risk in what we do as an organization and to implement a zero defects strategy does more harm than good as it affects Service members mind-set about safety.
66	Leader training on risk management is part of all training and MDMP.
67	Prior to OIF, the training preparation for ARNG units (especially Aviation) mobilizing was extensive. Wartime exigencies and the availability of equipment (helicopters) has had an inverse impact on post mobilization training. Aviators, for example, may not have flown their aircraft for protracted periods of time prior to arrival in theater and have not practiced the tough tasks in limited visibility.

COMMENT NO.	PLEASE PROVIDE ANY OTHER GENERAL COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE:
68	Q12: In the military I don't think we accept that accidents will occur. But, the reality in what we do, where and when we do it, equipment used and understanding that our mission is often to assure the lack of safety of others (as in close with and kill the enemy) creates a unique safety environment.
69	Safety is a priority in theater of operations (Iraq).
70	Safety is one of those things that require constant reinforcement and emphasis at all levels of leadership. Soldiers will do what their leaders do and what their leaders check. Discipline is the key.
71	Safety is preached at the senior leadership level. However, at the company grade level, and probably battalion and brigade, the OPSTEMPO is so furious that commanders do not have time to take all the safety precautions they should. All resources are adequate, except time.
72	Safety personnel should a dedicated function and not treated as an additional duty. They should be assigned down to battalion level as part of the personal staff of all commanders.
73	Synthetic trainers are an essential to enhance combat readiness.
74	This is the second and final time I will take this survey.
75	Too much reliance on technology to prevent accidents and too little attention given to leadership responsibilities at all levels.
76	We all must realize the OPSTEMPO is higher for all commands than anytime in my 36 years of Service.
77	We should concentrate on never ever having any tiered readiness concepts applied within the total force. Merge the US Army Reserve and the National Guard. Make the entire reserve force dual missioned. Call it the National Guard. This consolidates resources and the bulk of your responsive units in the Reserve Components are in the National Guard. Fund the full-time manning model for the National Guard and we can maintain and sustain the war-fight along side the Active Duty as a full partner in the total force.
78	We spend a great amount of time and effort trying to reduce service member accidents when they are off duty and in the civilian environment. While it is a worthwhile goal, changing our people's habits and lifestyles off duty is unlikely. We should focus more energy on reducing accidents in the environment we can control and really integrate risk assessment as both a top down and bottom up process and hold people accountable for it before accidents occur.
79	We spend lots of time talking about safety and very little getting it done. For nearly 20 years I've asked about seat belts and roll bars for five ton trucks that carry troops. There has been lots of talk and some engineering but the system is still the same as the one I had in 1985 as a battalion commander when my unit rolled its first truck.

COMMENT NO.	PLEASE PROVIDE ANY OTHER GENERAL COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE:
80	What are the current consequences for leaders (E5-O8) who have poor safety records in their units?
81	A reduction of accidents by 50 percent is simply not achievable and therefore, robs the program of credibility. The most common accidents involve very young adults in private vehicles, which can not be reduced by such a high percentage. This is clear to everyone.
82	Any emphasis on safety seems to be directly influenced by the nature/mission of the organization. For example, a MACOM headquarters appears to be less concerned about local safety than, perhaps, a tactical maneuver unit. The risks are certainly different, but the value of personnel assigned and the costs to the organization of accidents is the same. Safety gets more attention when there is an accident and is less of a focal point when there are no accidents.
83	As a commander, I am adamant about risk management analysis preceding everything we do ... big and little, short-term and long-term. It needs to be a way of thinking and deciding a deliberate and formal process. The formal part is the thinking process, not the format form should follow function. The key thing is to be risk aware. Q12 expresses a sentiment that drives me crazy. What we do is dangerous, but accidents are not inevitable. It comes down to understanding the risk, mitigating to the degree possible and then making a deliberate decision about whether the potential good outweighs the risk.
84	Being a soldier is inherently dangerous work. From jumping out of aircraft to working out daily, soldiers run the risk of being injured. We can not eliminate these dangers, however, we can conduct a comprehensive risk assessment before undertaking each task. For example, when a helicopter crashes because of poor visibility or other inclement weather, you have to wonder why it was flying in the first place. Was it mission essential to fly at that time or could the mission have been accomplished without unreasonably risking the lives of many soldiers/contractors? When soldiers drive tankers on snow/ice covered roads or hard pack and one of them rolls over, you have to ask the same question as stated in the example above. BLUF: It gets down to the leadership conducting a risk assessment that values the safety of those assigned to their care and insisting that the standard be reinforced up and down the chain of command.
85	Continue to upgrade and simplify the risk assessment process. I recommend a small laminated card for leaders on the risk assessment process, a checklist.
86	For an Army Reserve soldier, thinking through safety beyond safety in training is a difficult task. Programs like inspection of private vehicles, other than inspection stickers required by installations (which are not safety type inspections at all, just proof of ownership and insurance) are impossible for the reserve forces. Auto crash is the biggest issue we have other than accidents brought on by battle.
87	I continue to be suspicious of statistics with small numbers, especially when the base population--my command--numbers its constituents in the thousands.

COMMENT NO.	PLEASE PROVIDE ANY OTHER GENERAL COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE:
88	My biggest concern is that safety and risk assessment may be afterthoughts that are addressed, but that soldiers sense leaders are merely checking the box. Indeed, we have not been conditioned to truly put safety first. Do we, the collective Army, really embrace that we can consistently mitigate accidents or do we believe that they are inherent in the risky business of life and that we are in a hazardous profession that will experience accidents? Does our mind agree that repetition of a thought process will truly reduce accidents? If it is to do that, we must start earlier in careers and be more consistent, as leaders grow into more senior leaders. I also feel, in the Army Reserve, that DRC MSC's should not be part of an Regional Readiness Command's safety program, but should have their own budget and allocation of other safety resources. Otherwise, you have a split...not in responsibility, so much, but the MSC commander must ask for resources and does not have dedicated personnel beyond TPU ADSO's.
89	No matter how often or how hard we push safety, POV accidents will continue to challenge our ability to influence safety in our formations. Soldiers who are young men and women are aggressive and we cannot enforce their behavior once they are out of our bases and off duty. In the reserve components our ability to influence is even less.
90	Reduce speed, wear seatbelts, and don't drive under the influence.
91	Require Reserve Component leaders to check for seatbelt wear by soldiers leaving reserve centers and armories.
92	Some feel there can be a paradox from over-focus on accident prevention that can lead to a less safe environment. Accentuate the positive such as in motor transport operations rewarding accident free miles for both units and drivers can pay big benefits if properly administered. Positive preventive actions to preclude incidents across a spectrum of negative actions (including safety) should be part of every leader's command philosophy.
93	The Army risk assessment and commanders training programs are great. The online test as a safety update briefing is great.
94	We need more online classes and self assessment dealing with safety across all Services lines.
95	As long as we count sports injuries that occur off the job but on post as part of command injuries, we will not greatly reduce injuries. A sprained ankle obtained in a basketball game after work can be counted as a lost time injury.
96	I am in an R&D organization that uses a lot of hazardous materials and equipment that can be dangerous to operate if not handled appropriately. There is no organized safety review process in my directorate other than that which I instituted myself, without any higher direction. I am sure that if a serious work-related accident occurred, that would change. However, it should change without an accident. I am pretty certain that safety is not a part of my supervisor's yearly objectives.

COMMENT NO.	PLEASE PROVIDE ANY OTHER GENERAL COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE:
97	In general, there really is a lack of knowledge of safe practices among drivers. In driving, safety is not only determined by the skill of the driver, but also the conditions under which he drives. Many drivers don't know the rules of the road (like where to wait to make a left turn), or that certain conditions demand that they slow down (like rain, night, being tired, on the cell phone). These non-skill oriented topics are at least as important as skill, per se.
98	Increased work tempo equates to increased risk. Ingrained safety practices that soldiers will still accomplish when they are tired and pushed to the limit is key to reducing accidents.
99	Last question is misleading. Yes, we have to accept there will be accidents in our profession because that is reality. That is why we have the risk assessment process we try to mitigate the risk as best we can.
100	My organization is all civilians and consultants. Safety is not the same issue as in a troop environment.
101	Need to ensure adequate funding for incorporating safety rather than having it as an afterthought.
102	Recognizing that statistically zero defects is too high a goal, the goal of 50 percent is reasonable and perhaps achievable. But we want manage our expectation in that even this modest goal is a stretch in today's environment. High OPTEMPO works against this.
103	Safety activities should always be a mandatory expense element.
104	Safety is generally strongly emphasized in the Corps of Engineers. In most Corps offices, it is a fabric of how we do business.. Of course there is always room for improvement in our safety /accident rate. Reducing the incident rate by 50 percent may be imprudent if the existing rate is exceedingly low, say 1 to 2 percent per units of universe used. However, if there is a higher frequency rate, of course the 50 percent target reduction is desirable. The real value of safety programs from my perspectives is: What are we learning from accidents that improves learning and what can be done to keep solid safety practices in the fabric of daily routine of mission execution. In other words, train so that employees/military personnel instinctively go about the execution of their assigned mission in a constant state of good safety awareness.
105	Safety takes a very low priority for the fielding of items, especially during a wartime effort. It needs to be part of the budget process and adequately funded.
106	Thank you for making it concise.
107	The Army does everything right, but bad things still happen to good people.
108	The safety community that I deal with is a dedicated group that tries to get the message across but the message has not yet been institutionalized and it needs to be.

COMMENT NO.	PLEASE PROVIDE ANY OTHER GENERAL COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE:
109	We are losing folks in combat zones to a variety of causes. DoD needs to include that as a first priority followed by asking what are we doing in training and equipping to get at this.
110	Appropriate programs are in place and are actively supported, but it's the errant decision based on incorrect or incomplete understanding of a situation that leads to accidents/injuries that concerns me most. We have got to get better at understanding how people think and how they make decisions. I am currently reading *Sources of Power*'. It is all about how people make decisions and I believe it might hold some keys to intervening in bad decision making. I recommend it. Additionally, we have got to provide opportunities to share experiences. Today's safety environment is much better than the one I grew up in. Today we don't have the aviation accidents I survived earlier in my career. Of course, I learned much from those accidents around me. They helped me recognize and respond much better to certain unsafe situations. I survived in spite of my surroundings because I went to school on others' mistakes. Today we don't have the same environment so our young service members aren't witness (to the same kinds of incidents).
111	I believe we should target specific goals based on specific performance. If command X has a specific safety rate, then goal them to improve to an achievable (but stretch) target, and hold the commander accountable if not achieved, and reward if the goal is met.
112	Considerable attention given to safety of forces in the field, and at posts around the area of responsibility. This is a major concern.
113	Considering the environment we work in on a daily basis, we have an outstanding record for safety. If we could somehow get safety mastered on the liberty side of our lives, it would be a miracle.
114	Don't see how this survey will provide anything of value.
115	Encourage personal heath and fitness. We must find a way to get junior and senior personnel to take responsibility for their physical heath and fitness. The Pentagon culture does not support our Service members physical and mental heath when it comes to stress relief and fitness. Is that the way it is or can we do something to keep our folks safe and healthy?
116	For the big mishaps there is a clear process improvement thread. For the day to day smaller mishaps/stupidity there needs to be a leadership tool that brings our young people into maturity that does not include GMT lectures or slogans. We need to invest in the time and closeness it takes to build our youngest into the young men and women who know what it takes to be responsible with alcohol, driving and sex.
117	I am a Submarine Group Commander, as well as a Navy Region Commander. Need to get internet access to our piers, working the issue but there are a number of stakeholders. Not just a submarine problem, surface ships and Coast Guard commands suffer as well. Safety first.
118	I believe everyone should be held accountable for bringing about safety and not accept accidents/mishaps as things that are going to happen anyway.

COMMENT NO.	PLEASE PROVIDE ANY OTHER GENERAL COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE:
119	I feel that we are making progress. The last few numbers are the hardest to get beyond.
120	I think that when a mishap happens generally there has been a breakdown in the communication flow. To ensure that doesn't happen, leaders need to know and understand that they are also responsible for the education and conduct of their assigned personnel. Leaders need to make sure that the message is clear and then everyone needs to walk to the drumbeat.
121	I'm not sure how this survey can adequately get at what you are trying to discern.
122	In combat, walking across the street in budgeting processes and I presume also in safety there is an acceptable level of risk that we accept through ORM. I am not sure that that message gets to the deck plates with young and invincible sailors/officers. I don't sense it is something that leaps off the five vector mode (yet) so I'm not sure who does teach it in a deliberate manner to young officers and sailors.
123	In the survey, I agree that accidents and mishaps are going to happen in our line of work. Question could imply that we should not drive for zero. Zero should always be the goal...I just am skeptical that given human behavior it is attainable.
124	Leaders get the message. Challenge is to change culture of younger members to take action involving their peers when unsafe personal behavior is witnessed off duty.
125	Lots of good people and experts who are addressing the matter of safety and who care deeply about it. For that I am most appreciative.
126	Many opportunities can be identified by looking at specific epidemiology of injury/accident. Take a look at USMC's athletic trainer program in OCS.
127	Need to ensure all levels understand the tactical necessity for safety first. Cutting corners is a commander's decision, implicit or explicit, executed either thoughtfully or by neglect.
128	Realistically, there will be accidents and mishaps that occur, especially given the dangerous nature of our job in the Armed Services. However, we must not allow ourselves to accept that they will occur. If we strive for anything less than 100% safety, then we have opened the door to compromising the safety mindset that is so important. When mishaps occur, we need to continue to learn from the mistakes of others and apply those lessons to every aspect of our job.
129	Safety is defined too broadly to be of real policy or programmatic utility in driving change. Focus, focus, focus is necessary.
130	Thanks for the opportunity to participate.
131	The fact I'm on a Service staff inside the Pentagon may not provide you with good data upon which to base your results. Safety is rarely a topic of discussion in our day-to-day operations.

COMMENT NO.	PLEASE PROVIDE ANY OTHER GENERAL COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE:
132	These questions are general in nature, and often assume a higher level of knowledge of funding than the respondent may have. I don't have any idea how much we spend on safety, Navy-wide, or in the office arena in the Pentagon. A survey based on general feelings or opinions of the person taking the survey may be of less value, as an opinion about funding levels (as an example) may not be within the individual's knowledge level. You should add a response which says no knowledge or some other opportunity to indicate the person cannot substantively respond to your question.
133	Units and personnel need to be evaluated on their safety performance. Supervisors need to create a non-retribution environment where near misses can be discussed in a formal setting. Supervisors need to create an environment where sufficient sleep, sufficient hydration, proper physical fitness, and a healthy life style is the top priority. Many times it's all about work first and physical fitness is done after hours. Top down driven stressing individual accountability and small unit leadership. Continual need for drunk driving and speeding awareness. Solid vehicle licensing procedures.
134	Vehicular mishaps continue to account for significant loss of life. Programs that assist in addressing vehicular mishaps must be implemented.
135	We are very tuned to operational safety, and rightly so, while our biggest vulnerability is off-duty mishaps.
136	We can get the biggest bang for the buck if we can deglamorize drinking and de-link drinking from driving.
137	We need to have a culture change to hold individuals accountable for their own unsafe actions - even disciplinary action in some cases where warranted.
138	Will be interesting to see if a 50 percent reduction can be achieved by edit.
139	CNI cuts in safety and preventative maintenance programs are putting safety at risk and visibly countering leadership message to troops.
140	DOD needs to improve resourcing of safety initiatives. This includes leadership time commitment as well appropriate funding.
141	For 35 years, each new leadership has strived for improved safety. Everyone pledges to improve safety by a factor of two or more and finds a new way to capture or interpret the statistics. But the actual accomplishment became impossible a long time ago without bringing the enterprise to a halt. Accidents happen and will continue to happen even if we came to work each day and did nothing. In my opinion, we have long since reached the point where mission effectiveness is being reduced without corresponding payback.

COMMENT NO.	PLEASE PROVIDE ANY OTHER GENERAL COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE:
142	Funding should be provided at time goal is assigned. Expecting Services to skim from other budgeted programs does not show DoD leadership commitment to safety. It also sets up decremented programs for future reductions caused by the apparent inability to execute to the levels of budgeted funds.
143	I had to answer neutral on many of the questions. I would have preferred a not applicable response because my job responsibilities and accountabilities do not provide me with the information in which to answer many of the questions.
144	I work in a legal organization, the Office of the General Counsel. Safety is not a very significant issue because there are few if any accidents in our line of work.
145	I work in an R&D organization, largely composed of professional scientists and engineers. Safety is something we are highly conscious of and have been since our entry into our professions. We have long since reached the point where only marginal improvements in safety are achievable since the safety record is already so low. As usual DoD is applying a standard to the whole organization that is only appropriate to a portion.
146	In the almost 60 years at the Naval Research Laboratory there has been only two quite minor safety issues.
147	It is terrific to see this attention to safety as evidenced by devoting a survey such as this to safety.
148	More widespread use of operational risk management and similar techniques would improve the safety of operations.
149	Safety is best handled through operational risk management processes. Increasing training and awareness in methods of risk assessment and the resulting improved judgment would go a long way towards creating better understanding, decision making, and resultant risk mitigation.
150	Safety is one of many competing priorities. We need to show the cost value of safety, by following the money. Showcase the cost implications primary and secondary of not paying attention to safety.
151	Safety is very broad. Safety in our own office work space is one avenue and we seem to be subjected to less than satisfactory sanitary conditions (specifics include chronically blocked up toilets and rodents in our buildings). Safety in what we are responsible to accomplish - managing ship construction and maintenance is clearly paramount. We budget and allocate personnel billets to insure submarines and ships go to sea. Funding is implicit in our way of doing business.
152	Some DoD activities are very focused on improving safety. However, in general, there appears to be little enthusiasm for spending additional resources to achieve an improved safety environment.

COMMENT NO.	PLEASE PROVIDE ANY OTHER GENERAL COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE:
153	This survey did not offer the reply "No comment" so I worry that a neutral response can be misinterpreted.
154	We find the DoD goal of 50 percent reduction in safety accidents and mishaps unacceptable. There should be zero tolerance. That is our benchmark. Further, we feel strongly that both supervisor and employee be held accountable for accidents/mishaps.
155	We will not make any headway unless we put commitment and resources behind the effort. Telling people to be safe is not enough! We have been doing that for years and the results are not impressive!
156	When we don't adequately fund our engineering work, safety issues increase.
157	A 50 percent reduction is doable. We just need to demand higher standards of ourselves and those we work with and those who we lead.
158	Anyone who says decreasing the DoD accident and mishap rate by 50 percent over the next 2 years is achievable is saying we have a really abysmal program now, which is not true. Improvements are always possible, of course.
159	Arbitrary goals like the 50 percent goal are good to get people to pay attention, but how we achieve that goal, and what is said if we do not achieve it will tell the field much about how the leadership appreciates their effort.
160	Build an acceptable glide slope of change in the accident rate that puts a tough, but achievable goal in front of the troops. In that manner they have something to strive for. Our current program has turned them all off.
161	Commanders understand they are their organization's safety officer. However, they need professional assistance with developing, implementing and overseeing safety programs.
162	Common sense, coupled with active ORM, is critical. That's the message to get to the troops at all levels, especially in combat.
163	Continue to emphasize that improved safety is a result of involvement by all levels of leadership and members of units/organizations.
164	Establishing a goal of cutting mishaps by 50 percent in 2 years without any substantial evidence that this can be done, and without any realistic program to achieve that goal is an exercise in futility. When the goal is not achieved, it will very possibly be deemed a failure of leadership. This may be true but it will not be a failure to perform by the service leadership. Rather it will be a failure to set realistic goals by those who established the goal, with no more planning or follow-up than make it so.
165	I am firmly convinced our people, across the board, care about safety and work diligently to make it a central element of their lifestyle and work habits.

COMMENT NO.	PLEASE PROVIDE ANY OTHER GENERAL COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE:
166	I believe we as senior leaders do a better job of talking about safety than living it or enforcing it.
167	I responded neutral to many of the questions since they ask about leadership and I am the leadership in my organization. Also, some aren't very applicable since I'm in a NATO organization with many international members. The US DoD is not the driver for our organization.
168	It's important to provide realistic goals 50 percent is hard and may set the bar too high. What we do is inherently more dangerous than most civilian jobs, we should set our own benchmarks versus comparing our activity to other organizations without similar tasks.
169	Just saying cut mishaps by 50 percent doesn't work. It implies that we were not doing all we could to be safe before. And if that is what people thought, they should tell us how to be safer not what number to shoot for.
170	Make goals reasonable. If they are seen as patently unrealistic, the troops on the ground won't take the program seriously.
171	Mandate seat belts for bus passengers.
172	Need to fund needed upgrades (wiring, airframe.) to old aircraft that we've decided to keep past their designed lifespan.
173	On-duty safety is worked hard and largely successful within the AF. Off-duty safety is a harder issue. It provides less oversight opportunities, but is a bigger issue. I think incentivizing good organizational off-duty safety records with cash or time-off awards to individuals might have merit, but will take some real thought and trial to find what works.
174	Our safety people are normally dedicated, but they get lousy support from leadership. Under this scenario, all they are ever viewed as is something akin to the IG just another agency to be tolerated not embraced.
175	Q12 could be better stated. Better said, we have to accept that accidents and mishaps may occur in our line of work. It is our obligation to minimize them as much as possible. We should be working to achieve a zero accident/mishap rate.
176	Q12 is a bit misleading. In the flying business, accidents and mishaps will continue because we are talking about machines that will fail and humans in difficult environments. That doesn't imply that I don't think we can do anything about it and ought to give up improving our safety record. Nothing could be further from the truth. I just realize that it will never be zero.
177	Q12: Some accidents will occur no matter how much we aim to prevent them completely.

COMMENT NO.	PLEASE PROVIDE ANY OTHER GENERAL COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE:
178	Question #4: The answer is yes but. For example, in the USAF if a unit crashes an aircraft and the investigation finds fault with leadership the commander can be relieved. Question #7: We can influence some accidents and mishaps within 2 years but not all. For example, sports and recreation , private motor vehicles we can influence in the short term by leadership involvement, training and mentoring. However, with aircraft mishaps our changes will take longer to see the impact. In aircraft mishaps there is no low hanging fruit - programs like Military Flight Operations Quality Assurance (MFOQA) will greatly improve safety but not within the next 2 years. Question #9: This not the correct way to approach the problem. The IG is asking the Services to show best practices but have not defined what is meant by best practices. Without a proper definition, the answers from the Services will be all over the map and greatly decrease the value of the effort.
179	In reference to the 50 percent reduction in accident and mishap rates, I believe rates are so low now that a 50 percent reduction is unachievable. I will do my best to get there though and hope I am surprised.
180	Risk exists; it can be managed. Accidents do happen, but they can be prevented.
181	Risk is a part of military operations. Operational risk management and mitigation of risk is the best avenue to attack operational safety issues. If we attempt to eliminate risk, or give the impression that we are attempting to eliminate risk, we will loose credibility with our force. Military operations are inherently dangerous, our obligation as leaders is to provide the best equipment, training, and leadership possible to mitigate the risks we can and accept those we can't.
182	Safety can be seen as the intelligent use of planning, engineering, training, manning and facilities. These factors must be balanced so that one does not cancel the effect of another and so that one is not excessively funded to no effect. The assumption of risk must be both overtly considered and stated. This is so that deviations from what commanders have already accepted are both recognized and either overtly accepted by the commander whose organization surfaced the problem or forwarded to the next level of command for decision. Such specificity would broaden the practice of operational risk management into risk management, precisely what DoD does, much more unconsciously than it should.
183	Safety is not about a management issue, it is a leadership issue.
184	Services have emphasized safety for many years, with significant reductions. Achieving additional reductions to meet the 50 percent reduction goal may therefore be difficult. We should celebrate those reductions that we do in fact realize and not consider our efforts a failure if we do not meet a specific numerical goal.

COMMENT NO.	PLEASE PROVIDE ANY OTHER GENERAL COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE:
185	Some comment with regard to some of the questions. Question #4: Do not think you can rate someone based on their safety record. I think you should look at their safety record but must take it in context. As an example, just because a base has a motorcycle accident does not mean they have a poor motorcycle safety program. The base could be doing everything perfectly, and sometimes things just happen. Or individuals make a deliberate decision not to follow rules, guidelines, good techniques, or common sense. Question #7:. Mishap rates can be decreased by 50 percent in the next 2 years but at what cost? You can make statistics say anything you want them to. DoD must continue to get the word out, keep talking about how to be safe in all operations, both on and off duty, and follow up with good procedures and solid techniques. Question #9:. Best practices are not the best way to incorporate change. A best practice at Base X might not work at all at Base Y. Share the best practice, but let the decision be made at the local level.
186	Thanks for asking these questions.
187	Thanks for taking this on; a critical subject.
188	The 50 percent reduction in safety incidents is unrealistic and does not give the Services credit for the huge improvement in safety that we have already achieved over the last few years. We are in an inherently dangerous occupation. While that does not mean we should accept unsafe tactics or procedures, setting a 50 percent reduction goal is more likely to generate creative paperwork to show improvement than real substantive improvements.
189	There is no credibility in mandates from on high to reduce mishap and accident rates without thought and action being given as to what resources are required to make it possible.
190	There should be a major DoD campaign that addresses excessive drinking and provides incentives to moderate such habits.
191	Too many people are still being seriously injured through intoxication.
192	Unachievable goals not based on science are potentially worse than no goals. If people don't believe they are relevant they will be ignored and, consequently, so will the entire safety program. Building a culture of safety should be the objective. Programs such as the AF Wingman program where senior leadership sets the example and gets visibly involved will make much more headway than any DoD goal could achieve.
193	We are making progress all the while fighting the global war on terrorism.
194	We drive the mission so hard that people take extraordinary measures to accomplish the mission and put themselves at risk. A lot of the time they are not even aware of the risk they are taking. People are our most valued resource yet we turn a blind eye to the risk they take as long as the mission gets done. Funding for safety related initiatives/training is one of the first things we cut. In the long run it ends up costing us more.

COMMENT NO.	PLEASE PROVIDE ANY OTHER GENERAL COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE:
195	We need to continue to share best practices between Services.
196	We work very hard to emphasize and enable at safe behavior both on duty and off duty, for both military members and their families and our Air Force civilians and families. We work with our DoD schools to keep kids making good decisions. Our mishap rate is near zero so it works for duty behavior but our vehicle accident rate is terrible. There appear to be two common factors with accidents: alcohol, and fatigue. No one likes to admit they are experiencing chronic fatigue, but that combined with a single drink sets them up for disaster.
197	We're serious about safety, but not enough to put real money behind it.
198	While I applaud the SecDef initiative to slash safety mishaps by 50 percent within 1 year, that may not be a realistic goal. Also, what is the baseline being used for comparative purposes. Is this baseline definition the same for each service? (It isn't.) We need lasting solutions, not just 1 year's worth. Permit me a tangential comment: we should also be pushing to eliminate long-term risks...like tobacco use. In 15 years, those related medical bills will consume our budgets!
199	Wording of some questions may lead to skewed results. For example, implementing best practices may be effective at increasing safety, but may not be a most effective way to bring about change. I laud the effort to get leadership thoughts on safety.
200	You need to have a category don't know, or N/A. As it is, if a person has no knowledge about the area of a question, they have to make a declarative statement, hence, the survey instrument is fundamentally flawed.
201	I answered this survey once before. I hope my response was not lost the first time or that this response is a double counter. If so the results will be in error.
202	I apologize if I've missed any deadline. I'm deployed in theater and only check my AMC email address sporadically.
203	We need to have the ability to have universal or joint safety programs in organizations that are Joint and are populated by personnel from different Services. Currently, we are required to have as many safety programs as we have different personnel, causing the programs to be diluted and less effective than if we could leverage safety programs.
204	Our people are working harder and harder. The average experience level of the force seems to be decreasing; requirements have been gradually increasing over time with seldom any decrease to the work load. The ever increasing OPSTEMPO will need to be reversed to improve our mishap rate.
205	Our people will pay attention to what we pay attention to. Those units with successful safety programs have well defined metrics and set improvement goals. DoD higher headquarters tends to react to poor safety statistics with a short term fix it now mentality. We need to be more proactive and long haul in our approach.

COMMENT NO.	PLEASE PROVIDE ANY OTHER GENERAL COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE:
206	Safety awareness has to be part of the Air Force culture, right from basic training activities and on. Reinforcement at all levels of command with greater regularity will instill an improved working environment.
207	Safety offices at ANG units need increased manpower to support multitude of safety issues. Especially overtasked is the ground safety manager. He/she is responsible for a vast array of safety programs. It is impossible to adequately do the job, insure the wing is following all compliance issues, and instill a safety culture wing wide with one full time individual. Same manpower we had 20 years ago but programs have greatly expanded. Procedures to handle a ground Class A accident need emphasis. Procedures are very clear when it is an aircraft Class A but a different sense of urgency from the safety center and HQ safety office when it's a ground Class A. Either way, ground or air, a fatality is a fatality!
208	Today is the only day that matters, yesterday's records and tomorrow's worries are not important, just today.
209	Yes, the safety climate is superb. In the ANG fighter community, we are extremely pleased with our record of safety, but don't think about anything less than a complete emphasis on the program. I believe it always must remain our highest priority program and we can never cut corners in our training. Our seriousness will keep us out of trouble in the war zone. Perhaps more realistic training camps for such things as convoy procedures would be good. Also, continue to emphasize the physical training program for all of us. Good physically fit personnel are needed to keep standards high.
210	Resources are always tight, and safety may be one of the areas that is not always funded appropriately in a constrained world.
211	You can't walk the walk without learning to talk the talk. Formal training is important to enable our leaders and managers to talk safety programs and practices in a convincing manner. Leaders need to talk safety every day every chance they get in order to convince people that compliance with all regulations, instructions, and technical orders is indeed mandatory, and that any accident/mishap is unacceptable. I loved my people and I loved my airplanes and I truly didn't want to see either get hurt on my watch. That I was successful is the greatest accomplishment of my career. I'd rather be lucky than good any day, but was it luck or attention to detail? Or, a little of both! To reduce the accident rate by 50 percent in that short a period of time will require a lot of both and some money for training.
212	Do not take a stick approach to safety. There must be as much carrot as stick.
213	Doing more, faster, over a prolonged period of time with less drives is a formula for safety problems. I don't think you can have it both ways.
214	Measures like a 50 percent improvement are meaningless out of context, maybe it should be 75 percent, or maybe 20 percent is all that can be hoped for within realistically achievable levels of funding.

COMMENT NO.	PLEASE PROVIDE ANY OTHER GENERAL COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE:
215	Rate commanders on their safety knowledge and how it is implemented within their command.
216	The AF has placed great emphasis in improving our safety record recently. Unfortunately that has been triggered by increases in accidents and mishaps.
217	The Air Force's Wingman Day was a top notch effort that addressed the issues of suicide, safety and other issues that are stress factors. This effort should provide a good model for others to investigate.
218	This is a really stupid survey!
219	This is an important survey, and I hope the results are shared with the Services. It's my belief that supervisors have no idea of the cost of unsafe activities/operations in the workplace. For example, supervisors don't see the impact of workers' compensation costs or a consistent roll-up of lost work days across the supervised workforce. We treat military and civilians differently. We know the on and off duty accidents for our Airmen, but don't track the same for the civilian workforce. Until individual supervisors are held accountable, any goal won't be met. The goal should be zero accidents... it's achievable. You can't put a dollars and cents cost/benefit on it, especially if we're talking a human life.
220	A 50 percent reduction within a couple of years is unachievable. Good men have been working hard at this for a long time. If it were easy we would already be having far fewer accidents and mishaps. DoD should set a lofty but reasonable goal, after analysis of the data, and then build on the momentum of achieving same. What is our branch plan? What are our actions if / when we don't achieve our 50 percent goal?
221	All services have been conducting safety programs for many years, and all are well ahead of the national average of reducing accidents. Although an admirable goal, reducing all Services accident and mishap rates by 50 percent during major deployments supporting the global war on terrorism, is challenging at best. History shows where accidents and mishaps increase after every major contingency. Today's deployments only reinforce this. The best result that will come out of this effort will be to have all Services share common safety practices that do make a difference (there is no cookie cutter). The accidents and mishaps are coming down, but not down to the 50 percent reduction goal.

COMMENT NO.	PLEASE PROVIDE ANY OTHER GENERAL COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE:
222	Any complex activity with demanding physical tasks, use of machinery, and done by people (from individuals to large groups), especially one that trains for combat in uncertain environments, will be inherently more risky than typical industrial activities. When I say we have to accept that accidents and mishaps will occur in our line of work (war-fighting is the business here, supported by several industrial and business-like processes), it is not to say that we must simply accept that there are no safer ways to conduct training, exercises and operations. And it certainly does not accept that off-duty accidents and mishaps are not preventable. It only means that some level of accidents and mishaps, particularly given our line of work and the demographics and geographics of our populations, is a fact of the human condition. We need DoD-wide consistent training programs, including leader mentorship of juniors, to increase safe practices in planning and execution of activities at the individual as well as group level.
223	Changing our young Marines' attitude that they are not always invincible remains a challenge. While we need this attitude in combat, we need to temper this view particularly with off-duty activities. They need to slow down while on the road and think about the unintended consequences of their actions.
224	Dictating a 50 percent reduction rate for accidents in DoD is not realistic.
225	Don't mistake the US Military for a business. Don't try and apply across the board civilian best business practices to what we do. There are so many examples in the past that often indicate civilian rules don't apply. What many of us do is inherently dangerous, and inefficient when compared to a business. Additionally, the civilian leadership may want to consider listening to the service leadership on this and many other issues.
226	Military training and operations are inherently dangerous. It takes extraordinary efforts to maintain a safe environment and to drive the accident rate to the lowest possible number. Coupled with the young age of our force and the sense of invulnerability associated with young folks, this effort takes constant attention. Budget pressures have second and third order effects on our safety challenges, often delaying safer environments simply because the dollars aren't available against the backdrop of war-fighting priorities.
227	None.
228	I'm not sure the 50 percent mishap reduction is based upon scientific data. I do believe that we can do much better than we currently do. It needs to start at entry level training for both officers and enlisted. As we have said in the past, safety is not paramount, rather it is inherent in everything we do. That is a culture change that will take time, but I do believe those seeds have been planted. At least in the Marine Corps. Also I believe that having full time safety officers at ground battalions and brigades/regiments is an idea whose time has come. Just like the aviation community. That however needs to come with new structure, not from existing or as a collateral duty as we presently do.

COMMENT NO.	PLEASE PROVIDE ANY OTHER GENERAL COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE:
229	Properly resource commanders to implement an effective training program, personnel, funding, training, and career progression.
230	Reducing DoD accident and mishap rate by 50 percent over 2 years is an absolutely arbitrary and a terrible goal regardless of who set it.
231	Safety as a performance metric especially in terms of fitness reports is little more than a sentence in the fitness report. If we want to make safety important, make actual results of safety programs, initiatives, improvements a required entry in the fitrep not a trite sentence but actual performance data that can help selection boards judge the leadership potential of a candidate.
232	Safety programs are best when they are unique to commands and when they are driven bottom up. Services and commands and missions drive different OPSTEMPO, PERSTEMPO and safety challenges. It is well and good to share best of breed ideas and successes, but safety is not a one size fits all. We should encourage command attention and supervision without forcing safety billet and/or program creation.
233	Safety programs tend to get stale over time. We need to constantly evolve strategies and processes. Human dynamics are at the heart of most accidents and safety programs may fix an immediate problem but often fail in time. There are however specific, industrial processes that are an exception and do require menu-driven standards but these are the exceptions.
234	Safety starts at the top but quickly is delegated to lower levels. The problem is, senior leadership steps back when execution of the safety programs reach the lower levels. The only time the young Marines see the top echelons of the leadership chain involving safety issues, is during safety stand downs. Safety has to become a cultural issue. For now, it is treated like a nuisance. Something that has to be done, but is taking away precious training time we would rather not spend commit to.
235	Setting top down arbitrary goals that span the full range of various service demographics and operational scenarios is not particularly helpful. For example, some Services are fully engaged in combat operations (USA and USMC) and stressful deployment cycles while the other services are in a more business as usual mode. Comparing the very different Services against the same flawed statistical metrics simply diverts attention from each Service's legitimate safety objectives.
236	Setting unrealistic goals detracts from the safety program. A 50 percent reduction is extremely unrealistic. The Services do not have the resources, manpower, money, or schools, to achieve this standard. How much has the DoD safety budget been cut over the last 3 year? Set achievable goal, I want to see a decrease in automobile accidents this calendar year. Finally, how does the accident record of DoD compare to the US national accident rate?
237	Some accidents/mishaps will continue to occur in the military just due to the nature and complexity of our environment. However, I believe that we can certainly do more to prevent them.

COMMENT NO.	PLEASE PROVIDE ANY OTHER GENERAL COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE:
238	Some of the questions can not be answered so simplistically.
239	The Marines that we recruit are by nature those individuals who like adventure and if they were not in the Marine Corps would likely be involved in high risk sports or jobs. Safety is often viewed as risk avoidance. Marines do not buy that. Operationally, we mitigate risk through planning and preparation prior to execution. We are trying to instill this on duty risk mitigation in our force 24 hours a day. Our day to day lives are full of hazards. We can only reduce accidents and injury by recognizing the hazards and mitigating the risk in those areas that we control. I believe our non-commissioned officers' leadership program is making a difference in bringing those actions to fruition. I would only add that as we look at best practices across the Services we must be careful to recognize that each service is unique and an action that is working in one may not necessarily be effective across the force. The cookie cutter must be avoided if we are going to effect change and meet the mishap reduction.
240	There remains an attitude that when we go to war, the rules don't apply. That's why, at least in the case of aircraft, we crash more than get shot down. In relation to ground mishaps, this applies to how vehicles are operated. Easy to see this when looking at the mishap rates of newly deployed units. While I believe senior leadership is committed to safety, the commitment is not open ended. In times of tight resources, we still do not bite the bullet and pay the safety bill. It takes people, money and time, all in short supply. When we properly resource safety, then that will be when we make real dents in the mishap rate. And I don't mean creating large bureaucratic organizations; it is investing in training, equipment and time.
241	While it is important to hold leaders accountable, we must make sure we keep the proper balance of safety and realism in training and operations. Intimidation is the wrong answer. Accountability is the right answer, but we must give leaders the tools and training for accountability.
242	Accidents will happen, but they should not be repeat events. Safety is an attitude that must continually be "reinvented" to avoid complacency
243	The culture needs to start at day one at Officer Candidate School and boot camp. Funding must be adequate and easy to access for safety programs. We need to make safety officer and senior enlisted safety billets high visibility and sought after in terms of avenues for future promotion.
244	Other than the question about whether an annual safety goal is established, I am not sure how much value there is in the survey since I found some of the questions to be of the motherhood and apple pie variety. In my organization, while there is no formal safety goal set locally, our leadership is forever reminding the staff and managers of the importance of safe practices and care of the workforce. I do know that as a headquarters organization, safety is very much in the forefront of thought of our leadership, especially to mishaps in the operational forces where the incidence and likelihood are more likely to occur.

COMMENT NO.	PLEASE PROVIDE ANY OTHER GENERAL COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE:
245	Safety within DoD is hard. We are a mission-oriented organization. No matter how much time and effort we put forward to provide leadership, schedule safety stand downs, and training, accidents will happen. It is especially difficult in this period with the high OPTEMPO and global war on terror. We are expending a lot of effort. Unfortunately, I don't believe we are achieving the desired results commensurate with our effort.
246	Accidents are always something that happens to the other person. The average DoD employee has no idea of the frequency or cost of accidents. A continual education program would certainly help.
247	Accidents cannot be completely taken out of the equation, given the nature and complexity of the DoD mission and environment. The operative word should be risk management, balancing the probability of an accident or safety factor with the impact to adequately balance and manage the risk.
248	Being on the OSD staff here in the Pentagon, I don't recall hearing about a serious accident or other safety related incident. I am sure there are safety related incidents and accidents here. But in an office environment, we rarely think about such things, and given the press of urgent business, I would be surprised if it came to the attention of senior leadership either.
249	Creating measures that were consistent across the Services/Agencies is imperative if we are to truly know what programs are working and which to benchmark as a best practice.
250	Funding and personnel resource for safety programs are historically underrepresented in budgets. If the Department is serious about safety programs then it should commit resources towards them.
251	I answered the questions from perspective of being from the DoD IG. I'm not sure how relevant the questions were to our function. I answered neutral in a lot of cases because I wasn't sure of the applicability.
252	I completed an extensive survey on safety from Personnel and Readiness, not sure why I need to do this one too.
253	I find this survey difficult. It is hard to tell the bounds of safety in your short questions. I was once a Navy pilot and I know a good deal about aviation safety and Navy safety in general. It was hard to tell what safety in DoD meant in this questionnaire. If it meant my organization, it meant the office environment of a government bureaucracy, unless it meant the entire DoD. It could mean vehicle safety, aircraft safety, safety within the Pentagon, or lots of undefined things. I now work on the Defense budget so professionally find it hard to offer opinions on the adequacy of funding. By definition, to a budget person, whatever the level of funding is adequate. Accordingly, I meant a neutral response to signify I don't know enough information to offer an opinion.

COMMENT NO.	PLEASE PROVIDE ANY OTHER GENERAL COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE:
254	I work in an office environment and my organization has no direct responsibility for safety policy. I consider our work environment to be relatively safe. Reasonable precautions are taken to ensure the safety of our workforce.
255	I've never been trained on safety and it has never been a part of any performance standard in any job I've ever had.
256	Let's get the force right-sized for the mission. People are getting killed because we have under-manned the missions in DoD.
257	My job is to supervise people who work at desks. Our safety issues are not great, particularly as compared to those of the folks in the Services.
258	We need more specific goals and objectives to meet the overarching goal of the SecDef, and more senior level involvement.
259	On Question 12, I want to clarify, that in our office environment, accidents and mishaps should not happen, or should be minimized through effective training and attention to appropriate safety precautions. However, in "our line of work" being the US military, it is an inherently dangerous job, and even with the best preventative measures, accidents/mishaps occur.
260	Our work and environment is not hazardous and routine is structured to include safety.
261	Safety has received considerable attention in my agency and we have shown considerable improvement during the past year.
262	Safety has to be included in the organization's strategic plan and resources should be programmed to support the safety objectives. Safety needs to be an operations effort, not just lip service. A safety program that prevents one accident or saves one life is worth the time, effort, and expense of the program. We need to get serious about safety from the top down!
263	Safety is very important because it deals with our most important and expensive resource--the organization's personnel.
264	Safety issues seem pretty removed from day-to-day activities in the OSD office environment. Maybe some background regarding the kinds of safety issues we face would be a useful motivator to understand the safety issues.
265	The current high PERSTEMPO and OPTEMPO has contributed to the accident rates.

COMMENT NO.	PLEASE PROVIDE ANY OTHER GENERAL COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE:
266	There are two elements to safety: 1. Workplace changes to reduce the number of routine accidents like people falling off ladders. 2. Workplace hardening to protect against terrorism like truck bombs. Our agency has an office style of work environment, so routine accidents are minimal and I don't perceive that any increased attention is warranted. But our building is vulnerable to terrorists and our mission makes us a potential target. It's not clear to me who is responsible for improving the situation nor how much would be an appropriate increase in budget to remediate the problem to some degree nor how we could obtain such funds given that we are a non-appropriated activity.
267	This seems like a rather pointless survey.
268	This survey could have used an I don't know or N/A column.
269	This survey is so innocuous as to be virtually meaningless.
270	This survey is totally inappropriate for a DoD policy office in the Pentagon.
271	This survey seems to imply that there is a problem that needs fixing. I don't believe we have any such problems in the Missile Defense Agency.
272	We work in an office environment. Therefore, some of the safety issues regarding large machinery don't exist. However, we do have civilian personnel deployed in Baghdad and Kuwait. Our policy has been that personal safety in these areas override mission when there are security issues. We have people take every precaution to assure that people understand where there are safe and unsafe areas to travel, and travel is accomplished with a military escort.
273	When personnel shortages are created due to budget cuts, dedicated employees who work industrial type work experience fatigue and may be subject to increased accidents.
274	Safety is a leadership issue. Balance of safety and realistic training is crucial. Nothing hurts readiness more than loss of personnel or other resources.
275	While it is not possible to prevent all accidents, attention to accident prevention must be constant. It is a shared responsibility between individuals and organizations.

COMMENT NO.	PLEASE PROVIDE ANY OTHER GENERAL COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE:
276	As a Reserve officer, I have always been concerned with the risk involved when soldiers commute to their place of duty during weekend drills. Because the Army does not reimburse soldiers for overnight lodging during independent duty training periods, many are forced to drive to and from their home of record. In many instances these distances exceed 100 miles or more. This driving takes place very early in the morning hours in order to be on time for 7:00 a.m. formations or late in the afternoon after 17:00 final formation. I see this becoming a bigger issue as we move forward with the reorganization of the Army Reserve requiring participating members to drive longer distances in order to find their unit of choice. We must move forward with actions that will allow the Soldier to remain overnight during his independent duty training period.
277	Everything that we do in the uniformed military is inherently risky. As a result, we must ensure that every leader is engaged in risk assessment and risk mitigation for each mission. It is something for which we must be "unconsciously competent". As a senior leader it is a role requirement for me to inspect the risk management plans of my units when I am inspecting training. Troops tend to do well those things which the boss checks. Thanks for soliciting our views and recommendations.
278	No serious command inspection policy improvements have been targeted to safety procedures, except in maintaining paperwork, for over 20 years. A positive command emphasis must be developed in all command environments.
279	Reference Q5: This is a poorly worded question that reflects a lack of understanding of both mission and safety. Mission and safety are not in any way opposing factors. A good safety record is a by-product of doing the mission right the first time. Our operational risk management tools provide a means to ensure this is accomplished. Ref Q7: Beware of accounting changes that make us look like we are achieving this objective, while accomplishing nothing. Ref Q11: Wrong question. We don't need to focus on safety funding. We should adequately fund and man the mission safety will improve.
280	Safety is important, and we must do all we can to reduce or mitigate accidents. My perception is that we are doing that. I see two problems with our current approaches. Safety goals are set, and we beat ourselves up over numbers that are statistically insignificant. This is something you can never say in a public forum, because, of course, every life is precious, and every death or serious accident is, indeed, a tragedy. But, for example, in an organization the size of the Army, when suicides go up from 26 to 32, that's a 23 percent increase. Six soldiers lost to suicide is a tragedy, but six more out of 425,000 is, indeed, statistically insignificant. The second problem has to do with the feeling that, when something happens, we should have done more. The logical extension is that whatever we are doing, it was not effective so we have to have yet another class or other requirement.

COMMENT NO.	PLEASE PROVIDE ANY OTHER GENERAL COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE:
281	The Army's safety program is viable, but we fail to look closely enough at the human factors. Most of our accidents involve motor vehicles operated by young, self confident soldiers who believe wholeheartedly in their own indestructibility. A way to recognize safe drivers and restrict those who do not drive safely, coupled with mandatory advanced safe motor vehicle operations training, may help. Training is often a large factor in accident/incident prevention. Install seat belts in tactical vehicles that extend around soldiers and their individual body amour, camelback and load bearing equipment. Air condition cabs of tactical vehicles to help alleviate fatigue that contributes to unsafe conditions.
282	Too many leaders with motorcycles. Radar detectors in dash where subordinates are able to observe them assume that their leaders routinely and fully intend to speed, break the law. Consider mimicking AF line-of-duty no if deemed legal and appropriate. Train and behave to known standards and competencies. Don't allow at-war-mentality to diminish standards leading to dangerous, cavalier profiles.
283	We must do more as leaders and hold ourselves accountable. One safety day a year is not enough. We must measure (metrics) and reward positive behavior. We must do more to ensure the use of seatbelts, and motorcycle helmets.
284	We need to review how we train people on safety issues. Some processes have not changed in decades. As we get new people in and the older workforce leaves, many will have difficulty adapting to old training methods. Too many people are computer literate, and look for variety in a training scenario.
285	Worthy pursuit, but can not be mandated. We need to get into the root causes.

Appendix K – List of Acronyms

ANG	Air National Guard
ADUSD (ESOH)	Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Environment, Safety, and Occupational Health
CLAIMANT	Major Command (Navy)
COCOM	Combatant Command
DMDC	Defense Manpower Data Center
DoD	Department of Defense
DoD IG	DoD Inspector General
DSOC	Defense Safety Oversight Council
DUSD(R)	Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness
JCS	Joint Chief of Staff
JPDO	Joint Program Development Office
MACOM	Major Command (Army)
MAJCOM	Major Command (Air Force)
NCO	Non-commissioned Officer
NSC	National Safety Council
OIG	Office of Inspector General (DoD)
OPSTEMPO	Operations Tempo
ORM	Operational Risk Management
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
P&R	Personnel and Readiness
PERSTEMPO	Personnel Tempo
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SES	Senior Executive Service
USAREUR	US Army Europe
USD(AT&L)	Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
USD(P&R)	Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness

Appendix L – Definitions

Benchmarking. The process of identifying, learning, and adapting outstanding practices and processes to help an organization improve its performance. Benchmarking gathers the tacit knowledge (the know-how, judgments, and enablers) that explicit knowledge often misses.

Climate. A prevailing condition or set of attitudes.

Compliance. Meeting applicable statutory and regulatory standards, including standards for protection of human health and the environment.

Culture. Set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group, and encompasses art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs.

Percentile score. Expresses the percentage of database organizations with a lower average response score than DoD senior leader survey responses.

Perception. Insight or intuition relative to information introduced through sensory reception. The act of perceiving or being aware of objects or other data through any of the senses. The meaning or interpretation given to stimuli received through the senses.

Prevention. A proactive process that empowers individuals and systems to meet the challenges of life events and transitions by creating and reinforcing conditions that promote healthy behaviors and lifestyles.

Risk management. Process that formalizes procedures for identifying hazards, assessing risks, considering risk control measures, making control decisions, implementing risk controls, and supervising and reviewing.

Safety Barometer. An employee safety perception survey tool created and used by the National Safety Council.

Safety management system. An organized and structured means of ensuring that an organization is capable of achieving and maintaining high standards of safety performance.

Safety program. An administrative and procedural plan for placing loss-prevention and hazard-control systems into operation and maintaining their effectiveness.

Senior Leader. A Flag Officer (O-7 thru O-10) or Senior Executive Service member in the Department of Defense.

World-class. Ranking among the foremost in the world; of an international standard of excellence. The OIG, DoD recommends that, relative to perception surveys, the top 10 percentile be considered world-class (above 90 percent).

Appendix M – Distribution List

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